Documents a study whose goals were to develop an understanding of commanders' information requirements for cultural and other "soft" factors in order to improve the effectiveness of combined arms operations, and to develop practical ways for commanders to integrate information and influence operations activities into combined arms planning/assessment in order to increase the usefulness to ground commanders of such operations.

The objective of this study was to provide an analytic framework for intelligence analysis of irregular warfare (IW) environments that could be used as the basis for a subsequent IW intelligence analysis curriculum development effort. The authors conducted a review of recent policy, strategy, doctrinal, and other materials pertaining to IW, concluding that although the term irregular warfare remains somewhat nebulous, situations considered within the realm of IW generally can be thought of in terms of two main stylized types: (1) population-centric IW situations, which include such missions as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and support to insurgency, where the indigenous population is the center of gravity; and (2) counterterrorism operations, whether conducted as one element of a theater commanderas campaign or as part of the U.S. Special Operations Command-led global war on terrorism, where a cellular network is being targeted. The authors identify the intelligence and analytic requirements associated with each of these two stylized forms of IW and describe a top-down framework, or analytic procedure, that can be used for assessing IW environments. Also included is a list of references to IW-relevant doctrinal publications.

Concern in United States military and policymaking circles about civilian casualties and collateral damage in military operations appears to have increased since the end of the Cold War. In part, this concern appears to be based on the belief that press and public reaction to civilian casualties reduces public support and constrains military operations. to determine whether these incidents affect media reporting or public support for military operations, and if so, how. After reviewing the major literature on American public opinion and war, the authors examine case studies of U.S. and foreign press, public, and leadership responses to civilian deaths during four recent conflicts: Operation Desert Storm (Iraq, 1991), Operation Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999), Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 2001), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq, 2003). has realistic expectations about avoiding casualties. Second, the press reports heavily on civilian casualty incidents. Third, adversaries understand and seek to exploit the public's sensitivities to civilian deaths. Fourth, other factors have been more important determinants of American's support and opposition during armed conflict than civilian casualties, while for foreign publics it may be among the most important factors. Fifth, while sizeable majorities of the American public gives U.S. military and political leaders the benefit of the doubt when civilian casualty incidents occur, this does not necessarily extend to foreign audiences. Sixth, when civilian casualty incidents occur, it may be more important to get the story right than to get the story out. abroad have increased in recent years and may continue to do so, perhaps becoming an even more salient concern in the conduct of future military operations.

Have South Korean attitudes toward the United States deteriorated? To answer this question, RAND researchers compiled and analyzed South Korean public opinion data from the past decade. Have South Korean attitudes toward the United States deteriorated? To answer this question, RAND researchers compiled and analyzed public opinion data on those attitudes and examined selected periods in U.S.-South Korean relations to identify the sources of anti-U.S. sentiment. They found evidence of a downturn in favorable sentiment toward the U.S. but also of a more recent recovery. They recommend ways to improve South KoreansO perceptions of the U.S. and address their long-standing grievances.

Although military policy seems focused on overseas threats, defending the homeland is, of course, the ultimate objective. This guide examines emergent threats to the USA homeland such as speciality weapons, cyber attacks and ballistic missiles and delineates the army's responsibilities.

This study reports the efforts of a workshop to build partnerships between universities, industry, and governments. In 2000, the National Science Foundation (NSF) created the Partnerships for Innovation (PFI) program. The PFI is part of a larger NSF effort to build a new foundation for innovation based upon partnerships between university, industry, and local and regional governments that also will be responsive to emerging economic and social challenges facing the nation. In June 2001, a workshop held in Arlington, Virginia, brought together PFI grantees and representatives from university and industry to consider the roles of the PFI and the NSF in the larger national innovation enterprise. This report synthesizes workshop discussions regarding innovation and sustainable partnerships. The workshop revealed strong support for a formal evaluation of the PFI program and endorsed both an expanded NSF role in promoting innovation and partnerships through the PFI and other programs and continued efforts by NSF to further diversify and better exploit synergies between its innovation-supporting programs. (PB) The National Science Foundation created the Partnerships for Innovation program in 2000. This report synthesizes workshop discussions regarding innovation and sustainable partnerships between universities, industry, and government, and participants' strong endorsement of an expanded NSF role promoting these activities.

Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the Persian Gulf War dramatized U.S. vulnerability to theater ballistic missiles. In this report, the authors describe a methodology for allocating resources among various facets of missile defense. Their model takes into account the number of attacking objects, the requirement that no missiles get through, the number of layers of defense, the probability of kill by the interceptors in each layer, other operational parameters, and cost considerations. In addition, they examine the effects of critical uncertainties. The model indicates the benefits of architectures that rely on multiple layers of defense, the high costs of these defenses, and the high leverage in engaging attacking objects before launch or early in their flight.