|
Showing 1 - 8 of
8 matches in All Departments
Several published reports indicate that top Israeli decisionmakers
are seriously considering whether to order a military strike on
Iran's nuclear facilities, and if so, when. Twice in Israel's
history, it has conducted air strikes aimed at halting or delaying
what Israeli policymakers believed to be efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons by a Middle Eastern state-destroying Iraq's Osirak reactor
in 1981 and a facility the Israelis identified as a reactor under
construction in Syria in 2007. Today, Israeli officials generally
view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as an unacceptable threat
to Israeli security-with some describing it as an existential
threat. This report analyzes key factors that may influence Israeli
political decisions relating to a possible strike on Iranian
nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the
views of and relationships among Israeli leaders; the views of the
Israeli public; U.S., regional, and international stances and
responses as perceived and anticipated by Israel; Israeli estimates
of the potential effectiveness and risks of a possible strike; and
responses Israeli leaders anticipate from Iran and Iranian-allied
actors-including Hezbollah and Hamas-regionally and
internationally.
This report and its appendixes provide background information on
Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, and U.S. policy towards
it. It also includes information and analysis on (1) the threats
Hamas currently poses to U.S. interests, (2) how Hamas compares
with other Middle East terrorist groups, (3) Hamas's ideology and
policies (both generally and on discrete issues), (4) its
leadership and organization, and (5) its sources of assistance.
Finally, the report raises and discusses various legislative and
oversight options related to foreign aid strategies, financial
sanctions, and regional and international political approaches. In
evaluating these options, Congress can assess how Hamas has emerged
and adapted over time, and also scrutinize the track record of
U.S., Israeli, and international policy to counter Hamas. Hamas is
a Palestinian Islamist military and sociopolitical movement that
grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood. The United States, Israel, the
European Union, and Canada consider Hamas a terrorist organization
because of (1) its violent resistance to what it deems Israeli
occupation of historic Palestine (constituting present-day Israel,
West Bank, and Gaza Strip), and (2) its rejection of the off-and-on
peace process involving Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) since the early 1990s. Since Hamas's inception
in 1987, it has maintained its primary base of political support
and its military command in the Gaza Strip-a territory it has
controlled since June 2007-while also having a significant presence
in the West Bank. The movement's political leadership is currently
headquartered in exile in Damascus, Syria. Hamas receives
assistance and training from Iran, Syria, and the Lebanese Shiite
militant group Hezbollah. Hamas is often discussed alongside other
groups in the region that engage in militant and terrorist
activities to achieve their ends, yet Hamas has confined its
militancy to Israel and the Palestinian territories-distinguishing
it from the broader aspirations expressed by Al Qaeda and its
affiliates. The overarching U.S. goal regarding Hamas is to deter,
transform, marginalize, or neutralize it so that it no longer
presents a threat to Israel's security, to a peaceful and lasting
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or to other U.S.
interests-either in its own right or as a proxy of Iran or other
actors. Various legislative and policy initiatives designed to
accomplish this goal have at most achieved temporary or partial
success. It is possible to conclude that U.S. and other
international support for Israel and the Palestinian Authority/PLO
dominated by Fatah (Hamas's main rival faction) has been
counterproductive to some extent when comparing Hamas's domestic,
regional, and international strength in the early 1990s-measured by
factors such as popularity, military force, and leverage with other
actors (including Israel and Fatah)-to its current strength. The
Israeli-Egyptian closure regime in Gaza and various U.S. and
international initiatives constrain and isolate Hamas to a point
and may exacerbate its internal organizational tensions and
tactical disagreements. Yet, the threats Hamas continues to pose to
Israel, to prospects for a two-state solution and to the future of
Palestinian democracy present considerable risks and difficult
trade-offs for any U.S. policy decisions going forward.
The circumstances surrounding the collapse of the Camp David summit
between U.S. president Bill Clinton, Israeli prime minister Ehud
Barak and Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Yasser Arafat in July
2000 are still hotly debated by scholars and experts of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In pointing out the myriad of reasons
for the breakdown, some have pointed to flaws in leaders'
personalities and differences in negotiation styles; others have
stressed the lack of sufficient preparations for the summit and the
initial unbridgeable differences between the parties attending it.
Most experts, however, agree that domestic considerations played a
major role in the summit progression and eventual breakdown. This
book highlights the attempts to salvage peace against the backdrop
of intensifying violence during the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
and the role of domestic factors, particularly public opinion in
determining the conduct of Israelis and Palestinians since the
beginning of the second intifada. This book consists of public
documents which have been located, gathered, combined, reformatted,
and enhanced with a subject index, selectively edited and bound to
provide easy access.
|
You may like...
Loot
Nadine Gordimer
Paperback
(2)
R383
R310
Discovery Miles 3 100
|