This research review will appeal to researchers interested in a summary of the growing appreciation of the market for corporate control, and also to others seeking to understand this aspect of the relationship between the economics and the law of the modern corporation.

Why has antitrust legislation not lived up to its promise of promoting free-market competition and protecting consumers? Assessing 100 years of antitrust policy in the United States, this book shows that while the antitrust laws claim to serve the public good, they are as vulnerable to the influence of special interest groups as are agricultural, welfare, or health care policies. Presenting classic studies and new empirical research, the authors explain how antitrust caters to self-serving business interests at the expense of the consumer.
The contributors are Peter Asch, George Bittlingmayer, Donald J. Boudreaux, Malcolm B. Coate, Louis De Alessi, Thomas J. DiLorenzo, B. Epsen Eckbo, Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Roger L. Faith, Richard S. Higgins, William E. Kovacic, Donald R. Leavens, William F. Long, Fred S. McChesney, Mike McDonald, Stephen Parker, Richard A. Posner, Paul H. Rubin, Richard Schramm, Joseph J. Seneca, William F. Shughart II, Jon Silverman, George J. Stigler, Robert D. Tollison, Charlie M. Weir, Peggy Wier, and Bruce Yandle.

As the founder of the Center for Law and Economics at George Mason University and dean emeritus of the George Mason School of Law, Henry G. Manne is one of the founding scholars of law and economics as a discipline. This three-volume collection includes articles, reviews, and books from more than four decades, featuring "Wall Street in Transition," which redefined the commonly held view of the corporate firm.
Volume 1, "The Economics of Corporations and Corporate Law," includes Manne's seminal writings on corporate law and his landmark blend of economics and law that is today accepted as a standard discipline, showing how Manne developed a comprehensive theory of the modern corporation that has provided a framework for legal, economic, and financial analysis of the corporate firm.
Volume 2, "Insider Trading," uses Manne's ground-breaking "Insider Trading and the Stock Market" as a framework for many of Manne's innovative contributions to the field, as well as a fresh context for understanding the complex world of corporate law and securities regulation.
Volume 3, "Liberty and Freedom in the Economic Ordering of Society," includes selections exploring Manne's thoughts on corporate social responsibility, on the regulation of capital markets and securities offerings, especially as examined in "Wall Street in Transition," on the role of the modern university, and on the relationship among law, regulation, and the free market.
Manne's most auspicious work in corporate law began with the two pieces from the "Columbia Law Review" that appear in volume 1, says general editor Fred S. McChesney. Editor Henry Butler adds: "Henry Manne was an innovator challenging the very foundations of the current learning." "The 'Higher Criticism' of the Modern Corporation" was Manne's first attempt at refuting the all too common notion that corporations were merely devices that allowed managers to plunder shareholders. Manne saw that such a view of corporations was inconsistent with the basic economic assumption that individuals either understand or soon will understand the costs and benefits of their own situations and that they respond according to rational self-interest.
Fred S. McChesney is James B. Haddad Professor of Law at the Northwestern School of Law, focusing on business and antitrust law and their intersection with economic theory. He has been an associate director for policy and evaluation at the Federal Trade Commission.
Henry N. Butler, editor of volume 1, is Executive Director of the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth at Northwestern University School of Law.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, editor of volume 2, is William D. Warren Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law.
Jonathan R. Macey, editor of volume 3, is Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Securities Law, and Corporate Finance and is deputy dean at Yale Law School.

The institution of property is as old as mankind, and property rights are today deemed vital to a prosperous economic system. Much has been written in the last decade on the economics of the legal institutions protecting such rights. This unprecedented book provides a magnificent introduction to the subject. Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney have gathered twelve leading thinkers to explore how property rights arise, and how they bolster economic development. As the subtitle indicates, the book examines as well how controversies over valuable property rights are resolved: by agreement, by violence, or by law.

The essays begin by surveying the approaches to property taken by early political economists and move to colorful applications of property rights theory concerning the Wild West, the Amazon, endangered species, and the broadcast spectrum. These examples illustrate the process of defining and defending property rights, and demonstrate what difference property rights make. The book then considers a number of topics raised by private property rights, analytically complex topics concerning pollution externalities, government taking of property, and land use management policies such as zoning.

