This book provides a ground-breaking assessment of the Israeli national security experience from the establishment of the country through to the present day. Seventy-five years after its establishment, the State of Israel continues to face an acute national security predicament as a result of the still unresolved Arab–Israeli conflict. This monograph offers a new framework for analyzing this experience, first exploring the crucial events of the past and present that define it, including interstate wars, asymmetrical wars, low-intensity conflicts, and developments in weapons of mass destruction. The book then probes how Israel’s evolving national security doctrine has addressed these various challenges over the years, highlighting the roles of a number of variables: deterrence, warning, and decision; strategic depth and defensible borders; the quality and quantity of fighting men and machines; intelligence; self-reliance in military matters; foreign policy; and the influence of ethnic demography, societal resilience, economic prosperity, and water security. Written in accessible, non-technical language, the book will appeal to general readers seeking an introduction to Israeli security, as well as to specialists and researchers in various fields, including Israeli history, Middle Eastern politics, and security studies.

Three outcomes are possible on the battlefield: victory, defeat, or draw. An adversary may defeat or be defeated by its adversary, or neither of the two may emerge victorious or vanquished. Observers of military history have long tried to identify the variables that determine victory, defeat, or draw. While most would certainly acknowledge that decisions on the battlefield are dictated by a combination of variables rather than by a lone circumstance, many observers nevertheless tend to stress a single variable -- for example, the number of fighting men and fighting machines deployed by the adversaries, or the operational doctrines employed by the opposing forces -- as far more significant to the explanations of these decisions than other variables. This book, in contrast, takes a multicausal approach to the question of victory, defeat, or draw, proposing that a combination of six organizational, materiel, and environmental variables are pivotal to the explanation of decision on the battlefield. Using the extensive history of the Israel Defense Forces, the book examines a sample of eight battles across the ArabIsraeli conflict from 1948 to 1982 in order to determine the collective impact of the six variables on the outcomes of these battles, concluding that this basket of variables captures much of the explanation behind victory, defeat, or draw on the battlefield, at least insofar as concerns the record of the IDF. While the research in this book is aimed primarily at military historians and military practitioners, it is fully accessible to any layperson interested in Israeli military history in particular or international military history in general.

The State of Israel faced one of its most difficult challenges during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Though the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) eventually emerged as the clear victor in the war, it suffered serious reverses at the outset of hostilities, as well as substantial losses in men and equipment. This book revisits the Yom Kippur War by exploring a number of issues that have not previously received the attention they deserve or that would benefit from a fresh evaluation. Among the issues examined are: the AmericanIsraeli and JordanianIsraeli relationships during the war; the roles of Israeli nuclear weapons and airpower; the IDFs practice of combined arms warfare; the reasons why the IDF turned the tide of the war more quickly on the Golan front than on the Sinai front; the impact of American arms transfers; and the lessons derived from the war by the United States Army and the IDF. This book, which relies heavily on government documents and other primary sources of information, fills important descriptive and analytical gaps in the academic literature about the Yom Kippur War. No other book compares to it in respect of content and interpretation. It is, in short, essential reading for all scholars interested in the diplomatic and military dimensions of the war.

Combined arms warfare (CAW) -- the integration of different arms on the battlefield (e.g., armor, infantry, artillery, aircraft, and engineers) in order to achieve maximal efficiency there -- is as old as war itself. Every army across both time and space that has engaged in combat has practiced one version or another of CAW, whether consciously or otherwise. The Israel Defenxse Forces (IDF) has been no exception to the rule. This book traces the Israeli experience with CAW from the countrys War of Independence in 194749 (against a coalition of Arab states) through Operation Protective Edge in 2014 (against a coalition of Hamas-led terrorist/insurgent groups). It describes and analyzes the IDFs practice of CAW in each interstate war (IW), asymmetrical war (AW), and low-intensity conflict (LIC) that Israel has fought since the countrys establishment in the mid-twentieth century. The book also highlights the Israeli approach to CAW in respect of special operations (SPEC OPS). With no end in sight to the ArabIsraeli conflict, and with further hostilities between Israel and its neighbors virtually assured in the future, Combined Arms Warfare in Israeli Military History constitutes an essential addition to the literature about Middle Eastern warfare. This book is aimed primarily at the academic and research community, but it is fully accessible to anyone with an interest in Israeli military history.

The State of Israel faced one of its most difficult challenges during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Though the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) eventually emerged as the clear victor in the war, it suffered serious reverses at the outset of hostilities, as well as substantial losses in men and equipment. This book revisits the Yom Kippur War by exploring a number of issues that have not previously received the attention they deserve or that would benefit from a fresh evaluation. Among the issues examined are: the American-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli relationships during the war; the roles of Israeli nuclear weapons and airpower; the IDFs practice of combined arms warfare; the reasons why the IDF turned the tide of the war more quickly on the Golan front than on the Sinai front; the impact of American arms transfers; and the lessons derived from the war by the United States Army and the IDF. This book, which relies heavily on government documents and other primary sources of information, fills important descriptive and analytical gaps in the academic literature about the Yom Kippur War. No other book compares to it in respect of content and interpretation. It is, in short, essential reading for all scholars interested in the diplomatic and military dimensions of the war.

