In spite of the outcome of the Cold War, English argues persuasively here that the nuclear defensive posture adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was inherently flawed. Victory in the Cold War, moreover, seems to have increased the attractiveness of this potentially dangerous model. In fact, NATO's attempts to replace conventional armies with nuclear technology represented a misreading of history inasmuch as war has always been more of a social than technological phenomenon. From his succinct survey of the growth and operations of field armies from medieval times to the Gulf War, English concludes that the legitimately constituted conventional army of the nation-state still remains the best instrument for bringing some semblance of order to the destructive chaos of war.

The development of field armies has involved much more sophistication than generally supposed. In both practice and theory, army operations have been as knowledge-based and intellectually rigorous as any academic discipline, ensuring them an enduring place as a practical means of applying massive force. Fortunately, the NATO attempt to replace conventional armies with nuclear technology was never tested in a real war. But English suggests that the likelihood of deterrence continuing in war, because of its transmutability, also offers hope that it can be controlled in the future, as it was in the past, by social forces. This book offers a longer, more realistic view of war than that normally embraced by technocrats in search of better weapons and peacemakers in search of utopia.

This book also addresses in detail the questions of why armies became so large and why war itself transmutated. The technological transformation of war that occurred after 1815 is discussed, in turn, for the effect it exerted upon the future operations of armies. A novel perspective on the tactical and operational progression of warfighting up to the end of World War II is also provided through an examination of modern defensive theory. On a more elevated plane, the book critically assesses the ways in which nuclear deterrence ultimately affected NATO's defensive posture in central Europe. Also subjected to detailed scrutiny are the theoretical and practical dimensions of ground force concepts for the defense of the NATO central front. Finally, English evaluates ground force operations in the Gulf War with a view to drawing relevant conclusions and lessons for the future.

General Bernard Law Montgomery, affectionately known as "Monty," exerted an influence on the Canadian Army more lasting than that of any other Second World War commander. In 1942 he assumed responsibility for the exercise and training of Canadian formations in England, and by the end of the war Canada’s field army was second to none in the practical exercise of combined arms. In Monty and the Canadian Army, John A. English analyses the way Montgomery’s operational influence continued to permeate the Canadian Army. For years, the Canadian Army remained a highly professional force largely because it was commanded at almost every lower level by "Monty men" steeped in the Montgomery method. The era of the Canadian Army headed by such men ceased with the integration and unification of Canada’s armed forces in 1964. The embrace of Montgomery by Canadian soldiers stands in marked contrast to largely negative perceptions held by Americans. Monty and the Canadian Army aims to correct such perceptions, which are mostly superficial and more often than not wrong, and addresses the anomaly of how this gifted general, one of the greatest field commanders of the Second World War, managed to win over other North American troops.

The reverses experienced by Canadian troops during the late stages of World War II continue to be the subject of intensive inquiry among military historians. Going beyond the obvious immediate causes of these setbacks, the author presents a detailed historical examination of the role of the Canadian army in Normandy and of the organization, training, and fighting-style that the Canadians brought to the battlefield in 1944.

In Book I, the author analyzes the impact of the British military model on the Canadian corps in terms of doctrine, training, command and staff appointments, equipment, and organization. He discusses the contribution of Canadian troops in World War I and the failure of the Canadian military to maintain a high level of professionalism in the interwar period. Drawing on archival records, particularly Montgomery's personal correspondence, the author offers new information on attempts to turn Canadian troops into an effective fighting force as late as 1943. Book II presents a critical analysis of Canadian operations in Normandy. The author gives special attention to the Canadian Army's inability to close the Falaise Gap in a timely manner--a delay that may have prolonged the war in Europe by several months. Providing both theoretical and practical perspectives on the relationship of peacetime preparation to the operation of large field forces in battle, this work will be of interest to students and buffs of military history and to professional analysts and strategic planners in the armed services.

Another volume in Praeger's "The Military Profession" series, this revised edition of the 1984 Praeger classic tells the story of infantry in the 20th century and its impact on the major conflicts of our time. Its purpose is to provide the reader--whether infantryman or not--with hitherto unavailable insights on the role that infantry plays in the larger battle and how that has helped shape the world that we live in today. Unique aspects of the book include the treatment of technical issues in non-technical language, the extensive use of German and French sources generally unavailable to the English-speaking reader, and the shattering of some long-cherished myths. Combat motivation and combat refusal, the role played by small units (such as the squad and fire team), the role of infantry in the Blitzkrieg, and many other issues often papered over in the literature of infantry are discussed and analyzed in detail in this revised edition.

In spite of the outcome of the Cold War, English argues persuasively here that the nuclear defensive posture adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was inherently flawed. Victory in the Cold War, moreover, seems to have increased the attractiveness of this potentially dangerous model. In fact, NATO's attempts to replace conventional armies with nuclear technology represented a misreading of history inasmuch as war has always been more of a social than technological phenomenon. From his succinct survey of the growth and operations of field armies from medieval times to the Gulf War, English concludes that the legitimately constituted conventional army of the nation-state still remains the best instrument for bringing some semblance of order to the destructive chaos of war. The development of field armies has involved much more sophistication than generally supposed. In both practice and theory, army operations have been as knowledge-based and intellectually rigorous as any academic discipline, ensuring them an enduring place as a practical means of applying massive force. Fortunately, the NATO attempt to replace conventional armies with nuclear technology was never tested in a real war. But English suggests that the likelihood of deterrence continuing in war, because of its transmutability, also offers hope that it can be controlled in the future, as it was in the past, by social forces. This book offers a longer, more realistic view of war than that normally embraced by technocrats in search of better weapons and peacemakers in search of utopia. This book also addresses in detail the questions of why armies became so large and why war itself transmutated. The technological transformation of war that occurred after 1815 is discussed, in turn, for the effect it exerted upon the future operations of armies. A novel perspective on the tactical and operational progression of warfighting up to the end of World War II is also provided through an examination of modern defensive theory. On a more elevated plane, the book critically assesses the ways in which nuclear deterrence ultimately affected NATO's defensive posture in central Europe. Also subjected to detailed scrutiny are the theoretical and practical dimensions of ground force concepts for the defense of the NATO central front. Finally, English evaluates ground force operations in the Gulf War with a view to drawing relevant conclusions and lessons for the future.

General Bernard Law Montgomery, affectionately known as "Monty," exerted an influence on the Canadian Army more lasting than that of any other Second World War commander. In 1942 he assumed responsibility for the exercise and training of Canadian formations in England, and by the end of the war Canada's field army was second to none in the practical exercise of combined arms. In Monty and the Canadian Army, John A. English analyses the way Montgomery's operational influence continued to permeate the Canadian Army. For years, the Canadian Army remained a highly professional force largely because it was commanded at almost every lower level by "Monty men" steeped in the Montgomery method. The era of the Canadian Army headed by such men ceased with the integration and unification of Canada's armed forces in 1964. The embrace of Montgomery by Canadian soldiers stands in marked contrast to largely negative perceptions held by Americans. Monty and the Canadian Army aims to correct such perceptions, which are mostly superficial and more often than not wrong, and addresses the anomaly of how this gifted general, one of the greatest field commanders of the Second World War, managed to win over other North American troops.