This rare 10th anniversary edition (published in 2007) contains a new introduction by expert Soviet historian David M. Glantz. In addition all maps and graphics have been enhanced from the 1996 edition. "When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival." (From the original foreword by Hans Binnendijk, 1996)

On first publication, this uncommonly concise and readable account of Soviet Russia's clash with Nazi Germany utterly changed our understanding of World War II on Germany's Eastern Front, immediately earning its place among top-shelf histories of the world war. Revised and updated to reflect recent Russian and Western scholarship on the subject, much of it the authors' own work, this new edition maintains the 1995 original's distinction as a crucial volume in the history of World War II and of the Soviet Union and the most informed and compelling perspective on one of the greatest military confrontations of all time. In 1941, when Pearl Harbor shattered America's peacetime pretensions, the German blitzkrieg had already blasted the Red Army back to Moscow. Yet, less than four years later, the Soviet hammer-and-sickle flew above the ruins of Berlin, stark symbol of a miraculous comeback that destroyed the Germany Army and put an end to Hitler's imperial designs. In swift and stirring prose, When Titans Clash provides the clearest, most complete account of this epic struggle, especially from the Soviet perspective. Drawing on the massive and unprecedented release of Soviet archival documents in recent decades, David Glantz, one of the world's foremost authorities on the Soviet military, and noted military historian Jonathan House expand and elaborate our picture of the Soviet war effort-a picture sharply different from accounts that emphasize Hitler's failed leadership over Soviet strategy and might. Rafts of newly available official directives, orders, and reports reveal the true nature and extraordinary scale of Soviet military operations as they swept across the one thousand miles from Moscow to Berlin, featuring stubborn defenses and monumental offensives and counteroffensives and ultimately costing the two sides combined a staggering twenty million casualties. Placing the war within its wider context, the authors also make use of recent revelations to clarify further the political, economic, and social issues that influenced and reflected what happened on the battlefield. Their work gives us new insight into Stalin's political motivation and Adolf Hitler's role as warlord, as well as a better understanding of the human and economic costs of the war-for both the Soviet Union and Germany. While incorporating a wealth of new information, When Titans Clashed remains remarkably compact, a tribute to the authors' determination to make this critical chapter in world history as accessible as it is essential.

In history guerrilla warfare always played an important role whether it was of a large scale or of a limited character fighting. Grenkevich traces its impact on military history in the 18th and 19th century in Europe and North America. He carefully analyses the Russian partisan movement from the first bloody encounters in the 1870s, taking into account the social, economic and political configurations of Russia. The work details how the Communist Party studied the Red guerrillas' fighting experience at the end of 1918 and included in the Red Army's Field Manual a special chapter named 'Partisan Operations'. During the Second World War the most significant partisan war took place. The relationship between the Party, the Red Army and the Partisan Movements is covered in the main body of Grenkevich's historical research. This study is a response to the lack of a comprehensive bibliography and reliable books on the Partisan Movement. In preparing this research the author conducted interviews with surviving partisans; in addition, a significant amount of new Russian information on the activity of the Soviet partisans has become available in recent years.

In history guerrilla warfare always played an important role whether it was of a large scale or of a limited character fighting. Grenkevich traces its impact on military history in the 18th and 19th century in Europe and North America. He carefully analyses the Russian partisan movement from the first bloody encounters in the 1870s, taking into account the social, economic and political configurations of Russia. The work details how the Communist Party studied the Red guerrillas' fighting experience at the end of 1918 and included in the Red Army's Field Manual a special chapter named 'Partisan Operations'. During the Second World War the most significant partisan war took place. The relationship between the Party, the Red Army and the Partisan Movements is covered in the main body of Grenkevich's historical research. This study is a response to the lack of a comprehensive bibliography and reliable books on the Partisan Movement. In preparing this research the author conducted interviews with surviving partisans; in addition, a significant amount of new Russian information on the activity of the Soviet partisans has become available in recent years.

This volume begins with an investigation of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. It draws upon eye-witness German accounts of what occurred, and supplements these with German archival and detailed Soviet materials. The Soviet government has released extensive amounts of formerly classified archival materials from the period. This material has been incorporated into the maps and text.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as "war of annihilations", "deep battle", and "deep operations" have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as war of annihilations, deep battle, and deep operations have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

This volume begins with an investigation of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. It draws upon eye-witness German accounts of what occurred, and supplements these with German archival and detailed Soviet materials. The Soviet government has released extensive amounts of formerly classified archival materials from the period. This material has been incorporated into the maps and text.

This text is the second of three volumes written by Colonel Glantz on the contribution of intelligence and deception operations to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It examines the area where intelligence and operations overlap; the nature of co-ordination between the two; and the support provided by intelligence to operational planning and execution (or the absence of such support). This is not a study of intelligence work as such, but of how intelligence can improve the chances of success on the battlefield by facilitating the more effective and economical use of troops.

