The origins of, and in many ways the prototype for, modern reality programming can be traced to Real People, a show that premiered on the NBC network in April of 1979. An instant ratings success, Real People appealed to an audience that clamored for stories about "everyday" men and women. However, many of the vignettes focused on individuals who were far from average-eccentric collectors, allegedly talented performers, and inspirational overachievers-many of whom could be called quirky, if not just plain weird. In the wake of the show's success, a rash of imitators followed. What had started out as a counter-programming gamble became the norm, and now the television airwaves are littered with reality shows. In Real People and the Rise of Reality Television, Michael McKenna looks at the show that started a trend in television viewing, one that now permeates not only the major networks but almost all of cable channels as well. McKenna traces the history of reality programming back to the early days of television up to the late 1970s when networks were beginning to take a chance on non-scripted prime time shows. The author provides an in-depth look at how Real People evolved from profiles of peculiar characters to an almost weekly display of hyper-patriotism, largely fueled by a desperate desire to recover from the disappointments of the 1970s. McKenna also charts the rise of shows that aimed to duplicate Real People's success: That's Incredible!, The People's Court, COPS, America's Funniest Home Videos, and MTV's The Real World. Though Real People was cancelled in 1984, reality-themed programming flourished and this look at the show's history makes for a fascinating read. Fans of nonfiction programs owe a debt to the show that started it all, and Real People and the Rise of Reality Television provides readers with insights into how and why one show changed the cultural landscape forever.

Philosophical interest in forgiveness has seen a resurgence. This interest reflects, at least in part, a large body of new work in psychology, several newsworthy cases of institutional apology and forgiveness, and intense and increased attention to the practices surrounding responsibility, blame, and praise. In this book, some of the world's leading philosophers present twelve entirely new essays on forgiveness. Some contributors have been writing about forgiveness for decades. Others have taken the opportunity here to develop their thinking about forgiveness they broached in other work. For some contributors, this is their first time writing on forgiveness. While all the contributions address core questions about the nature and norms of forgiveness, they also collectively break new ground by raising entirely new questions, offering original proposals and arguments, and making connections to the topics of free will, moral responsibility, collective wrongdoing, apology, religion, and our emotions.

The philosophical debate about free will and responsibility has been of great importance throughout the history of philosophy. In modern times this debate has received an enormous resurgence of interest and the contribution in 1962 by P.F. Strawson with the publication of his essay "Freedom and Resentment" has generated a wide range of discussion and criticism in the philosophical community and beyond. The debate is of central importance to recent developments in the free will literature and has shaped the way contemporary philosophers now approach the problem. This volume brings together a focused selection of the major contributions and reactions to the free will and responsibility debate inspired by Strawson's contribution. McKenna and Russell also provide a comprehensive overview of the debate. This book will be of great value to scholars of Strawson and those interested in the free will debate more generally.

If my ability to react freely is constrained by forces beyond my control, am I still morally responsible for the things I do?

The question of whether, how and to what extent we are responsible for our own actions has always been central to debates in philosophy and theology, and has been the subject of much recent research in cognitive science. And for good reason- the views we take on free will affect the choices we make as individuals, the moral judgments we make of others, and they will inform public policy.

Michael McKenna's text introduces this important subject with remarkable clarity, offering the first comprehensive overview of both incompatibilist and compatibilist stances. He begins by motivating both viewpoints, then provides classical accounts of each before giving students an in-depth examination of current scholarship in the free will debate.

Topics covered include:

• the nature of free will
• the nature of determinism
• the nature of moral responsibility
• arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism
• arguments of the compatibility of free will and determinism
• libertarian theories of free will and moral responsibility
• compatibilist theories of free will and moral responsibility
• hard determinist and hard incompatibilist theories

On September 23, 1969, five years after the first made-for-television movie premiered, the ABC network broadcast Seven in Darkness. This was the first television film for an anthology show called the Tuesday Night Movie of the Week. Dedicating ninety minutes of weekly airtime to a still-emerging genre was a financial risk for the third-place network-a risk that paid off. The films were so successful that in 1972 the network debuted The Wednesday Movie of the Week. Although most of the movies are no longer remembered, a handful are still fondly recalled by viewers today, including Duel, Brian's Song, and The Night Stalker. The series also showcased pilot films for many eventual series, such as Alias Smith and Jones, The Six Million Dollar Man, and Starsky and Hutch. By the end of both shows' regular runs in the spring of 1975, the network had broadcast more than 200 made-for-television films. In The ABC Movie of the Week: Big Movies for the Small Screen, Michael McKenna examines this programming experiment that transformed the television landscape and became a staple of broadcast programming for several years. The author looks at how the revolving films showcased the right mixture of romantic comedy, action, horror, and social relevance to keep viewers interested week after week. McKenna also chronicles how the ratings success led to imitations from the other networks, resulting in a saturation of television movies. As a cultural touchstone for millions who experienced the first run and syndicated versions of these films, The ABC Movie of the Week is a worthy subject of study. Featuring a complete filmography of all 240 movies with credit information and plot summaries, a chronology, and a list of pilots-both failed and successful-this volume will be valuable to television historians and scholars, as well as to anyone interested in one of the great triumphs of network programming.

