A look at First Amendment coverage of music, non-representational art, and nonsense The Supreme Court has unanimously held that Jackson Pollock’s paintings, Arnold Schöenberg’s music, and Lewis Carroll’s poem “Jabberwocky” are “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense: all receive constitutional coverage under an amendment protecting “the freedom of speech,” even though none involves what we typically think of as speech—the use of words to convey meaning. As a legal matter, the Court’s conclusion is clearly correct, but its premises are murky, and they raise difficult questions about the possibilities and limitations of law and expression. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense do not employ language in any traditional sense, and sometimes do not even involve the transmission of articulable ideas. How, then, can they be treated as “speech” for constitutional purposes? What does the difficulty of that question suggest for First Amendment law and theory? And can law resolve such inquiries without relying on aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy? Comprehensive and compelling, this book represents a sustained effort to account, constitutionally, for these modes of “speech.” While it is firmly centered in debates about First Amendment issues, it addresses them in a novel way, using subject matter that is uniquely well suited to the task, and whose constitutional salience has been under-explored. Drawing on existing legal doctrine, aesthetics, and analytical philosophy, three celebrated law scholars show us how and why speech beyond words should be fundamental to our understanding of the First Amendment.

The Second Amendment is among the most recognized provisions of the Constitution. It is also perhaps the most misunderstood. Common misconceptions about the amendment - what it forbids, what it permits, how it functions as law - distort the gun debate and America's constitutional culture. In The Positive Second Amendment, Blocher and Miller provide the first comprehensive post-Heller account of the history, theory, and law of the right to keep and bear arms. Their aim is not to pick sides in the gun debate, but rather to show how a positive account of the 'constitutional' Second Amendment differs from its political cousin. Understanding the right to keep and bear arms as constitutional law will challenge many deeply held beliefs. But it may also provide a better way to negotiate the seemingly intractable issues that afflict America's debate over gun rights and regulation.

The Second Amendment is among the most recognized provisions of the Constitution. It is also perhaps the most misunderstood. Common misconceptions about the amendment - what it forbids, what it permits, how it functions as law - distort the gun debate and America's constitutional culture. In The Positive Second Amendment, Blocher and Miller provide the first comprehensive post-Heller account of the history, theory, and law of the right to keep and bear arms. Their aim is not to pick sides in the gun debate, but rather to show how a positive account of the 'constitutional' Second Amendment differs from its political cousin. Understanding the right to keep and bear arms as constitutional law will challenge many deeply held beliefs. But it may also provide a better way to negotiate the seemingly intractable issues that afflict America's debate over gun rights and regulation.

A look at First Amendment coverage of music, non-representational art, and nonsense The Supreme Court has unanimously held that Jackson Pollock's paintings, Arnold Schoeenberg's music, and Lewis Carroll's poem "Jabberwocky" are "unquestionably shielded" by the First Amendment. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense: all receive constitutional coverage under an amendment protecting "the freedom of speech," even though none involves what we typically think of as speech-the use of words to convey meaning. As a legal matter, the Court's conclusion is clearly correct, but its premises are murky, and they raise difficult questions about the possibilities and limitations of law and expression. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense do not employ language in any traditional sense, and sometimes do not even involve the transmission of articulable ideas. How, then, can they be treated as "speech" for constitutional purposes? What does the difficulty of that question suggest for First Amendment law and theory? And can law resolve such inquiries without relying on aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy? Comprehensive and compelling, this book represents a sustained effort to account, constitutionally, for these modes of "speech." While it is firmly centered in debates about First Amendment issues, it addresses them in a novel way, using subject matter that is uniquely well suited to the task, and whose constitutional salience has been under-explored. Drawing on existing legal doctrine, aesthetics, and analytical philosophy, three celebrated law scholars show us how and why speech beyond words should be fundamental to our understanding of the First Amendment.