The main topic of the book is a reconstruction of the evolution of nervous systems and brains as well as of mental-cognitive abilities, in short "intelligence" from simplest organisms to humans. It investigates to which extent the two are correlated. One central topic is the alleged uniqueness of the human brain and human intelligence and mind. It is discussed which neural features make certain animals and humans intelligent and creative: Is it absolute or relative brain size or the size of "intelligence centers" inside the brains, the number of nerve cells inside the brain in total or in such "intelligence centers" decisive for the degree of intelligence, of mind and eventually consciousness? And which are the driving forces behind these processes? Finally, it is asked what all this means for the classical problem of mind-brain relationship and for a naturalistic theory of mind.

We all know what a voluntary action is - we all think we know when an action is voluntary, and when it is not. First, there has to be some wish or goal, then an action designed to fulfil that wish or attain that goal. This standard view of voluntary action is prominent in both folk psychology and the professional sphere (e.g. the juridical) and guides a great deal of psychological and philosophical reasoning. But is it that simple though? For example, research from the neurosciences has shown us that the brain activation required to perform the action can actually precede the brain activation representing our conscious desire to perform that action. Only in retrospect do we come to attribute the action we performed to some desire or wish to perform the action.

This presents us with a problem - if our conscious awareness of an action follows its execution, then is it really a voluntary action?

The question guiding this book: What is the explanatory role of voluntary action, and are there ways that we can reconcile our common-sense intuitions about voluntary actions with the findings from the sciences? This is a debate that crosses the boundaries of philosophy, neuroscience, psychology and social science. This book brings together some of the leading thinkers from these disciplines to consider this deep and often puzzling topic. The result is a fascinating and stimulating debate that will challenge our fundamental assumptions about our sense of free-will.

We all know what a voluntary action is - we all think we know when an action is voluntary, and when it is not. First, there has to be some wish or goal, then an action designed to fulfil that wish or attain that goal. This standard view of voluntary action is prominent in both folk psychology and the professional sphere (e.g. the juridical) and guides a great deal of psychological and philosophical reasoning. But is it that simple though? For example, research from the neurosciences has shown us that the brain activation required to perform the action can actually precede the brain activation representing our conscious desire to perform that action. Only in retrospect do we come to attribute the action we performed to some desire or wish to perform the action.

This presents us with a problem - if our conscious awareness of an action follows its execution, then is it really a voluntary action?

The question guiding this book is: What is the explanatory role of voluntary action, and are there ways that we can reconcile our common-sense intuitions about voluntary actions with the findings from the sciences? This is a debate that crosses the boundaries of philosophy, neuroscience, psychology and social science. This book brings together some of the leading thinkers from these disciplines to consider this deep and often puzzling topic. The result is a fascinating and stimulating debate that will challenge our fundamental assumptions about our sense of free-will.

The main topic of the book is a reconstruction of the evolution of nervous systems and brains as well as of mental-cognitive abilities, in short "intelligence" from simplest organisms to humans. It investigates to which extent the two are correlated. One central topic is the alleged uniqueness of the human brain and human intelligence and mind. It is discussed which neural features make certain animals and humans intelligent and creative: Is it absolute or relative brain size or the size of "intelligence centers" inside the brains, the number of nerve cells inside the brain in total or in such "intelligence centers" decisive for the degree of intelligence, of mind and eventually consciousness? And which are the driving forces behind these processes? Finally, it is asked what all this means for the classical problem of mind-brain relationship and for a naturalistic theory of mind.

Salamanders are subject to misconceptions even among vertebrate zoologists and physiologists. They are often said to exist only in northern temperate zones, being bound to aquatic or very moist cool habitats. In reality, more than half of all salamander species live in subtropical and tropical zones, ex clusively in the New World. Again, more than half of the salamand r species have become totally independent of aquatic habitats following the loss of a free larval stage. Many of the subtropical and tropical salamanders have become adapted to rather high temperatures up to 26-28 DC. The brain and the sensory systems of salamanders are often considered to be primitive, and their behavior is thought to be simple and uninfluenced by learning. However, careful studies show that the salamander brain possesses virtually all the ana tomical and functional properties found in anurans, which are usually regarded as being much more evolved with respect to the guidance of comparable behavior. Most of the salamander species not only possess a highly efficient visual system, which is the topic of the present work, but can orient themselves almost as effectively by means of olfaction, vibration sense, and electroreception. Furthermore, it has recently been shown that at least part of their behavior, especially that concerned with feeding and prey preferences, is strongly influenced by individual experience."

Das Lehrbuch schlagt eine Brucke zwischen den "Neurowissenschaften" (theoretische und experimentelle Neurobiologie, Neurologie) und den "Psychowissenschaften" (Psychologie, Psychiatrie, Psychotherapie) und will dabei helfen, den jeweils anderen Disziplinen die wichtigsten und wissenschaftlich gesicherten Kenntnisse in verstandlicher Form zu liefern. Die Frage, wie sich psychisches Erleben und Gehirnvorgange zueinander verhalten, galt lange als ratselhaft. In diesem Buch erfahren Sie aufgrund neuester wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse, dass beide Bereiche eine unaufloesliche Einheit bilden, auch wenn wir sie unterschiedlich erfahren und untersuchen. Diese Einheit stellen wir in der psychologisch-neurobiologischen Theorie und der psychiatrisch-psychotherapeutischen Praxis konkret dar. Wir behandeln die Prinzipien der neurobiologischen Erregungs- und Informationsverarbeitung, Aufbau und Funktion des limbischen Systems, die Entwicklung der Persoenlichkeit und der dabei stattfindenden gunstig oder ungunstig verlaufenden Interaktion genetisch-epigenetischer Faktoren und vorgeburtlich sowie nachgeburtlich stattfindender Umwelteinflussen. Auf dieser Grundlage erfolgt die beispielhafte Darstellung wichtiger psychischer Stoerungen wie Suchterkrankungen, schizophrene Stoerungen, affektive Stoerungen sowie Angststoerungen. In der Nachfolge des bedeutenden Psychotherapeuten Klaus Grawe wird schliesslich in das, Konzept der "Neuropsychotherapie" eingefuhrt und gezeigt, warum Psychotherapie und Neurobiologie zusammengehoeren, und sich gegenseitig bereichern koennen. Unser psychoneurowissenschaftlicher Ansatz zeichnet ein Menschenbild, das nicht auf Gegensatzen, sondern einer Integration von Psyche, Gehirn, Verhalten und Erleben beruht.