Overall, the book is intended as an introduction to the economics and law of property rights. It is divided into six parts, with each featuring an introduction by the editors that integrates prior chapters and material in coming chapters. In the end, the book provides a fresh, comprehensive overview of an intriguing subject, accessible to anyone with a minimal background in economics. With chapters written by noted experts on the subject, "Property Rights " offers the first primer on the subject ever produced. In addition to the editors, the contributors are Louise De Alessi, Yoram Barzel, Harold Demsetz, Thrainn Eggertsson, Richard A. Epstein, William A. Fischel, David D. Haddock, Peter J. Hill, Gary D. Libecap, Dean Lueck, Edwin G. West, and Bruce Yandle."

As the founder of the Center for Law and Economics at George Mason University and dean emeritus of the George Mason School of Law, Henry G. Manne is one of the founding scholars of law and economics as a discipline. This three-volume collection includes articles, reviews, and books from more than four decades, featuring "Wall Street in Transition," which redefined the commonly held view of the corporate firm.
Volume 1, "The Economics of Corporations and Corporate Law," includes Manne's seminal writings on corporate law and his landmark blend of economics and law that is today accepted as a standard discipline, showing how Manne developed a comprehensive theory of the modern corporation that has provided a framework for legal, economic, and financial analysis of the corporate firm.
Volume 2, "Insider Trading," uses Manne's ground-breaking "Insider Trading and the Stock Market" as a framework for many of Manne's innovative contributions to the field, as well as a fresh context for understanding the complex world of corporate law and securities regulation.
Volume 3, "Liberty and Freedom in the Economic Ordering of Society," includes selections exploring Manne's thoughts on corporate social responsibility, on the regulation of capital markets and securities offerings, especially as examined in "Wall Street in Transition," on the role of the modern university, and on the relationship among law, regulation, and the free market.
Manne's most auspicious work in corporate law began with the two pieces from the "Columbia Law Review" that appear in volume 1, says general editor Fred S. McChesney. Editor Henry Butler adds: "Henry Manne was an innovator challenging the very foundations of the current learning." "The 'Higher Criticism' of the Modern Corporation" was Manne's first attempt at refuting the all too common notion that corporations were merely devices that allowed managers to plunder shareholders. Manne saw that such a view of corporations was inconsistent with the basic economic assumption that individuals either understand or soon will understand the costs and benefits of their own situations and that they respond according to rational self-interest.
Fred S. McChesney is James B. Haddad Professor of Law at the Northwestern School of Law, focusing on business and antitrust law and their intersection with economic theory. He has been an associate director for policy and evaluation at the Federal Trade Commission.
Henry N. Butler, editor of volume 1, is Executive Director of the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth at Northwestern University School of Law.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, editor of volume 2, is William D. Warren Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law.
Jonathan R. Macey, editor of volume 3, is Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Securities Law, and Corporate Finance and is deputy dean at Yale Law School.

Surveys reveal that a majority of Americans believe government is run for special interests, not public interest. The increased presence and power of lobbyists in Washington and the excesses of PAC and campaign contributions, in-kind benefits, and other favors would seem to indicate a government of weak public servants corrupted by big private-interest groups.

But as Fred McChesney shows, this perspective affords only a partial understanding of why private interests are paying, and what they are paying for. Consider, for example, Citicorp, the nation's largest banking company, whose registered lobbyists spend most of their time blocking legislation that could hurt any one of the company's credit-card, loan, or financial-service operations. What this scenario suggests, the author argues, is that payments to politicians are often made not for political favors, but to avoid political disfavor, that is, as part of a system of political extortion or "rent extraction."

The basic notion of rent extraction is simple: because the state can legally take wealth from its citizens, politicians can extort from private parties payments not to expropriate private wealth. In that sense, rent (that is, wealth) extraction is "money for nothing"--money paid in exchange for politicians' inaction. After constructing this model of wealth extraction, McChesney tests it with many examples, including several involving routine proposals of tax legislation, followed by withdrawal for a price. He also shows how the model applies more generally to regulation. Finally, he examines how binding contracts are written between private interests and politicians not to extract wealth.

This book, standingsquarely at the intersection of law, political science, and economics, vividly illustrates the patterns of legal extortion underlying the current fabric of interest-group politics.