Value change and uncertainty about the validity of traditional moral convictions are frequently observed when scientific re search confronts us with new moral problems or challenges the moral responsibility of the scientist. Which ethics is to be relied on? Which principles are the most reasonable, the most humane ones? For want of an appropriate answer, moral authorities of ten point to conscience, the individual conscience, which seems to be man's unique, directly accessible and final source of moral contention. But what is meant by 'conscience'? There is hardly a notion as widely used and at the same time as controversial as that of conscience. In the history of ethics we can distinguish several trends in the interpretation of the concept and function of conscience. The Greeks used the word O"uvEt81lm~ to denote a kind of 'accompa nying knowledge' that mostly referred to negatively experienced behavior. In Latin, the expression conscientia meant a knowing together pointing beyond the individual consciousness to the common knowledge of other people. In the Bible, especially in the New Testament, O"uvEt81l0"t~ is used for the guiding con sciousness of the morality of one's own action.

This volume constitutes the Proceedings and Discussions of the 1968 Salzburg Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. The Colloquium was held at the Institut fUr Wissenschaftstheorie of the Internationales Forschungszentrum fUr Grundfragen der Wissenschaften, Salzburg, Austria, from August 28 to August 31, 1968, under the joint auspices of the Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, and the Institut fur Wissenschaftstheorie of the Internationales Forschungs- zentrum, Salzburg. The Colloquium was organized by an executive committee consisting ofY. Bar-Hillel (President), M. Black, J. Hintikka, B. Juhos, M. Strauss, and P. Weingartner (Secretary). The Colloquium was generously subsidised by the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, and by the Internationales For- schungszentrum, Salzburg. The Colloquium was divided into three main sections: Induction and Probability (Chairman: 1. Hintikka), Foundations of Physics (Chairman: M. Strauss), and Science and Ethics: The Moral Responsibility of the Scientist (Chairman: M. Black). This volume contains all papers presented at the Colloquium. Six of those papers concerning Induction and Probability, have, with slight changes, already been published in Synthese 20, 1969. Although the articles of the section Science and Ethics were only read at the International Congress of Philosophy in Vienna on September 3, 1968, the discussion on them took place in Salzburg two days ago. This was possible, because early drafts of all papers had been sent to each participant, in order to prepare appropriate discussions.

Value change and uncertainty about the validity of traditional moral convictions are frequently observed when scientific re search confronts us with new moral problems or challenges the moral responsibility of the scientist. Which ethics is to be relied on? Which principles are the most reasonable, the most humane ones? For want of an appropriate answer, moral authorities of ten point to conscience, the individual conscience, which seems to be man's unique, directly accessible and final source of moral contention. But what is meant by 'conscience'? There is hardly a notion as widely used and at the same time as controversial as that of conscience. In the history of ethics we can distinguish several trends in the interpretation of the concept and function of conscience. The Greeks used the word O"uvEt81lm~ to denote a kind of 'accompa nying knowledge' that mostly referred to negatively experienced behavior. In Latin, the expression conscientia meant a knowing together pointing beyond the individual consciousness to the common knowledge of other people. In the Bible, especially in the New Testament, O"uvEt81l0"t~ is used for the guiding con sciousness of the morality of one's own action.