Using recently released archival materials from the United States and Europe, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam explains how and why the United States came to assume control as the dominant western power in Vietnam during the 1950s. Acting on their conviction that American methods had a better chance of building a stable, noncommunist South Vietnamese nation, Eisenhower administration officials systematically ejected French military, economic, political, bureaucratic, and cultural institutions from Vietnam. Kathryn C. Statler examines diplomatic maneuvers in Paris, Washington, London, and Saigon to detail how Western alliance members sought to transform South Vietnam into a modern, westernized, and democratic ally but ultimately failed to counter the Communist threat. Abetted by South Vietnamese prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem, Americans in Washington, D.C., and Saigon undermined their French counterparts at every turn, resulting in the disappearance of a French presence by the time Kennedy assumed office. Although the United States ultimately replaced France in South Vietnam, efforts to build South Vietnam into a nation failed. Instead, it became a dependent client state that was unable to withstand increasing Communist aggression from the North. Replacing France is a fundamental reassessment of the origins of U.S. involvement in Vietnam that explains how Franco-American conflict led the United States to pursue a unilateral and ultimately imperialist policy in Vietnam.

In the United States, the Cold War is often remembered as a two-power struggle. However, increasing globalization during that time meant nations across the world became involved in the conflict. During the Eisenhower administration, American officials struggled to respond to the dual threats of communism and nationalism as decolonization swept through the Third World during the 1950s and changed the nature of the Cold War and U.S. foreign relations with those nations. As the Cold War increasingly became a zero-sum game, the Third World became the primary battleground in the ideological, economic, and political struggle between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, as these essays demonstrate, the Eisenhower administration placed an extremely high priority on victory in the Third World and seemed willing to go to virtually any length to ensure that countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas remained aligned with the forces of democracy and capitalism. Relying on formerly unavailable archival research from many nations, the scholars in this volume systematically assess the impact of the globalizing Cold War and the process of decolonization on the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy. Intended for diplomatic historians and readers interested in the Cold War, this book is a major contribution to an under-studied aspect of that conflict. Contributions by: Michael R. Adamson, David L. Anderson, Nathan J. Citino, Peter L. Hahn, Andrew L. Johns, Robert J. McMahon, James H. Meriwether, Kenneth A. Osgood, Chester J. Pach Jr., Jason C. Parker, John Prados, James F. Siekmeier, Kathryn C. Statler, and Yi Sun