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This title was first published in 1980: Drawing upon released
documents, memoirs and party-history works, the process and impact
of the political campaigns in China between 1950 and 1965 is
documented. Complete with extensive interviews with Chinese
scholars and former officials, the book reviews the findings of the
first edition.
This title was first published in 1984: This text provides a source
of citations to North American scholarships relating specifically
to the area of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It
indexes fields of scholarship such as the humanities, arts,
technology and life sciences and all kinds of scholarship such as
PhDs.
This title was first published in 1980: Drawing upon released
documents, memoirs and party-history works, the process and impact
of the political campaigns in China between 1950 and 1965 is
documented. Complete with extensive interviews with Chinese
scholars and former officials, the book reviews the findings of the
first edition.
This title was first published in 1984: This text provides a source
of citations to North American scholarships relating specifically
to the area of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It
indexes fields of scholarship such as the humanities, arts,
technology and life sciences and all kinds of scholarship such as
PhDs.
The decollectivization of Chinese agriculture in the early post-Mao
period is widely recognized as a critical part of the overall
reform program. But the political process leading to this outcome
is poorly understood. A number of approaches have dominated the
existing literature: 1) a power/policy struggle between Hua
Guofeng's alleged neo-Maoists and Deng Xiaoping's reform coalition;
2) the power of the peasants; and 3) the leading role of provincial
reformers. The first has no validity, while second and third must
be viewed through more complex lenses. This study provides a new
interpretation challenging conventional wisdom. Its key finding is
that a game changer emerged in spring 1980 at the time Deng
replaced Hua as CCP leader, but the significant change in policy
was not a product of any clash between these two leaders. Instead,
Deng endorsed Zhao Ziyang's policy initiative that shifted emphasis
away from Hua's pro-peasant policy of increased resources to the
countryside, to a pro-state policy that reduced the rural burden on
national coffers. To replace the financial resources, policy
measures including household farming were implemented with
considerable provincial variations. The major unexpected production
increases in 1982 confirmed the arrival of decollectivization as
the template on the ground. The dynamics of this policy change has
never been adequately explained. Paradoxes of Post-Mao Rural Reform
offers a deep empirical study of critical developments involving
politics from the highest levels in Beijing to China's villages,
and in the process challenges many broader accepted interpretations
of the politics of reform. It is essential reading for students and
scholars of contemporary Chinese political history.
This book launches an ambitious reexamination of the elite politics
behind one of the most remarkable transformations in the late
twentieth century. As the first part of a new interpretation of the
evolution of Chinese politics during the years 1972-82, it provides
a detailed study of the end of the Maoist era, demonstrating Mao's
continuing dominance even as his ability to control events ebbed
away. The tensions within the "gang of four," the different
treatment of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, and the largely
unexamined role of younger radicals are analyzed to reveal a view
of the dynamic of elite politics that is at odds with accepted
scholarship. The authors draw upon newly available documentary
sources and extensive interviews with Chinese participants and
historians to develop their challenging interpretation of one of
the most poorly understood periods in the history of the People's
Republic of China.
The decollectivization of Chinese agriculture in the early post-Mao
period is widely recognized as a critical part of the overall
reform program. But the political process leading to this outcome
is poorly understood. A number of approaches have dominated the
existing literature: 1) a power/policy struggle between Hua
Guofeng's alleged neo-Maoists and Deng Xiaoping's reform coalition;
2) the power of the peasants; and 3) the leading role of provincial
reformers. The first has no validity, while second and third must
be viewed through more complex lenses. This study provides a new
interpretation challenging conventional wisdom. Its key finding is
that a game changer emerged in spring 1980 at the time Deng
replaced Hua as CCP leader, but the significant change in policy
was not a product of any clash between these two leaders. Instead,
Deng endorsed Zhao Ziyang's policy initiative that shifted emphasis
away from Hua's pro-peasant policy of increased resources to the
countryside, to a pro-state policy that reduced the rural burden on
national coffers. To replace the financial resources, policy
measures including household farming were implemented with
considerable provincial variations. The major unexpected production
increases in 1982 confirmed the arrival of decollectivization as
the template on the ground. The dynamics of this policy change has
never been adequately explained. Paradoxes of Post-Mao Rural Reform
offers a deep empirical study of critical developments involving
politics from the highest levels in Beijing to China's villages,
and in the process challenges many broader accepted interpretations
of the politics of reform. It is essential reading for students and
scholars of contemporary Chinese political history.