The Israel Air Force (IAF) has accumulated as much battle experience as any air force in the world during the post-Second World War era, and it has recorded many outstanding accomplishments throughout a seemingly endless string of interstate wars, asymmetrical wars, counterinsurgency campaigns, and special operations. This book examines the IAF's experience in the ArabIsraeli conflict from the establishment of Israel in 1948 to the present day. It analyses this experience through the prisms of manoeuvre warfare, attrition warfare, counterinsurgency warfare, special operations, and humanitarian operations. The book reviews the IAF's performance in such wars as the 1967 Six-Day War, the 196970 War of Attrition, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 2006 Second Lebanon War, and the 20089 Gaza War. The book also scrutinizes the IAF's participation in major counterinsurgency campaigns and special operations, traces the air force's experience with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which have occupied a very prominent place in air operations since the 1982 Lebanon War, and chronicles its experience with anti-aircraft defences and satellites. Up-to-date information on the IAF's bases, squadrons, and other infrastructure is provided as well. The book is based on personal visits to the IAF over the past few years, during which the author had the opportunity to tour bases, listen to lectures and briefings, and speak with numerous retired, reserve, and active duty officers.

This book dispels two common myths about the American-Israeli patron-client relationship -- that arms transfers to Israel have been motivated by American domestic politics rather than national interests and that these arms transfers have come without any political strings attached to them. The first part of the book describes and analyses the institutionalisation of the American-Israeli arms pipeline during the Johnson administration, demonstrating conclusively in the process that arms transfers to the Jewish state were based primarily on American national interests. The second part of the book consists of four case studies that clearly reveal that American arms transfers to Israel, whether in wartime or in peacetime, have always come with a diplomatic price tag attached to them. The book is based largely on American government documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, from the Lyndon B Johnson Presidential Library, and from the United States National Archives.

The Israel Air Force (IAF) has accumulated as much battle experience as any air force in the world during the post-Second World War era, and it has recorded many outstanding accomplishments throughout a seemingly endless string of interstate wars, asymmetrical wars, counterinsurgency campaigns, and special operations. This book examines the IAF's experience in the ArabIsraeli conflict from the establishment of Israel in 1948 to the present day. It analyses this experience through the prisms of manoeuvre warfare, attrition warfare, counterinsurgency warfare, special operations, and humanitarian operations. The book reviews the IAF's performance in such wars as the 1967 Six-Day War, the 196970 War of Attrition, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 2006 Second Lebanon War, and the 20089 Gaza War. The book also scrutinizes the IAF's participation in major counterinsurgency campaigns and special operations, traces the air force's experience with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which have occupied a very prominent place in air operations since the 1982 Lebanon War, and chronicles its experience with anti-aircraft defences and satellites. Up-to-date information on the IAF's bases, squadrons, and other infrastructure is provided as well. The book is based on personal visits to the IAF over the past few years, during which the author had the opportunity to tour bases, listen to lectures and briefings, and speak with numerous retired, reserve, and active duty officers.

Combined arms warfare (CAW) -- the integration of different arms on the battlefield (eg: armor, infantry, artillery, aircraft, and engineers) in order to achieve maximal efficiency there -- is as old as war itself. Every army across both time and space that has engaged in combat has practiced one version or another of CAW, whether consciously or otherwise. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has been no exception to the rule. This book traces the Israeli experience with CAW from the countrys War of Independence in 1947-49 (against a coalition of Arab states) through Operation Protective Edge in 2014 (against a coalition of Hamas-led terrorist/insurgent groups). It describes and analyzes the IDFs practice of CAW in each interstate war (IW), asymmetrical war (AW), and low-intensity conflict (LIC) that Israel has fought since the countrys establishment in the mid-twentieth century. The book also highlights the Israeli approach to CAW in respect of special operations (SPEC OPS). With no end in sight to the ArabIsraeli conflict, and with further hostilities between Israel and its neighbors virtually assured in the future, Combined Arms Warfare in Israeli Military History constitutes an essential addition to the literature about Middle Eastern warfare. This book is aimed primarily at the academic and research community, but it is fully accessible to anyone with an interest in Israeli military history.

This work defines the central concepts of Israel's national security doctrine as deterrence, geography, manpower, quantity versus quality, offensive manoeuvre warfare, conventional versus unconventional threats, self-reliance, great power patronage, and peripheral partnerships. The author describes and explains how these concepts have influenced the war fighting experience of the Israel Defense Forces, including the air force and the navy. Special attention is paid to Israel's relationships with the United States, Turkey, and India as they relate to the Jewish state's national security, and in particular offers a new interpretation of what really drives these relationships; the motives behind Israeli foreign policy and Israeli arms export policy; and whether Israel's national security doctrine ought to include a capability to threaten the existence of hostile Arab (and Islamic) governments. Sections of this book have been used to teach a class on strategic studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.