Today more than one hundred small, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars are being waged around the world. This book provides invaluable tools for fighting such wars by taking enemy perspectives into consideration. The third volume of a trilogy by Max G. Manwaring, it continues the arguments the author presented in "Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime" and "Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries." Using case studies, Manwaring outlines vital survival lessons for leaders and organizations concerned with national security in our contemporary world.
The insurgencies Manwaring describes span the globe. Beginning with conflicts in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s, he goes on to cover the Shining Path and its resurgence in Peru, Al Qaeda in Spain, popular militias in Cuba, Haiti, and Brazil, the Russian youth group Nashi, and drugs and politics in Guatemala, as well as cyber warfare.
Large, wealthy, well-armed nations such as the United States have learned from experience that these small wars and insurgencies do not resemble traditional wars fought between geographically distinct nation-state adversaries by easily identified military forces. Twenty-first-century irregular conflicts blur traditional distinctions among crime, terrorism, subversion, insurgency, militia, mercenary and gang activity, and warfare.
Manwaring's multidimensional paradigm offers military and civilian leaders a much needed blueprint for achieving strategic victories and ensuring global security now and in the future. It combines military and police efforts with politics, diplomacy, economics, psychology, and ethics. The challenge he presents to civilian and military leaders is to take probable enemy perspectives into consideration, and turn resultant conceptions into strategic victories.

Addressing the interaction between military operations and the activities of civilian government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) during and after conflict, this study traces the development of civil military operations from their origin during World War II as Civil Affairs and military government to the present array of civil military operations. In so doing, it looks closely at the recent cases of Panama, Kuwait and southern Iraq, the Kurdish rescue mission in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. Of particular interest is the book's integration of national policy, strategy, and operations as it looks at the interplay between combat operations and their civil, military and political consequences. The outcome of the operations considered here suggests a need to look at the organization and planning of military forces in contemporary conflict as well as the integration of nonmilitary players into the game from the start of operations. The author concludes that the essence of modern conflict can be found in civil military operations.

As the first decade of the twenty-first century has made brutally clear, the very definitions of war and the enemy have changed almost beyond recognition. Threats to security are now as likely to come from armed propagandists, popular militias, or mercenary organizations as they are from conventional armies backed by nation-states. In this timely book, national security expert Max G. Manwaring explores a little-understood actor on the stage of irregular warfare--the gang.

Since the end of the Cold War, some one hundred insurgencies or irregular wars have erupted throughout the world. Gangs have figured prominently in more than half of those conflicts, yet these and other nonstate actors have received little focused attention from scholars or analysts. This book fills that void.

Employing a case study approach, and believing that shadows from the past often portend the future, Manwaring begins with a careful consideration of the writings of V. I. Lenin. He then scrutinizes the Piqueteros in Argentina, gangs in Colombia, private armies in Mexico, Hugo Chavez's use of popular militias in Venezuela, and the looming threat of Al Qaeda in Western Europe.

As conventional warfare is increasingly eclipsed by these irregular and "uncomfortable" wars, Manwaring boldly diagnoses the problem and recommends solutions that policymakers should heed.

This volume commends itself to the reader to provoke thought about what governments and international organizations ought to do when faced with the responsibilities of a given peace operation. Equally important, it suggests what we as citizens in the world community ought to demand of our governments and that community in the current world disorder.
The intent is to help decision-makers, policy makers, opinion-makers and students understand the nature of the problem that is likely to provide the greatest challenge to international security management into the next century.

This volume commends itself to the reader to provoke thought about what governments and international organizations ought to do when faced with the responsibilities of a given peace operation. Equally important, it suggests what we as citizens in the world community ought to demand of our governments and that community in the current world disorder.
The intent is to help decision-makers, policy makers, opinion-makers and students understand the nature of the problem that is likely to provide the greatest challenge to international security management into the next century.

Today more than one hundred small, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars are being waged around the world. This book provides invaluable tools for fighting such wars by taking enemy perspectives into consideration. The third volume of a trilogy by Max G. Manwaring, it continues the arguments the author presented in Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime and Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries. Using case studies, Manwaring outlines vital survival lessons for leaders and organizations concerned with national security in our contemporary world. The insurgencies Manwaring describes span the globe. Beginning with conflicts in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s, he goes on to cover the Shining Path and its resurgence in Peru, Al Qaeda in Spain, popular militias in Cuba, Haiti, and Brazil, the Russian youth group Nashi, and drugs and politics in Guatemala, as well as cyber warfare. Large, wealthy, well-armed nations such as the United States have learned from experience that these small wars and insurgencies do not resemble traditional wars fought between geographically distinct nation-state adversaries by easily identified military forces. Twenty-first-century irregular conflicts blur traditional distinctions among crime, terrorism, subversion, insurgency, militia, mercenary and gang activity, and warfare. Manwaring's multidimensional paradigm offers military and civilian leaders a much needed blueprint for achieving strategic victories and ensuring global security now and in the future. It combines military and police efforts with politics, diplomacy, economics, psychology, and ethics. The challenge he presents to civilian and military leaders is to take probable enemy perspectives into consideration, and turn resultant conceptions into strategic victories.

Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since September 11, 2001, the United States has faced daunting challenges in the areas of foreign policy and national security. Threatened by failing states, insurgencies, civil wars, and terrorism, the nation has been compelled to re-evaluate its traditional responses to global conflict. In this timely book, John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring present a much-needed strategy for conducting unconventional warfare in an increasingly violent world.

In the early 1990s, Manwaring introduced a new paradigm for addressing low-intensity conflicts, or conflicts other than major wars. Termed the Manwaring Paradigm or SWORD (Small Wars Operations Research Directorate) model, it has been tested successfully by scholars and practitioners and refined in the wake of new and significant "uncomfortable wars" around the world, most notably the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. "Uncomfortable Wars" Revisited broadens the definition of the original paradigm and applies it to specific confrontations

As the first decade of the twenty-first century has made brutally clear, the very definitions of war and the enemy have changed almost beyond recognition. Threats to security are now as likely to come from armed propagandists, popular militias, or mercenary organizations as they are from conventional armies backed by nation-states. In this timely book, national security expert Max G. Manwaring explores a little-understood actor on the stage of irregular warfare - the gang.Since the end of the Cold War, some one hundred insurgencies or irregular wars have erupted throughout the world. Gangs have figured prominently in more than half of those conflicts, yet these and other nonstate actors have received little focused attention from scholars or analysts. This book fills that void. Employing a case study approach, and believing that shadows from the past often portend the future, Manwaring begins with a careful consideration of the writings of V. I. Lenin. He then scrutinizes the Piqueteros in Argentina, gangs in Colombia, private armies in Mexico, Hugo Chavez's use of popular militias in Venezuela, and the looming threat of Al Qaeda in Western Europe. As conventional warfare is increasingly eclipsed by these irregular and ""uncomfortable"" wars, Manwaring boldly diagnoses the problem and recommends solutions that policymakers should heed.

Security policy is a key factor not only of domestic politics in the U.S., but also of foreign relations and global security. This text sets to explain the process of security policy making in the United States by looking at all the elements that shape it, from institutions and legislation to policymakers themselves and historical precedents. To understand national security policy, the book first needs to address the way national security policy makers see the world. It shows that they generally see it in realist terms where the state is a single rational actor pursuing its national interest. It then focuses on how legislative authorities enable and constrain these policy makers before looking at the organizational context in which policies are made and implemented. This means examining the legal authorities that govern how the system functions, such as the Constitution and the National Security Act of 1947, as well as the various governmental institutions whose capabilities either limit or allow execution, such as the CIA, NSA, etc. Next, the text analyzes the processes and products of national security policy making, such as reports, showing how they differ from administration to administration. Lastly, a series of case studies illustrate the challenges of implementing and developing policy. These span the post-Cold war period to the present, and include the Panama crisis, Somalia, the Balkans Haiti, the Iraq wars, and Afghanistan. By combining both the theory and process, this textbook reveals all aspects of the making of national security policy in United States from agenda setting to the successes and failures of implementation.

Security policy is a key factor not only of domestic politics in the U.S., but also of foreign relations and global security. This text sets to explain the process of security policy making in the United States by looking at all the elements that shape it, from institutions and legislation to policymakers themselves and historical precedents. To understand national security policy, the book first needs to address the way national security policy makers see the world. It shows that they generally see it in realist terms where the state is a single rational actor pursuing its national interest. It then focuses on how legislative authorities enable and constrain these policy makers before looking at the organizational context in which policies are made and implemented. This means examining the legal authorities that govern how the system functions, such as the Constitution and the National Security Act of 1947, as well as the various governmental institutions whose capabilities either limit or allow execution, such as the CIA, NSA, etc. Next, the text analyzes the processes and products of national security policy making, such as reports, showing how they differ from administration to administration. Lastly, a series of case studies illustrate the challenges of implementing and developing policy. These span the post-Cold war period to the present, and include the Panama crisis, Somalia, the Balkans Haiti, the Iraq wars, and Afghanistan. By combining both the theory and process, this textbook reveals all aspects of the making of national security policy in United States from agenda setting to the successes and failures of implementation.