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What is it to be scientific? Is there such a thing as scientific
method? And if so, how might such methods be justified? Robert Nola
and Howard Sankey seek to provide answers to these fundamental
questions in their exploration of the major recent theories of
scientific method. Although for many scientists their understanding
of method is something they just pick up in the course of being
trained, Nola and Sankey argue that it is possible to be explicit
about what this tacit understanding of method is, rather than leave
it as some unfathomable mystery. They robustly defend the idea that
there is such a thing as scientific method and show how this might
be legitimated. This book begins with the question of what
methodology might mean and explores the notions of values, rules
and principles, before investigating how methodologists have sought
to show that our scientific methods are rational. Part 2 of this
book sets out some principles of inductive method and examines its
alternatives including abduction, IBE, and hypothetico-deductivism.
Part 3 introduces probabilistic modes of reasoning, particularly
Bayesianism in its various guises, and shows how it is able to give
an account of many of the values and rules of method. Part 4
considers the ideas of philosophers who have proposed distinctive
theories of method such as Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend and
Part 5 continues this theme by considering philosophers who have
proposed naturalised theories of method such as Quine, Laudan and
Rescher. This book offers readers a comprehensive introduction to
the idea of scientific method and a wide-ranging discussion of how
historians of science, philosophers of science and scientists have
grappled with the question over the last fifty years.
Originally published in 1994, The Incommensurability Thesis is a
critical study of the Incommensurability Thesis of Thomas Kuhn and
Paul Feyerabend. The book examines the theory that different
scientific theories may be incommensurable because of conceptual
variance. The book presents a critique of the thesis and examines
and discusses the arguments for the theory, acknowledging and
debating the opposing views of other theorists. The book provides a
comprehensive and detailed discussion of the incommensurability
thesis.
While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time
to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research
area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science-and the sciences
themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics
of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The
principle areas covered are: The modal metaphysics of properties:
What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all
properties essentially categorical? Are they all essentially
dispositions, or are some categorical and others dispositional?
Realism in mathematics and its relation to science: What does a
naturalistic commitment of scientific realism tell us about our
commitments to mathematical entities? Can this question be framed
in something other than a Quinean philosophy? Dispositions and
their relation to causation: Can we generate an account of
causation that takes dispositionality as fundamental? And if we
take dispositions as fundamental (and hence not having a
categorical causal basis), what is the ontological ground of
dispositions? Pandispositionalism: Could all properties be
dispositional in nature? Natural kinds: Are there natural kinds,
and if so what account of their nature should we give? For example,
do they have essences? Here we consider how these issues may be
illuminated by considering examples from reals science, in
particular biochemistry and neurobiology.
While "metaphysics of science" is a phrase that has been used from
time to time, it has only recently been used to denote a specific
research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science and the
sciences themselves. The purpose of this volume is to bring
together essays by researchers that demonstrate that metaphysics of
science is a field of research in its own right which is at the
forefront of innovative ideas in philosophy. The principle areas
covered are: * The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the
essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties
essentially categorical? Are they all essentially dispositions, or
are some categorical and others dispositional? * Realism in
mathematics and its relation to science: What does a naturalistic
commitment of scientific realism tell us about our commitments to
mathematical entities? Can this question be framed in something
other than a Quinean philosophy? * Dispositions and their relation
to causation: Can we generate an account of causation that takes
dispositionality as fundamental? And if we take dispositions as
fundamental (and hence not having a categorical causal basis), what
is the ontological ground of dispositions? * Pandispositionalism:
Could all properties be dispositional in nature? * Natural kinds:
Are there natural kinds, and if so what account of their nature
should we give? For example, do they have essences? Here we
consider how these issues may be illuminated by considering
examples from reals science, in particular biochemistry and
neurobiology.
