The Maginot Line was the last great gun-bearing line of subterranean forts built before World War II. Although it acquired an unjustified reputation as a white elephant, the Maginot Line fulfilled the role for which it was built, allowing the French High Command the opportunity to mass its forces and counter the German invasion. Unfortunately, the French leadership failed to make the most of its assets, with the resulting disastrous outcome. During the 1920s, the French High Command formulated a number of offensive plans to strike at Germany, but by the end of the decade, it switched to defensive plans because of a lack of manpower. Work thus began on the Maginot Line and on other fortifications such as the French Mareth Line in North Africa and the heavy naval coastal defense batteries in Bizerte (Tunisia) and Toulon (France). The authors conclude that the Maginot Line offered the French High Command many opportunities from September 1939 until May 1940. They blame a failed French military doctrine for taking the initiative away from subordinates, laying the groundwork for the disastrous events of 1940 that left the French High Command paralyzed while German forces broke through the weakly held Ardennes.

This book chronicles the experience of the World War II paratroopers from their earliest days in training to final days of the war spent at Berchtesgaden. Relying heavily on memoirs, letters, and personal interviews with soldiers, this work highlights the rigors of training, the spectacle of combat, and the relief of survival and victory. From D-Day to Bastogne, Kaufmann follows the American advance across France, shedding light on the emotional strain and shock of combat that was, until recently, often overlooked by generations of Americans, but freely admitted to by the Vets themselves. Along the way, the book details the struggle faced by American G.I.s as they made their way through France. Indeed, it becomes clear the Nazis were not the only obstacle to Mutt and Joe during the campaign. The common problems of supply and relief often exacerbated difficult conditions in the field, while incompetent line officers often raised doubt and suspicion among men in the ranks. Ultimately, this is a very personal story about struggle and triumph, told by those who endured the hardship of combat.

Tracing the development of the fortifications in Europe from the end of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to the twentieth century, this is the first comprehensive book in English on the forts of the Maginot Line, German espionage, and the German sieges during the 1940 campaign. It analyzes the reasons why the French opted for this type of defensive system, and explains how the Maginot Line presented the French Army with opportunities (mostly wasted) to regroup and mount an effective defense. Shrouded in media myth for 40 years, this study demonstrates both how the media created the myth and the truth behind the myth of the Maginot Line. At the time reporters wildly speculated about these fortifications, German intelligence agents were busy collecting data. Finally, this book relates the heroic battles waged by the forts, large and small: the tragic fall of La Ferte, the surrender of other DEGREESIpetits ouvrages DEGREESR after prolonged and fierce fighting, the triumphant resistance of the larger forts even in the face of the most savage artillery pounding, and the unqualified victory of the Little Maginot Line over invading Italian forces.

This unusual book examines definitions of the fable, apologue, parable, moral tale, etc. It then proposes the use of the term exemplum, used by medieval scribes, to define all types of wisdom narratives. It makes a cross-cultural structural analysis of the exemplum and identifies its tripartite structure composed of the promythium, the nucleus, and the epimythium. The book ends with an analysis of the reasons why grown men spent so much time writing and collecting these tales. It demonstrates that fables and related genres were not really meant for little children to learn moral lessons. They were used to teach complex religious and political ideologies, to safely ridicule tyrants and despots, to release tensions, and to give good or bad advice.

The Maginot Line was the last great gun-bearing line of subterranean forts built before World War II. Although it acquired an unjustified reputation as a white elephant, the Maginot Line fulfilled the role for which it was built, allowing the French High Command the opportunity to mass its forces and counter the German invasion. Unfortunately, the French leadership failed to make the most of its assets, with the resulting disastrous outcome. During the 1920s, the French High Command formulated a number of offensive plans to strike at Germany, but by the end of the decade, it switched to defensive plans because of a lack of manpower. Work thus began on the Maginot Line and on other fortifications such as the French Mareth Line in North Africa and the heavy naval coastal defense batteries in Bizerte (Tunisia) and Toulon (France). The authors conclude that the Maginot Line offered the French High Command many opportunities from September 1939 until May 1940. They blame a failed French military doctrine for taking the initiative away from subordinates, laying the groundwork for the disastrous events of 1940 that left the French High Command paralyzed while German forces broke through the weakly held Ardennes.