From a world expert on Hitler's war in Russia, this book on the operation that changed the course of World War II includes updated information on casualty numbers and opposing forces Here, David Glantz challenges the time-honored explanation that poor weather, bad terrain, and Hitler's faulty strategic judgement produced German defeat, and reveals how the Red Army thwarted the German Army's dramatic and apparently inexorable invasion before it achieved its ambitious goals. On June 22, 1941 Hitler unleashed his forces on the Soviet Union. Spearheaded by four powerful Panzer groups and protected by an impenetrable curtain of air support, the seemingly invincible Wehrmacht advanced from the Soviet Union's western borders to the immediate outskirts of Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov in the shockingly brief period of less than six months. The sudden, deep, relentless German advance virtually destroyed the entire peacetime Red Army and captured almost 40 percent of European Russia before expiring inexplicably at the gates of Moscow and Leningrad. An invasion designed to achieve victory in three to six weeks failed and, four years later, resulted in unprecedented and total German defeat.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as war of annihilations, deep battle, and deep operations have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

No war has caused greater human suffering than the Second World War on Germany's Eastern Front. Victory in the war cost the Red Army over 29 million casualties, whose collective fate is only now being properly documented. Among the many millions of soldiers who made up that gruesome toll were an unprecedented number of Red Army general officers. Many of these perished on the battlefield or in prison camps at the hands of their German tormentors. Others fell victim to equally terrifying Stalinist repression. Together these generals personify the faceless nature of the war of the Eastern Front - the legions of forgotten souls who perished in the war. Covered up for decades, the saga of these victims of war can now be told and in this volume, A A Maslov begins the difficult process of memorializing these warrior casualties. Using formerly secret Soviet archival materials and personal interviews with the families of the officers, he painstakingly documents the fate of Red Army generals who fell victim to wartime enemy action.

The Soviet Study of War" series examines the lessons Soviet military theorists and commanders learned from the study of their own military experience. These are translations of Soviet documents.

In mid-December 1942, after encircling the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, Soviet forces in southern Russia began a series of offensive operations which continued unabated into February 1943. In these offensives the Soviet High Command attempted to smash German resistance and encircle the bulk of two German army groups. For two months the German forces struck back. In a well co-ordinated counterstroke they inflicted a major operational defeat on the Soviets and stabilized the front until the summer.

First published in 2006. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The Soviet Study of War" series examines the lessons Soviet military theorists and commanders learned from the study of their own military experience. These are translations of Soviet documents.

In mid-December 1942, after encircling the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, Soviet forces in southern Russia began a series of offensive operations which continued unabated into February 1943. In these offensives the Soviet High Command attempted to smash German resistance and encircle the bulk of two German army groups. For two months the German forces struck back. In a well co-ordinated counterstroke they inflicted a major operational defeat on the Soviets and stabilized the front until the summer.

A comprehensive guide to the battle for the Ukraine from the Soviet perspective during the winter of 1943-1944. This volume is an unexpurgated translation of the originally classified Soviet General Staff Study No.14.

This new book is a chronological narrative of the experiences of Evgenii Moniushko, who lived through and survived the first year of the siege of Leningrad and who served as a junior officer in the Red Army during the last eighteen months of war and the first year of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

This volume presents an intensely human view of daily army life both in combat and garrison duty and unique perspectives on the conditions he and other junior officers and common soldiers endured while in army service.

This new book is a chronological narrative of the experiences of Evgenii Moniushko, who lived through and survived the first year of the siege of Leningrad and who served as a junior officer in the Red Army during the last eighteen months of war and the first year of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

This volume presents an intensely human view of daily army life both in combat and garrison duty and unique perspectives on the conditions he and other junior officers and common soldiers endured while in army service.

Armed revolution and civil war gave birth to the Soviet Union, world War II propelled it to global pre-eminence, and the Cold War contributed to the Soviet Union's demise. Given Marxism-Leninism's idological preoccupation with war and threats of war, it is understandable that the spectre of war should play a vital role in the life and fate of the Soviet state. This study of Soviet military strategy is based upon the twin pillars of Soviet political-military actions and Soviet writings on the subject of military strategy. Thanks to the policy of glasnost, it incorporates Soviet materials hitherto unavailable in the West. It aims to be not simply a retrospective account of what was, but to form part of the context for what will be in the future.

This volume offers detailed information about the Red Army's preparation for and conduct of the Battle of Kursk. Prepared by the Red Army General Staff in 1944 from combat reports and other top-secret archive materials, the work is a practical and candid document, which was written to educate the Red Army in the intricacies, demands and pitfalls of modern mobile warefare.

This volume offers detailed information about the Red Army's preparation for and conduct of the Battle of Kursk. Prepared by the Red Army General Staff in 1944 from combat reports and other top-secret archive materials, the work is a practical and candid document, which was written to educate the Red Army in the intricacies, demands and pitfalls of modern mobile warefare.

No war has caused greater human suffering than the Second World War on Germany's Eastern Front. Victory in the war cost the Red Army over 29 million casualties, whose collective fate is only now being properly documented. Among the many millions of soldiers who made up that gruesome toll were an unprecedented number of Red Army general officers. Many of these perished on the battlefield or in prison camps at the hands of their German tormentors. Others fell victim to equally terrifying Stalinist repression. Together these generals personify the faceless nature of the war of the Eastern Front - the legions of forgotten souls who perished in the war. Covered up for decades, the saga of these victims of war can now be told and in this volume, A A Maslov begins the difficult process of memorializing these warrior casualties. Using formerly secret Soviet archival materials and personal interviews with the families of the officers, he painstakingly documents the fate of Red Army generals who fell victim to wartime enemy action.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as "war of annihilations," "deep battle," and "deep operations" have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.