From riverine operations in the American Civil War and China in the 1860s to the major fleet engagements of the World Wars, plus more recent naval actions in the Falklands/Malvenas War and Gulf War, Lindberg and Todd methodically show how geography has shaped the strategy, tactics, and tools of naval warfare. Alfred T. Mahan was perhaps the first naval professional to recognize and acknowledge fully the influence of geography on navies and naval warfare. Many of his principles of seapower were inherently geographical and influenced both what kind of naval force a state would possess and how it would be utilized. In the time that has passed since Mahan made his observations, naval warfare and navies have experienced major technological changes, yet geographical factors continue to exert their influence on how navies fight, how they are structured, and the design of the ships that they deploy.

After providing a comprehensive review of geostrategic theory and its application to naval warfare, the book is organized by major operational environments in which such warfare occurs--the high seas, littoral regions, and inland waterways. Lindberg and Todd illustrate how such geographical factors as distance, location, surface, and subsurface conditions influence naval operations, including fleet-to-fleet engagements, amphibious assault, coastal defense, logistical support, and riverine actions. A separate chapter takes an in-depth look at the ways in which geography influences navies themselves with issues such as primary mission type, force structure development, and ship design. Through the use of historical case studies, this volume applies long held geographical concepts to fundamental naval theories and practices to illustrate just how pervasive geography's influence has been during the past 140 years.

The expansion of the shipbuilding industry in Britain and the United States between 1938 and 1945 was one of the greatest economic feats in history. This study examines in detail the unprecedented growth both in total industrial capacity and that of individual shipyards. Lindberg and Todd go beyond the normal descriptive historical account of this expansion to analyze it through the application of a geographical perspective. Specifically, they apply the geographic concepts of clustering and agglomeration to the merchant and naval shipbuilding industries of both nations during this vital era. Beginning with the emergence of a modern shipbuilding capability in the late nineteenth century, the authors examine how these geographic concepts were progressively implemented in both the United States and Britain as a result of new technological demands on navies as well as changing geostrategic considerations. While World War I marked the initial large-scale example of clustering/agglomeration, the interwar period would witness a quick demise of both the industry and the major shipyard agglomerations. This important work explains how, as a result of the war, the governments and the shipbuilding industries of two nations were able to reconstitute and greatly expand their capabilities in the face of ever-increasing demands for both warships and merchant vessels.

The central theme running through this book is the mutual dependence of navies and shipbuilding industries. Historically, naval ambitions and the ambitions of industrialists converge, and a symbiosis is born. The technical competence of industry emerges as a key player in determining the effectiveness of navies. That industrial capability, for its part, rests increasingly on the navy as chief customer because progressive specialization renders it more and more unsuited for any other use. These trends are universal, afflicting the relations of all major navies and their industrial suppliers since the dawn of the modern age. They continue to complicate the running of navies today. The book enlarges on this fundamental fact, explaining why the symbiosis emerged and how it is manifested in the contemporary world.