This book is a revised version, with some omissions, of a Cambridge doctoral dissertation submitted in 1963: I fear that it still bears marks of its origins. The dissertation itself was the result of an earlier scheme to identify the sources of Plotinus' psychological doctrines. In the course of this work it soon became evident that it was not sufficient1y clear what these doctrines were. Students of Plotinus have tended to concentrate on the higher regions of his world, and there is still no satisfactory treatment of his doctrines of the embodied soul. It is the purpose of this book to provide a fairly extensive survey of these doctrines. It does not claim to be exhaustive. Nor does it claim to add a large body of new knowledge, since over so wide a field many points have been touched on by others, if only in passing. But I hope that it may remove some misconceptions, and bring the details of Plotinus' theories into sharper focus. It had been my intention to add an introduction - mainly for the benefit of non-specialist readers - on the psychology of Plotinus' predecessors. In the meantime the Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy has appeared, and the reader who wants information on this subject may convenient1y be referred to the relevant parts of the late Professor Merlan's chapters on the predeces sors of Plotinus."

In "On the Soul" 3.1-5, Aristotle goes beyond the five senses to the general functions of sense perception, the imagination and the so-called active intellect, whose identity was still a matter of controversy in the time of Thomas Aquinas. In his commentary on Aristotle's text, Simplicius insists that the intellect in question is not something transcendental, but the human rational soul. He denies both Plotinus' view that a part of our soul has never descended from uninterrupted contemplation of the Platonic forms, and Proclus' view that our soul cannot be changed in its substance through embodiment. Continuing the debate in Carlos Steel's earlier volume in this series, Henry Blumenthal assesses the authorship of the commentary. He concludes against it being by Simplicius, but not for its being by Priscian. In a novel interpretation, he suggests that if Priscian had any hand in it at all, it might have been as editor of notes from Simplicius' lectures.

This book presents a series of Dr. Blumenthal's studies on the history of Neoplatonism, from its founder Plotinus to the end of Classical Antiquity, relating especially to the Neoplatonists' doctrines about the soul. The work falls into two parts. The first deals with Plotinus and considers the soul both as part of the structure of the universe and in its capacity as the basis of the individual's vital and cognitive functions. The second part is concerned with the later history of Neoplatonism, including its end. Its main focus is the investigation of how Neoplatonic psychology was modified and developed by later philosophers, in particular the commentators on Aristotle, and used as the starting point for their Platonizing interpretations of his philosophy.

This book is a revised version, with some omissions, of a Cambridge doctoral dissertation submitted in 1963: I fear that it still bears marks of its origins. The dissertation itself was the result of an earlier scheme to identify the sources of Plotinus' psychological doctrines. In the course of this work it soon became evident that it was not sufficient1y clear what these doctrines were. Students of Plotinus have tended to concentrate on the higher regions of his world, and there is still no satisfactory treatment of his doctrines of the embodied soul. It is the purpose of this book to provide a fairly extensive survey of these doctrines. It does not claim to be exhaustive. Nor does it claim to add a large body of new knowledge, since over so wide a field many points have been touched on by others, if only in passing. But I hope that it may remove some misconceptions, and bring the details of Plotinus' theories into sharper focus. It had been my intention to add an introduction - mainly for the benefit of non-specialist readers - on the psychology of Plotinus' predecessors. In the meantime the Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy has appeared, and the reader who wants information on this subject may convenient1y be referred to the relevant parts of the late Professor Merlan's chapters on the predeces sors of Plotinus."

In "On the Soul 3.1-5," Aristotle goes beyond the five sense to the general functions of sense perception, the imagination and the so-called active intellect, the of which was still a matter of controversy in the time of Thomas Aquinas. In his commentary on Aristotle's text, 'Simplicius' insists that the intellect in question is not something transcendental but the human rational soul. He denies both Plotinus' view that a part of the soul has never descended from uninterrupted contemplation of the Platonic Forms, and Proclus' view that the soul cannot be changed in its substance through embodiment. He also denies that imagination sees things as true or false, which requires awareness of one's own cognitions. He thinks that imagination works by projecting imprints. In the case of mathematics, it can make the imprints more like shapes taken on during sense perception or more like concepts, which calls for lines without breadth. He acknowledges that Aristotle would not agree to reify these concepts as substances, but thinks of mathematical entities as mere abstractions. Addressing the vexed question of authorship, H. J. Blumenthal concludes that the commentary was written neither by Simplicius nor Priscian. In a novel interpretation, he suggests that if Priscian had any hand in this commentary, it might have been as editor of notes from Simplicius' lectures.