This book describes and analyses two iconic figures in twentieth-century naval history: the German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and the Russian Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. It examines the men, what they thought and wrote about seapower, the fleets they created and the strategic consequences of what they did. More broadly, it draws on the respective histories of the post-1897 Imperial German Navy and the post-1956 Soviet Navy to examine the continental bid for large-scale seapower. The work argues that both individuals built navies that did not, and could not, fulfil the objectives for which they were created. Drawing on the legacies of both men, the book also develops some wider ideas about the creation of large navies by continental states, with cautionary lessons for today's emerging powers, India and China. Both admirals have received book-length biographies, but this is the first attempt at a comparative study and the first to draw broader strategic lessons from their respective attempts as continental navalists to challenge maritime states. This book will be of much interest to students of naval history, strategic studies and International Relations.

This book describes and analyses two iconic figures in twentieth-century naval history: the German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and the Russian Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. It examines the men, what they thought and wrote about seapower, the fleets they created and the strategic consequences of what they did. More broadly, it draws on the respective histories of the post-1897 Imperial German Navy and the post-1956 Soviet Navy to examine the continental bid for large-scale seapower. The work argues that both individuals built navies that did not, and could not, fulfil the objectives for which they were created. Drawing on the legacies of both men, the book also develops some wider ideas about the creation of large navies by continental states, with cautionary lessons for today's emerging powers, India and China. Both admirals have received book-length biographies, but this is the first attempt at a comparative study and the first to draw broader strategic lessons from their respective attempts as continental navalists to challenge maritime states. This book will be of much interest to students of naval history, strategic studies and International Relations.

Britain was the first country to come under sustained ballistic missile attack, during 1944--45. Defence against ballistic missiles has been a persistent, if highly variable, subject of political policy and technical investigation ever since. The British Second World War experience of trying to counter the V-2 attacks contained many elements of subsequent responses to ballistic missile threats: an uncertain intelligence picture; the establishment of an early-warning system; a counter-force campaign to destroy rockets on the ground; passive defence measures to ameliorate the effects of missile strikes; and elaborate but untried active defences to intercept missiles in flight. After the war, a reasonably accurate picture of Soviet missile capabilities was not achieved until the early 1960s, by which time the problem of early warning had largely been solved. Early British efforts to develop active defences, however, foundered because of the formidable technical challenges and limited resources, but some defences were established by the Americans and the Soviets. the country's own defences towards the wider consequences of US and Soviet deployments. British concerns centred around the implications of active defence for strategic stability, the arms-control process and the credibility of the UK's small nuclear deterrent. The British government had to respond three times to American defence programmes, though each time its worries were ultimately assuaged. Soviet defences around Moscow were more problematic and resulted in a sophisticated and expensive project -- Chevaline -- to overcome them. After the end of the Cold War there was renewed interest in a limited active-defence capability against Third World missile threats. A series of technical and policy studies has yet to result in a procurement decision, but looks increasingly likely in coming years. This well-researched book is primarily aimed at students of post-war British foreign and defence policies, but will also be of interest to informed general readers.

Britain was the first country to come under sustained ballistic missile attack, during 1944-45. Defense against ballistic missiles has been a persistent, if highly variable, subject of political policy and technical investigation ever since.
The British Second World War experience of trying to counter the V-2 attacks contained many elements of subsequent responses to ballistic missile threats: an uncertain intelligence picture; the establishment of an early-warning system; a counter-force campaign to destroy rockets on the ground; passive defense measures to ameliorate the effects of missile strikes; and elaborate but untried active defenses to intercept missiles in flight.
After the war, a reasonably accurate picture of Soviet missile capabilities was not achieved until the early 1960s, by which time the problem of early warning had largely been solved. Early British efforts to develop active defenses, however, foundered because of the formidable technical challenges and limited resources, but some defenses were established by the Americans and the Soviets.
From the mid-1960s on, British attention shifted away from the development of the country's own defenses towards the wider consequences of US and Soviet deployments. British concerns centered around the implications of active defense for strategic stability, the arms-control process and the credibility of the UK's small nuclear deterrent. The British government had to respond three times to American defense programs, though each time its worries were ultimately assuaged. Soviet defenses around Moscow were more problematic and resulted in a sophisticated and expensive project - Chevaline - to overcome them. After the endof the Cold War there was renewed interest in a limited active-defense capability against Third World missile threats. A series of technical and policy studies has yet to result in a procurement decision, but looks increasingly likely in coming years. This well-researched book is primarily aimed at students of post-war British foreign and defense policies, but will also be of interest to informed general readers.

U.S. plans for missile defense have been a contentious issue in transatlantic relations for nearly 40 years. Notwithstanding the recent focus on events in Iraq, ballistic missile defense (BMD) remains a significant part of American defense policy, and an aspect that continues to generate interest and concern abroad. At the same time, U.S. allies have potentially important roles to play in American missile defense and have developing requirements of their own. This monograph, by Dr. Jeremy Stocker, seeks to examine the many facets of the role that Britain, America's closest and strongest ally, plays in missile defense, and to identify the ways in which disagreements can be minimized and cooperation enhanced, to mutual benefit.