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Covering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral
emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the
epistemology of moral intuitionism. His line of analysis resists
the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology
and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the
most tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines
epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an
account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral
judgment. The book culminates in a convincing argument about the
value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual
seeming and perceptual experience.
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