In spite of the outcome of the Cold War, English argues
persuasively here that the nuclear defensive posture adopted by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was inherently flawed.
Victory in the Cold War, moreover, seems to have increased the
attractiveness of this potentially dangerous model. In fact, NATO's
attempts to replace conventional armies with nuclear technology
represented a misreading of history inasmuch as war has always been
more of a social than technological phenomenon. From his succinct
survey of the growth and operations of field armies from medieval
times to the Gulf War, English concludes that the legitimately
constituted conventional army of the nation-state still remains the
best instrument for bringing some semblance of order to the
destructive chaos of war.
The development of field armies has involved much more
sophistication than generally supposed. In both practice and
theory, army operations have been as knowledge-based and
intellectually rigorous as any academic discipline, ensuring them
an enduring place as a practical means of applying massive force.
Fortunately, the NATO attempt to replace conventional armies with
nuclear technology was never tested in a real war. But English
suggests that the likelihood of deterrence continuing in war,
because of its transmutability, also offers hope that it can be
controlled in the future, as it was in the past, by social forces.
This book offers a longer, more realistic view of war than that
normally embraced by technocrats in search of better weapons and
peacemakers in search of utopia.
This book also addresses in detail the questions of why armies
became so large and why war itself transmutated. The technological
transformation of war that occurred after 1815 is discussed, in
turn, for the effect it exerted upon the future operations of
armies. A novel perspective on the tactical and operational
progression of warfighting up to the end of World War II is also
provided through an examination of modern defensive theory. On a
more elevated plane, the book critically assesses the ways in which
nuclear deterrence ultimately affected NATO's defensive posture in
central Europe. Also subjected to detailed scrutiny are the
theoretical and practical dimensions of ground force concepts for
the defense of the NATO central front. Finally, English evaluates
ground force operations in the Gulf War with a view to drawing
relevant conclusions and lessons for the future.
General
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