Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen tackles the major questions concerning luck egalitarianism, providing deep, penetrating and original discussion of recent academic discourses on distributive justice as well as responses to some of the main objections in the literature. He offers a new answer to the "Why equality?" and "Equality of what?" questions, and provides a robust luck egalitarian response to the recent criticisms of luck egalitarianism by social relations egalitarians. This systematic, theoretical introduction illustrates the broader picture of distributive justice and enables the reader to understand the core intuitions underlying, or conflicting with, luck egalitarianism.

Egalitarianism, the view that equality matters, attracts a great deal of attention amongst contemporary political theorists. And yet it has turned out to be surprisingly difficult to provide a fully satisfactory egalitarian theory. The cutting-edge articles in Egalitarianism move the debate forward. They are written by some of the leading political philosophers in the field. Recent issues in the debate over equality are given careful consideration: the distinction between 'telic' and 'deontic' egalitarianism; prioritarianism and the so-called 'levelling down objection' to egalitarianism; whether egalitarian justice should have 'whole lives' or some subset thereof as its temporal focus; the implications of Scanlon's contractualist account of the value of choice for egalitarian justice; and the question of whether non-human animals fall within the scope of egalitarianism and if so, what the implications are. Numerous 'classic' issues receive a new treatment too: how egalitarianism can be justified and how, if at all, this value should be combined with other values such as desert, liberty and sufficiency; how to define the 'worst off' for the purposes of Rawls' difference principle; Elizabeth Anderson's feminist account of 'equality of relations'; how equality applies to risky choices and, in particular, whether it is justifiable to restrict the freedom of suppliers who wish to release goods that confer different levels of risk on consumers, depending on their ability to pay. Finally, the implications of egalitarianism and prioritarianism for health care are scrutinized. The contributors to the volume are: Richard Arneson, Linda Barclay, Thomas Christiano, Nils Holtug, Susan Hurley, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Dennis McKerlie, Ingmar Persson, Bertil Tungodden, Peter Vallentyne, Andrew Williams, and Jonathan Wolff.

What role should (non-normative) facts such as people’s confined generosity and scarcity of resources play in the normative theorising of political philosophers? The chapters in this book investigate different aspects of this broad question. Political philosophers are often silent on questions of what types of facts are relevant, if any, for normative theory, and what methodological assumptions about agency and behaviour need to be made, if any such assumptions are necessary. However, due to recent debates among and between idealists, non-idealists and realists in political theory, the issue about the relation between facts and norms in political philosophy/theory is beginning to attract greater attention from political theorists/philosophers. The chapters in this book were originally published in the journal Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.

While it has many connections to other topics in normative and applied ethics, discrimination is a central subject in philosophy in its own right. It plays a significant role in relation to many real-life complaints about unjust treatment or unjust inequalities, and it raises a number of questions in political and moral philosophy, and in legal theory. Some of these questions include: what distinguishes the concept of discrimination from the concept of differential treatment? What distinguishes direct from indirect discrimination? Is discrimination always morally wrong? What makes discrimination wrong? How should we eliminate the effects of discrimination? By covering a wide range of topics, and by doing so in a way that does not assume prior acquaintance, this handbook enables the reader to get to grips with the omnipresent issue. The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination is an outstanding reference source to this exciting subject and the first collection of its kind. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors the handbook is divided into six main parts: * conceptual issues * the wrongness of discrimination * groups of 'discriminatees' * sites of discrimination * causes and means * history of discrimination. Essential reading for students and researchers in applied ethics and political philosophy the handbook will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as law, sociology and politics.

What role should (non-normative) facts such as people's confined generosity and scarcity of resources play in the normative theorising of political philosophers? The chapters in this book investigate different aspects of this broad question. Political philosophers are often silent on questions of what types of facts are relevant, if any, for normative theory, and what methodological assumptions about agency and behaviour need to be made, if any such assumptions are necessary. However, due to recent debates among and between idealists, non-idealists and realists in political theory, the issue about the relation between facts and norms in political philosophy/theory is beginning to attract greater attention from political theorists/philosophers. The chapters in this book were originally published in the journal Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.

