A dynamic authorial team of leading American politics scholars and a teachable Five Principles of Politics framework made American Government: Power and Purpose the gold standard in its field for more than 30 years. The Seventeenth Edition introduces the first new co-author in a decade, Hahrie Han (Johns Hopkins University), who brings a contemporary perspective on teaching American government and on the foundational collective action principle interwoven throughout the text. Together with InQuizitive, Norton’s online learning tool, and the new Norton Illumine Ebook, American Government engages students in applying the Five Principles framework to American politics. In the process, they learn to think critically about course concepts and understand how contemporary scholarship shapes our understanding of American government, past and present.

American Government: A Brief Introduction teaches students how to interpret and question data in charts, graphs, and polls that they encounter daily in social media. Drawing on her expertise as both a teacher and researcher, new co-author Hahrie Han helps students develop essential quantitative literacy as they learn how American government works. A reconceptualized introductory chapter establishes a foundation for interpreting empirical evidence, and a unique framework built around the themes of governance and representation, helps students understand how the concepts and processes of American government function in their daily lives. Together with a robust media program that offers opportunities to remediate and apply these skills, American Government: A Brief Introduction builds the knowledge and confidence that enables students to think for themselves-whether in the voting booth, community participation, or interpreting in the news.

Why does the American political system work the way it does? This major revision brings a renewed focus to the institutions, processes and data that illuminate big questions about governance and representation in the United States. With a new adaptive learning tool, this edition does more than ever to help students understand how American government developed over time and how it works today.

A dynamic authorial team of leading American politics scholars and a teachable Five Principles of Politics framework made American Government: Power and Purpose the gold standard in its field for more than 30 years. The Seventeenth Edition introduces the first new co-author in a decade, Hahrie Han (Johns Hopkins University), who brings a contemporary perspective on teaching American government and on the foundational collective action principle interwoven throughout the text. Together with InQuizitive, Norton’s online learning tool, and the new Norton Illumine Ebook, American Government engages students in applying the Five Principles framework to American politics. In the process, they learn to think critically about course concepts and understand how contemporary scholarship shapes our understanding of American government, past and present.

The emergence of 'positive' political economy has been one of the most dramatic developments in contemporary economics and these volumes include some of the foundational works in this area.

Through case studies, illustrations, and examples, the author provides students with the means to analyze a wide variety of situations. The Second Edition has been thoroughly revised to include updated cases and examples, new problem sets and discussion questions, and new "Experimental Corner" sections at the end of many chapters, describing experiments from social science literature.

Imagination may be thought of as a 'work-around.' It is a resourceful tactic to 'undo' a rule by creating a path around it without necessarily defying it...Transgression, on the other hand, is rule breaking. There is no pretense of reinterpretation; it is defiance pure and simple. Whether imagination or disobedience is the source, constraints need not constrain, ties need not bind. So writes Kenneth A. Shepsle in his introduction to Rule Breaking and Political Imagination. Institutions are thought to channel the choices of individual actors. But what about when they do not? Throughout history, leaders and politicians have used imagination and transgression to break with constraints upon their agency. Shepsle ranges from ancient Rome to the United States Senate, and from Lyndon B. Johnson to the British House of Commons. He also explores rule breaking in less formal contexts, such as vigilantism in the Old West and the CIA's actions in the wake of 9/11. Entertaining and thought-provoking, Rule Breaking and Political Imagination will prompt a reassessment of the nature of institutions and remind us of the critical role of political mavericks.

Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.

Thoroughly updated based on recent scholarship and current events, American Government: Power and Purpose remains the gold standard for teaching a political scientific perspective on American government. Thorough analysis of the 2018 midterm elections and the first years of the Trump presidency make this revision more current and authoritative than ever.

Thoroughly updated based on recent scholarship and current events, American Government: Power and Purpose remains the gold standard for teaching a political scientific perspective on American government. Thorough analysis of the 2018 midterm elections and the first years of the Trump presidency make this revision more current and authoritative than ever.

