"The link between food prices and poverty is as complex as it is important. Aksoy and Hoekman have put together a book that significantly advances our knowledge of this link. The book not only explores the conditions under which the poor are affected by food price movements but includes a number of empirical studies on the price-poverty link in specific developing countries. It deserves careful study by governments and NGOs." - Tim Josling, Professor Emeritus, Food Research Institute, and Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University "The timing of this book could hardly have been more appropriate: while the international community still ponders on the poverty implications of the 2007--8 global food crisis, food prices are on the rise again and create nervousness. Governments are being called upon to protect the poor against high food prices. But we know too little about the actual relationship between food prices and poverty. This book provides us with new insights into this critical link, and goes far beyond the simplistic views that have prevailed so far. Policy makers concerned about food prices and poverty should study it carefully." - Stefan Tangermann, Professor Emeritus, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, University of Gottingen; former OECD Director for Trade and Agriculture "The spike in international food prices in 2008 was a reminder to the world of how vital food prices are for those billion or more people near or below the extreme poverty line. Most of those poor people live in rural areas, but many are net buyers rather than net sellers of food. Even so, they may benefit indirectly through higher wages when the farm price of food rises. The only way to identify which groups are at risk is though careful empirical studies at the household level for each country. This volume brings together a rich collection of such studies. By covering rural areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America, it offers a range of insights for policy makers who too often focus only on the more visible urban poor." - Kym Anderson, George Gollin Professor of Economics, University of Adelaide

During the 1990s, SSA countries initiated agricultural policy reforms to increase producer incentives and increase growth. Yet, agricultural growth rates after the reforms have been uneven. This has been attributed to lack of supporting infrastructure or the inability to respond to incentives by the smallholders. Based on ten studies, this volume provides a different framework to interpret the outcomes. First, it attributes the success of the reforms to the degree of consensus around the reform programs, which in turn, creates the institutions that can accommodate unexpected shocks. It differentiates between short run growth accelerations and sustained growth episodes. Second, it analyzes the impact of international prices which increased during the early 1990 and collapsed around 2000. Finally, it links the support institutions that evolved after the reforms back to the political economy of the stakeholders and their interests. Aksoy and Anil develop a political economy framework by bringing together the issues of consensus over the distribution of rents, role of unexpected changes, and the capabilities of institutions in handling these changes. Onal tests the of supply responses while Onal and Aksoy analyze international commodity prices and their transmission to the producers. Baffes analyzes impact of the adoption of cotton biotechnology in India and China, and the failure of SSA to also adopt. Baffes and Onal undertake a comparative study of coffee sectors in Uganda, and Vietnam which faced similar shocks. Five case studies cover cashew in Mozambique (Aksoy and Yagci), coffee and tea in Kenya (Mitchell), cashew in Tanzania (Mitchell and Baregu), tobacco in Tanzania (Mitchell and Baregu), and cotton in Zambia (Yagci and Aksoy). Results show that Agricultural policy reforms generated an immediate positive supply response. Real producer prices increased along with output. In unsuccessful cases where the short run supply response petered out, political and social consensus on the reforms was weak, and the ability to redistribute income after a negative shock was not built into the new arrangements. These products had been a major instrument for rent distribution before the reforms. The agencies could not be reformed to give greater non price support. In successful cases, there was greater consensus on the reforms program. The product was not a major rent distribution instrument and the producers were allied with the governments. Lower conflict also led to greater non price support. There was enough political and economic space for the parties to find solutions in case of shocks.