For more than a century Western democracies have struggled to keep faith with both economic efficiency and social justice. Yet reconciliation of these factors remains as baffling as ever. Among the many voices clamoring today for a theory of collective action, we hear most often of the great chasm between "legitimacy" and "efficiency." It is the contention of the authors of this ground-breaking book that these antinomies can be seen as distinct "moments of application" in the operation of normative judgment, and that a reflexive treatment of norms of collective action, by clarifying limitations in rules and beliefs, allows us to develop mechanisms to correct the limiting effects of such judgments and act accordingly. Drawing on and developing recent trends in the social sciences, The Action of Norms presents a powerful new theory of governance with far-reaching implications for the future of law, the judiciary, and justice itself. Among the contributing modern ideas that are explained and developed as pillars of the authors' thesis are the following: critiques of the "political theory of interest groups; " the economic theory of efficiency; deliberative democracy; rational choice theory; the evolutionist debate; learning process theory; and the theory of risk.

Company Law / Corporate Law Even though our understanding of corporate governance has evolved from a rigid model of "command and control" toward a more flexible model of incentive mechanisms, numerous and major shortcomings continue to plague efforts to resolve the conflicts of interest inherent in the managerial approach to corporate control. In this stimulating book the work of nine outstanding scholars in the field converges, along different avenues of research and analysis, toward a vital critique of two assumptions in currently dominant economic theory: that uncertainty can be reduced to numerical probabilities, and that contracts can be "complete," that is, capable of establishing beforehand an efficacious solution for all possible eventualities. These authors argue that efficient corporate governance requires the establishment of devices of cooperation among the various stakeholders that enable the operation of collective learning. Their contributions to this book clearly enunciate both the need for such organisational learning and the lessons of several specific recent transformations in governance practice that manifest a degree of such learning. In the process their analyses touch upon such central governance issues as the following: the exercise of hierarchical authority in the framework of the labour contract; the "financialisation" of the wage system via profit sharing, stock options, and the like; the transformation of financial markets into markets for corporate control; the polarising effect of the concept of shareholder value; the self-perception of employee shareholders; justification of layoff projects; and rescue of firms in financial distress. What the common undertaking of these authors finally reveals is of immeasurable value to business leaders: potent suggestions that foster the development of a reflexive capacity among actors in corporate governance to isolate what the real problem is, to identify the elements of the context that it would be expedient to transform, and to construct collectively the modalities of an effective transformation.