First published in 1997, this volume brings together a series of
essays on the philosophy of science and responds to the "crisis of
rationality" which evolved from the denial of both a stable
methodology and a common language for science. Howard Sankey holds
that important insights about scientific methodology and
rationality may be gleaned from the historical approach, from which
the existence of profound conceptual change in science, as well as
the absence of a neutral observation language, are important
findings. Half of Sankey's essays concentrate specifically on the
thesis that alternative scientific theories are incommensurable due
to semantic differences between the vocabulary in which they are
expressed. Several others seek to derive a new way of thinking
about scientific rationality from the historical critique of the
idea of a fixed scientific method. Still others demonstrate how
some seemingly relativistic themes of the historical approach may
be embraced in a non-relativistic manner within the context of a
pluralistic and naturalistic theory of scientific methodology and
rationality.
Originally published in 1994, The Incommensurability Thesis is a
critical study of the Incommensurability Thesis of Thomas Kuhn and
Paul Feyerabend. The book examines the theory that different
scientific theories may be incommensurable because of conceptual
variance. The book presents a critique of the thesis and examines
and discusses the arguments for the theory, acknowledging and
debating the opposing views of other theorists. The book provides a
comprehensive and detailed discussion of the incommensurability
thesis.
First published in 1997, this volume brings together a series of
essays on the philosophy of science and responds to the "crisis of
rationality" which evolved from the denial of both a stable
methodology and a common language for science. Howard Sankey holds
that important insights about scientific methodology and
rationality may be gleaned from the historical approach, from which
the existence of profound conceptual change in science, as well as
the absence of a neutral observation language, are important
findings. Half of Sankey's essays concentrate specifically on the
thesis that alternative scientific theories are incommensurable due
to semantic differences between the vocabulary in which they are
expressed. Several others seek to derive a new way of thinking
about scientific rationality from the historical critique of the
idea of a fixed scientific method. Still others demonstrate how
some seemingly relativistic themes of the historical approach may
be embraced in a non-relativistic manner within the context of a
pluralistic and naturalistic theory of scientific methodology and
rationality.
Scientific realism is the position that the aim of science is to
advance on truth and increase knowledge about observable and
unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world which we
inhabit. This book articulates and defends that position. In
presenting a clear formulation and addressing the major arguments
for scientific realism Sankey appeals to philosophers beyond the
community of, typically Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of
science to appreciate and understand the doctrine. The book
emphasizes the epistemological aspects of scientific realism and
contains an original solution to the problem of induction that
rests on an appeal to the principle of uniformity of nature.
Scientific realism is the position that the aim of science is to
advance on truth and increase knowledge about observable and
unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world which we
inhabit. This book articulates and defends that position. In
presenting a clear formulation and addressing the major arguments
for scientific realism Sankey appeals to philosophers beyond the
community of, typically Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of
science to appreciate and understand the doctrine. The book
emphasizes the epistemological aspects of scientific realism and
contains an original solution to the problem of induction that
rests on an appeal to the principle of uniformity of nature.
What is it to be scientific? Is there such a thing as scientific
method? And if so, how might such methods be justified? Robert Nola
and Howard Sankey seek to provide answers to these fundamental
questions in their exploration of the major recent theories of
scientific method. Although for many scientists their understanding
of method is something they just pick up in the course of being
trained, Nola and Sankey argue that it is possible to be explicit
about what this tacit understanding of method is, rather than leave
it as some unfathomable mystery. They robustly defend the idea that
there is such a thing as scientific method and show how this might
be legitimated. This book begins with the question of what
methodology might mean and explores the notions of values, rules
and principles, before investigating how methodologists have sought
to show that our scientific methods are rational. Part 2 of this
book sets out some principles of inductive method and examines its
alternatives including abduction, IBE, and hypothetico-deductivism.
Part 3 introduces probabilistic modes of reasoning, particularly
Bayesianism in its various guises, and shows how it is able to give
an account of many of the values and rules of method. Part 4
considers the ideas of philosophers who have proposed distinctive
theories of method such as Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend and
Part 5 continues this theme by considering philosophers who have
proposed naturalised theories of method such as Quine, Laudan and
Rescher. This book offers readers a comprehensive introduction to
the idea of scientific method and a wide-ranging discussion of how
historians of science, philosophers of science and scientists have
grappled with the question over the last fifty years.
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