How should we respond to the worst refugee crisis since the World War II? What are our duties towards refugees, and how should we distribute these duties among those at the receiving end of the refugee flow? What are the relevant political solutions? Are some states more responsible for creating the current refugee situation, and if so, should they also carry a larger burden on solving this situation? Is people smuggling always morally wrong? Are some groups, for example children, owed more than others, and should we thus take active measures to remove them from conflict zones? How are the existing refugee regimes, in Europe, North-America, or Australia, challenged by the current crisis? Are some of their measures more justified than others? Refugee Crisis: The Borders of Human Mobility discusses the various ethical dilemmas and potential political solutions to the ongoing refugee crisis, providing both theoretical and practical reflections on the current crisis, as well as the ways in which this crisis has been handled in public debate. The contributors to the volume include some of the most prominent political theorists and experts on the current refugee situation, as well as some of the upcoming young scholars working on the theme. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Journal of Global Ethics.

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen here poses the question: "Is affirmative action morally (un)justifiable?" As a phrase that frequently surfaces in major headlines, affirmative action is a highly controversial and far-reaching issue, yet most of the recent scholarly literature surrounding the topic tends to focus on defending one side or another in a particular case of affirmative action. Lippert-Rasmussen instead takes a wide-angle view, addressing each of the prevailing contemporary arguments for and against affirmative action. In his introduction, he proposes an amended definition of affirmative action and considers what forms, from quotas to outreach strategies, may fall under this revised definition. He then analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of each position, relative to each other, and applies recent discussions in political philosophy to assess if and how each argument might justify different conclusions given different cases or philosophical frameworks. Each chapter investigates an argument for or against affirmative action. The six arguments for it consist of compensation, anti-discrimination, equality of opportunity, role model, diversity, and integration. The five arguments against it are reverse discrimination, stigma, mismatch, publicity, and merit. Lippert-Rasmussen also expands the discussion to include affirmative action for groups beyond the prototypical examples of African Americans and women, and to consider health and minority languages as possible criteria for inclusion in affirmative action initiatives. Based on the comparative strength of anti-discrimination and equality of opportunity arguments, Making Sense of Affirmative Action ultimately makes a case in favor of affirmative action; however, its originality lies in Lippert-Rasmussen's careful exploration of moral justifiability as a contextual evaluative measure and his insistence that complexity and a comparative focus are inherent to this important issue.

How should we respond to the worst refugee crisis since the World War II? What are our duties towards refugees, and how should we distribute these duties among those at the receiving end of the refugee flow? What are the relevant political solutions? Are some states more responsible for creating the current refugee situation, and if so, should they also carry a larger burden on solving this situation? Is people smuggling always morally wrong? Are some groups, for example children, owed more than others, and should we thus take active measures to remove them from conflict zones? How are the existing refugee regimes, in Europe, North-America, or Australia, challenged by the current crisis? Are some of their measures more justified than others? Refugee Crisis: The Borders of Human Mobility discusses the various ethical dilemmas and potential political solutions to the ongoing refugee crisis, providing both theoretical and practical reflections on the current crisis, as well as the ways in which this crisis has been handled in public debate. The contributors to the volume include some of the most prominent political theorists and experts on the current refugee situation, as well as some of the upcoming young scholars working on the theme. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Journal of Global Ethics.

While it has many connections to other topics in normative and applied ethics, discrimination is a central subject in philosophy in its own right. It plays a significant role in relation to many real-life complaints about unjust treatment or unjust inequalities, and it raises a number of questions in political and moral philosophy, and in legal theory. Some of these questions include: what distinguishes the concept of discrimination from the concept of differential treatment? What distinguishes direct from indirect discrimination? Is discrimination always morally wrong? What makes discrimination wrong? How should we eliminate the effects of discrimination? By covering a wide range of topics, and by doing so in a way that does not assume prior acquaintance, this handbook enables the reader to get to grips with the omnipresent issue. The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination is an outstanding reference source to this exciting subject and the first collection of its kind. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors the handbook is divided into six main parts: * conceptual issues * the wrongness of discrimination * groups of 'discriminatees' * sites of discrimination * causes and means * history of discrimination. Essential reading for students and researchers in applied ethics and political philosophy the handbook will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as law, sociology and politics.

Over the last twenty years, many political philosophers have rejected the idea that justice is fundamentally about distribution. Rather, justice is about social relations, and the so-called distributive paradigm should be replaced by a new relational paradigm. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen seeks to describe, refine, and assess these thoughts and to propose a comprehensive form of egalitarianism which includes central elements from both relational and distributive paradigms. He shows why many of the challenges that luck egalitarianism faces reappear, once we try to specify relational egalitarianism more fully. His discussion advances understanding of the nature of the relational ideal, and introduces new conceptual tools for understanding it and for exploring the important question of why it is desirable in the first place to relate as equals. Even severe critics of the distributive understanding of justice will find that this book casts important new light on the ideal to which they subscribe.

“Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye” says the Bible. In other words: there is something problematic about one person blaming another, when the blamer's faults are even greater. Many believe that even if one has done something blameworthy, one can dismiss blame when coming from a hypocritical blamer. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen examines the nature and ethics of standingless, hypocritical blame. It argues that hypocrites lack standing to blame in virtue of their lack of commitment to the norms to which they appeal in their blame; that hypocritical blame is pro tanto morally wrong because it involves treating the blamee as an inferior; and that there are many other sources of lacking standing to blame than hypocrisy, e.g., complicity. Lippert-Rasmussen extrapolates these analyses to other moral responses, notably praising and forgiving. So far, philosophers interested in standing have focused narrowly on blaming, but many other moral responses require standing as well. Indeed, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that considerations about standing apply to illocutionary acts not involving appeals to moral norms, e.g., non-moral encouragements and epistemic blame. In closing, Lippert-Rasmussen uses insights related to the idea of standing as a basis for making a grand claim about how part of morality is interpersonal in a sense often ignored in discussions of mainstream first-order moral theories, and to elucidate the nature of the moral wrong involved in relying on negative statistical generalizations about certain groups of people.

Over the last twenty years, many political philosophers have rejected the idea that justice is fundamentally about distribution. Rather, justice is about social relations, and the so-called distributive paradigm should be replaced by a new relational paradigm. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen seeks to describe, refine, and assess these thoughts and to propose a comprehensive form of egalitarianism which includes central elements from both relational and distributive paradigms. He shows why many of the challenges that luck egalitarianism faces reappear, once we try to specify relational egalitarianism more fully. His discussion advances understanding of the nature of the relational ideal, and introduces new conceptual tools for understanding it and for exploring the important question of why it is desirable in the first place to relate as equals. Even severe critics of the distributive understanding of justice will find that this book casts important new light on the ideal to which they subscribe.

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen tackles all the major questions concerning luck egalitarianism, providing deep, penetrating and original discussion of recent academic discourses on distributive justice as well as responses to some of the main objections in the literature. It offers a new answer to the "Why equality?" and "Equality of what?" questions, and provides a robust luck egalitarian response to the recent criticisms of luck egalitarianism by social relations egalitarians. This systematic, theoretical introduction illustrates the broader picture of distributive justice and enables the reader to understand the core intuitions underlying, or conflicting with, luck egalitarianism.

What is discrimination? There are certain instances of differential treatment that almost anyone would describe as discriminatory; yet upon deeper examination, this near-unanimity gives way to disagreement and difference. For instance, is it discrimination when hospitals hire non-smokers only? Not only do people differ on which cases of differential treatment they see as discriminatory, they also disagree about when discrimination is morally wrong; what makes it morally wrong; and, indeed, about whether all forms of discrimination are morally wrong! Finally, many disagree over what should be done about wrongful discrimination-especially about what the state could permissibly do to eliminate wrongful discrimination, e.g. in people's love lives. This book addresses these issues. It argues that there are different concepts of discrimination and that different purposes pertaining to different contexts determine which one is the most useful. It gives special attention to a concept of discrimination that ties discrimination to differential treatment of people on the basis of their membership in socially salient groups. Second, it argues that when discrimination is wrong, it is so first and foremost because of its harmful effects. Third, it takes issue with some of the standard devices used to counteract discrimination and submits that combating discrimination requires more than state actions. Finally, it argues that states may sometimes permissibly discriminate. "[Lippert-Rasmussen] is a master of advancing discussion on a topic by showing that where the rest of us saw only two or three possible positions, there are many positions, often smeared together in a confused way in prior writings on the topic. The different views need to be carefully distinguished, and we then need to look carefully at what can be said for and against each in turn. When we do this, our view of the issues significantly shifts. This method and its fruits are evident throughout the book... [The] author's analytical skill and creative imagination in following through this method make the book a pleasure to read. " -Richard J. Arneson, Professor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego

Three questions that loom large in moral and political philosophy are these: Can deontological moral constraints be justified? When, if ever, are we morally responsible for what we do? How is the ideal of equality best configured? Deontology, Responsibility and Equality deals with selected aspects of these three broad questions. It critically discusses certain attempts by Frances Kamm and Thomas Nagel (among others) to account for the impermissibility of minimizing violations in terms of moral status. Also, it challenges the view that there is a morally relevant difference between doing and allowing harm and, especially, between killing and letting die. In relation to the second question, it concentrates on recent developments within compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility prompted by the work of Harry Frankfurt. It challenges his purported refutation of the principle of alternative possibilities as well as certain positive compatibilist, identification- based accounts of respon