Some of the major industrial disasters could have been prevented. When the facts of what happened are established, their stories share a common thread: before things spiralled out of control, there were workers at the affected sites who knew that the situation was dangerous, and could become catastrophic unless immediate action was taken. But tragically, nobody dared to tell the decision-makers who could have authorized that action. With no idea of the risks they were taking, the people in charge continued as normal… and disaster struck. Because vital information about risks could not flow freely from the shop floor to the director’s office, the crucial decisions were not made in time. This observation has been documented in the following major technological accidents: Challenger space shuttle explosion (USA, 1986); Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster (USSR, 1986); Deepwater Horizon oil spill (USA, 2010); Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant disaster (Japan, 2011); and numerous other industrial disasters. After accidents like these, losses and costs for dealing with the consequences are often hundreds — or even thousands — of times greater than the finances that would have been required to deal with the risks when they were first recognized. This handbook is about how to transform the way large critical infrastructure companies communicate about safety and technological risks. It aims to support senior managers to get the information they need from their subordinates concerning the risks they are facing, in order to prevent accidents before it is too late. The recommendations in this handbook are based on interviews with 100 executives at various levels, working in 65 critical infrastructure companies around the world, in power, oil and gas, metals, chemicals and petrochemicals, mining and other industries. The recommendations of these leaders were also tested in the pilot project, in an industrial company which is the world leader in its sector. More than 400 managers at various levels of the corporate hierarchy, and employees at several of the company’s industrial plants, took part in the project. This open access handbook is written for the owners, senior managers, and industrial safety directors of critical infrastructure companies. 

The book reviews existing research on the challenges of voice and silence in organizations. After a major disaster, when investigators are piecing together the story of what happened, a striking fact often emerges: before disaster struck, some people in the organization involved were aware of dangerous conditions that had the potential to escalate to a critical level. But for a variety of reasons, this crucial information did not reach decision-makers. So, the organization moved ever closer to catastrophe, effectively unaware of the possible threat-despite the fact that some of its employees could see it coming. What is the problem with communication about risk in an organization, and why does this problem exist? What stops people in organizations or project teams from freely reporting and discussing critical risks? This book seeks to answer these questions, starting from a deep analysis of 20 disasters where the concealment of risks played a major part. These case studies are drawn from around the world and span a range of industries: civil nuclear power, coal, oil and gas production, hydropower energy, metals and mining, space exploration, transport, finance, retail manufacturing and even the response of governments to wars, famines and epidemics. Together, case studies give an insight into why people hesitate to report risks-and even when they do, why their superiors often prefer to ignore the news. The book reviews existing research on the challenges of voice and silence in organizations. This helps to explain more generally why people dread passing on bad news to others-and why in the workplace they prefer to keep quiet about unpleasant facts or potential risks when they are talking to superiors and colleagues. The discussion section of the book includes important examples of concealment within the Chinese state hierarchy as well as by leading epidemiologists and governments in the West during the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan in 2019-2020. The full picture of the very early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic remains unclear, and further research is obviously needed to better understand what motivated some municipal, provincial and national officials in China as well as Western counterparts to obfuscate facts in their internal communications about many issues associated with the outbreak.

This book discusses the risks of information concealment in the context of major natural or industrial disasters - offering detailed descriptions and analyses of some 25 historical cases (Three Mile Island nuclear accident, Bhopal disaster, Challenger Space Shuttle explosion, Chernobyl nuclear disaster, Deepwater Horizon oil spill, Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear disaster, Enron's bankruptcy, Subprime mortgage crisis, Worldwide Spanish flu and SARS outbreaks, etc.) and applying these insights to selected on-going cases where such information concealment is suspected. Some successful examples of preventive anti-concealment practice are also presented. In the book, the term 'concealment' is used to represent the two distinct behaviors uncovered in the investigations: (i) facts and information about an organization and its functioning being hidden from those that need them - here the concealment can be due to various factors, such as complexity and miscommunication, to name but two - and (ii) the conscious and deliberate action of keeping important information secret or misrepresenting it. This second meaning makes up a surprisingly important part of the evidence presented. Accordingly, emphasis has been put on this second aspect and the approach is more pragmatic than academic, remaining focused on evidence-based practical and useful factors. It raises awareness and provides valuable lessons for decision- makers, risk specialists and responsible citizens alike. This work is also intended as a fact-based reference work for future academic and scholarly investigations on the roots of the problem, in particular regarding any psychological or sociological modeling of human fallibility.

Some of the major industrial disasters could have been prevented. When the facts of what happened are established, their stories share a common thread: before things spiralled out of control, there were workers at the affected sites who knew that the situation was dangerous, and could become catastrophic unless immediate action was taken. But tragically, nobody dared to tell the decision-makers who could have authorized that action. With no idea of the risks they were taking, the people in charge continued as normal… and disaster struck. Because vital information about risks could not flow freely from the shop floor to the director’s office, the crucial decisions were not made in time. This observation has been documented in the following major technological accidents: Challenger space shuttle explosion (USA, 1986); Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster (USSR, 1986); Deepwater Horizon oil spill (USA, 2010); Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant disaster (Japan, 2011); and numerous other industrial disasters. After accidents like these, losses and costs for dealing with the consequences are often hundreds — or even thousands — of times greater than the finances that would have been required to deal with the risks when they were first recognized. This handbook is about how to transform the way large critical infrastructure companies communicate about safety and technological risks. It aims to support senior managers to get the information they need from their subordinates concerning the risks they are facing, in order to prevent accidents before it is too late. The recommendations in this handbook are based on interviews with 100 executives at various levels, working in 65 critical infrastructure companies around the world, in power, oil and gas, metals, chemicals and petrochemicals, mining and other industries. The recommendations of these leaders were also tested in the pilot project, in an industrial company which is the world leader in its sector. More than 400 managers at various levels of the corporate hierarchy, and employees at several of the company’s industrial plants, took part in the project. This open access handbook is written for the owners, senior managers, and industrial safety directors of critical infrastructure companies. 

This book explores the major differences between the kinds of risk encountered in different sectors of industry - production (including agriculture) and services - and identifies the main features of accidents within different industries. Because of these differences, unique risk-mitigation measures will need to be implemented in one industry that cannot be implemented in another, leading to large managerial differences between these broad economic sectors. Based on the analysis of more than 500 disasters, accidents and incidents - around 230 cases from the production sector and around 280 cases from the service sector - the authors compare the risk response actions appropriate within different sectors, and establish when and how it is possible to generalize the experience of dealing with risks in any given industry to a wider field of economic activity. This book is mainly intended for executives, strategists, senior risk managers of enterprise-wide organizations and risk management experts engaged in academic or consulting work. By setting out clearly the sector differences in risk management, the authors aim to improve the practice of general risk assessment with regard to identifying and prioritizing risks, and of risk control with regard to planning appropriate mitigation measures.