One of the key constitutional features of a parliamentary democracy is that the political executive, or cabinet, derives its mandate from - and is politically responsible to - the legislature. What makes a parliamentary democracy democratic is that, once a legislative election has been held, the new legislature has the power to dismiss the incumbent executive and replace it with a new one. Moreover, it sits essentially as a court, passing continual judgement on the record of the executive, and continuous sentence on its future prospects. That is how citizens, indirectly, choose and control their government. But the relationship between legislature and executive is not one-sided. The executive typically has the authority to recommend dissolution of parliament and is usually drawn from the parliament. Executive personnel, therefore, have intimate familiarity with parliamentary practices; and for their part, parliamentary personnel aspire to executive appointments. Surprisingly little is known about the constitutional relationship between legislature and executive in parliamentary regimes; the present volume seeks to remedy this.

This volume serves as an introduction to the new field of positive political economy and the various economic and political processes with which it is concerned. Grounded in the rational-actor methodology of microeconomics, positive political economy is devoted to the dual analysis of the role of economic behavior in political processes and of political behavior and constraints in economic exchange. The field has focused on three main subjects of study: models of collective action in industrialized democracies; the organization of markets and alternative mechanisms of exchange in the Third World; and the analysis of the role of transaction costs in the development and functioning of political and economic institutions. Developments in all of these areas are covered in the book. In the first part of the book, two chapters are devoted to explaining the evolution of the positive political economy approach; the first chapter focusing on microfoundations and the second on macrophenomena. In the second part of the book, three chapters demonstrate applications of the approach to the analysis of various forms of economic and political organizations. In the concluding section, four chapters discuss the research programs that have developed out of four different focuses of analysis: individual decision, exchange transactions, rent-seeking and indivisibilities.

Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary democracy works. The authors formulate a theoretical model of how parties create new governments and either maintain them in office or, after a resignation or no-confidence vote, replace them. The theory involves strategic interaction, derives consequences, formulates empirical hypotheses on the basis of these, and tests the hypotheses with data drawn from the postwar European experience with parliamentary democracy.

American Government: Power and Purpose is the gold standard for teaching with a political scientific perspective on American politics because it combines the most current scholarship with a framework that engages students in the analytical process. Now with InQuizitive, Norton's adaptive learning tool, students have even more opportunities to master core concepts and apply the text's hallmark Five Principles of Politics to make sense of American politics.

An ambitious synthesis, Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions attempts to reconcile a number of rational choice viewpoints to produce a comprehensive look at congressional institutions. While most theorists have presented their work as exclusive alternatives for understanding Congress, this volume reconsiders that basic premise. If in fact these approaches are mutually exclusive, what evidence favors one over the other? Could it be that these views focus on different aspects of a more complex puzzle? Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast have assembled leading proponents of rational choice approaches to debate these issues. Some emphasize the problems of legislative decisionmaking under uncertainty and the role institutions play in providing incentives for relevant actors to provide information. Other theorists focus on political parties and emphasize the conditions under which parties exercise institutional authority and monitor institutional practices (or fail to do so). Still others investigate legislative delegation, both within and without the legislature. In debating the relationships between these research strands, the contributors not only provide powerful evidence for the power of formal modelling but also invite those involved in other modes of research to join the discussion. Thus the volume suggests how a more satisfying and complete model might emerge. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions is a timely volume that will provide the foundation for all future work in this area. Contributors include John H. Aldrich, David P. Baron, Gary W. Cox, John A. Ferejohn, Morris P. Fiorina, Thomas W. Gilligan, Keith Krehbiel, John Londregan, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, Forrest Maltzman, David W. Rohde, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Barbara Sinclair, Steven S. Smith, James Snyder, and Barry R. Weingast. Kenneth A. Shepsle is Professor of Government, Harvard University. Barry R. Weingast is Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

One of the key constitutional features of a parliamentary democracy is that the political executive, or cabinet, derives its mandate from - and is politically responsible to - the legislature. What makes a parliamentary democracy democratic is that, once a legislative election has been held, the new legislature has the power to dismiss the incumbent executive and replace it with a new one. Moreover, it sits essentially as a court, passing continual judgement on the record of the executive, and continuous sentence on its future prospects. That is how citizens, indirectly, choose and control their government. But the relationship between legislature and executive is not one-sided. The executive typically has the authority to recommend dissolution of parliament and is usually drawn from the parliament. Executive personnel, therefore, have intimate familiarity with parliamentary practices; and for their part, parliamentary personnel aspire to executive appointments. Surprisingly little is known about the constitutional relationship between legislature and executive in parliamentary regimes; the present volume seeks to remedy this.