This book launches an ambitious reexamination of the elite politics
behind one of the most remarkable transformations in the late
twentieth century. As the first part of a new interpretation of the
evolution of Chinese politics during the years 1972-82, it provides
a detailed study of the end of the Maoist era, demonstrating Mao's
continuing dominance even as his ability to control events ebbed
away. The tensions within the "gang of four," the different
treatment of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, and the largely
unexamined role of younger radicals are analyzed to reveal a view
of the dynamic of elite politics that is at odds with accepted
scholarship. The authors draw upon newly available documentary
sources and extensive interviews with Chinese participants and
historians to develop their challenging interpretation of one of
the most poorly understood periods in the history of the People's
Republic of China.
This text analyzes the dramatic shifts in Chinese Communist Party
economic policy during the mid to late 1950s which eventually
resulted in 30 to 45 million deaths through starvation as a result
of the failed policies of the Great Leap Forward. Teiwes examines
both the substance and the process of economic policy-making in
that period, explaining how the rational policies of opposing rash
advance in 1956-57 gave way to the fanciful policies of the Great
Leap, and assessing responsibility for the failure to adjust
adequately those policies even as signs of disaster began to reach
higher level decision makers. In telling this story, Teiwes focuses
on key participants in the process throughout both "rational" and
"utopian" phases - Mao, other top leaders, central economic
bureaucracies and local party leaders. The analysis rejects both of
the existing influential explanations in the field, the long
dominant power politics approach focusing on alleged clashes within
the top leadership, and David Bachman's recent institutional
interpretation of the origins of the Great Leap. Instead, this
study presents a detailed picture of an exceptionally Mao-dominated
process, where no other actor challenged his position, where the
boldest step any actor took was to try and influence his
preferences, and where the system in effect became paralyzed while
Mao kept changing signals as disaster unfolded.
This text analyzes the dramatic shifts in Chinese Communist Party
economic policy during the mid to late 1950s which eventually
resulted in 30 to 45 million deaths through starvation as a result
of the failed policies of the Great Leap Forward. Teiwes examines
both the substance and the process of economic policy-making in
that period, explaining how the rational policies of opposing rash
advance in 1956-57 gave way to the fanciful policies of the Great
Leap, and assessing responsibility for the failure to adjust
adequately those policies even as signs of disaster began to reach
higher level decision makers. In telling this story, Teiwes focuses
on key participants in the process throughout both "rational" and
"utopian" phases - Mao, other top leaders, central economic
bureaucracies and local party leaders. The analysis rejects both of
the existing influential explanations in the field, the long
dominant power politics approach focusing on alleged clashes within
the top leadership, and David Bachman's recent institutional
interpretation of the origins of the Great Leap. Instead, this
study presents a detailed picture of an exceptionally Mao-dominated
process, where no other actor challenged his position, where the
boldest step any actor took was to try and influence his
preferences, and where the system in effect became paralyzed while
Mao kept changing signals as disaster unfolded.
The decision to initiate a High Tide of agricultural
co-operativisation in 1955 in China, is documented in this text.
The social impact, policy conflict and leadership style of Mao is
detailed, drawing upon documentary sources, interviews with Party
historians, and a chronology of events.
Drawing upon released documents, memoirs and party-history works,
the process and impact of the political campaigns in China between
1950 and 1965 is documented. Complete with extensive interviews
with Chinese scholars and former officials, the book reviews the
findings of the first edition.
Drawing upon released documents, memoirs and party-history works,
the process and impact of the political campaigns in China between
1950 and 1965 is documented. Complete with extensive interviews
with Chinese scholars and former officials, the book reviews the
findings of the first edition.
The investigation of the rise and fall of Gao Gang suggests broader
implications on the nature of elite politics in the Maoist era. The
illumination of basic issues in Chinese politics in the context of
this case, especially as regards the role of Mao Zedong, is
relevant not only to the initial post-1949 period of comparative,
but flawed, party unity, but also to the structural fault lines of
the political system which were later to contribute so
significantly to the Cultural Revolution.
The investigation of the rise and fall of Gao Gang suggests broader
implications on the nature of elite politics in the Maoist era. The
illumination of basic issues in Chinese politics in the context of
this case, especially as regards the role of Mao Zedong, is
relevant not only to the initial post-1949 period of comparative,
but flawed, party unity, but also to the structural fault lines of
the political system which were later to contribute so
significantly to the Cultural Revolution.
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