This book explores an important issue within the free will debate: the relation between free will and moral responsibility. In his seminal article 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility', Harry Frankfurt launched a vigorous attack on the standard conception of that relation, questioning the claim that a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Since then, Frankfurt's thesis has been at the center of philosophical discussions on free will and moral responsibility. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, edited by David Widerker and Michael McKenna, draws together the most recent work on Frankfurt's thesis by leading theorists in the area of free will and responsibility. As the majority of the essays appear here for the first time, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities offers the newest developments in this important debate.

In" Issues and Trends in Literacy Education, 5/e, "well-respected authors Dick Robinson Mike McKenna, and Kristin Conradi pull together the research and opinions of some of today's leading literacy educators to give readers an authoritative look at all crucial aspects of reading and writing education. This edition is completely revised to include all new, current articles and readings, including new chapters on English language learners and technology, and the scrupulously researched material meets the NCATE/International Reading Association requirements for accreditation of graduate reading programs.

If my ability to react freely is constrained by forces beyond my control, am I still morally responsible for the things I do?

The question of whether, how and to what extent we are responsible for our own actions has always been central to debates in philosophy and theology, and has been the subject of much recent research in cognitive science. And for good reason- the views we take on free will affect the choices we make as individuals, the moral judgments we make of others, and they will inform public policy.

Michael McKenna's text introduces this important subject with remarkable clarity, offering the first comprehensive overview of both incompatibilist and compatibilist stances. He begins by motivating both viewpoints, then provides classical accounts of each before giving students an in-depth examination of current scholarship in the free will debate.

Topics covered include:

• the nature of free will
• the nature of determinism
• the nature of moral responsibility
• arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism
• arguments of the compatibility of free will and determinism
• libertarian theories of free will and moral responsibility
• compatibilist theories of free will and moral responsibility
• hard determinist and hard incompatibilist theories

What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or another of these kinds. Debate on this point turns partly on disagreement about the kinds of responses made appropriate when one is blameworthy or praiseworthy. It is generally agreed that these include "reactive attitudes " such as resentment and gratitude, but theorists disagree about the nature of these attitudes. They dispute the connections between moral responsibility, desert, and the justification of punishment as well. Many theorists take it that, whatever the appropriate responses are, they are responses to an agent's "quality of will, " but there is no consensus on what this comes to. Are the agent's beliefs about the moral status of her behavior what matter, or is it what she cares about, or what she judges important? This volume presents twelve original essays from participants in these debates. The contributors include prominent established figures as well as influential younger philosophers. A substantive introduction by the editors surveys recent debates and situates the contributions within it.

The philosophical debate about free will and responsibility has been of great importance throughout the history of philosophy. In modern times this debate has received an enormous resurgence of interest and the contribution in 1962 by P.F. Strawson with the publication of his essay "Freedom and Resentment" has generated a wide range of discussion and criticism in the philosophical community and beyond. The debate is of central importance to recent developments in the free will literature and has shaped the way contemporary philosophers now approach the problem. This volume brings together a focused selection of the major contributions and reactions to the free will and responsibility debate inspired by Strawson's contribution. McKenna and Russell also provide a comprehensive overview of the debate. This book will be of great value to scholars of Strawson and those interested in the free will debate more generally.

In this book Michael McKenna advances a new theory of moral responsibility, one that builds upon the work of P. F. Strawson. As McKenna demonstrates, moral responsibility can be explained on analogy with a conversation. The relation between a morally responsible agent and those who hold her morally responsible is similar to the relation between a speaker and her audience. A responsible agent's actions are bearers of meaning--agent meaning--just as a speaker's utterances are bearers of speaker meaning. Agent meaning is a function of the moral quality of the will with which the agent acts. Those who hold an agent morally responsible for what she does do so by responding to her as if in a conversation. By responding with certain morally reactive attitudes, such as resentment or indignation, they thereby communicate their regard for the meaning taken to be revealed in that agent's actions. It is then open for the agent held responsible to respond to those holding her responsible by offering an apology, a justification, an excuse, or some other response, thereby extending the evolving conversational exchange.
The conversational theory of moral responsibility that McKenna develops here accepts two features of Strawson's theory: that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal--so that being responsible must be understood by reference to the nature of holding responsible--and that the moral emotions are central to holding responsible. While upholding these two aspects of Strawson's theory, McKenna's theory rejects a further Strawsonian thesis, which is that holding morally responsible is more fundamental or basic than being morally responsible. On the conversational theory, the conditions for holding responsible are dependent on the nature of the agent who is responsible. So holding responsible cannot be more basic than being responsible. Nevertheless, the nature of the agent who is morally responsible is to be understood in terms of sensitivity to those who would make moral demands of her, thereby holding her responsible. Being responsible is therefore also dependent on holding responsible. Thus, neither being nor holding morally responsible is more basic than the other. They are mutually dependent.

In this book Michael McKenna advances a new theory of moral responsibility, one that builds upon the work of P. F. Strawson. As McKenna demonstrates, moral responsibility can be explained on analogy with a conversation. The relation between a morally responsible agent and those who hold her morally responsible is similar to the relation between a speaker and her audience. A responsible agent's actions are bearers of meaning-agent meaning-just as a speaker's utterances are bearers of speaker meaning. Agent meaning is a function of the moral quality of the will with which the agent acts. Those who hold an agent morally responsible for what she does do so by responding to her as if in a conversation. By responding with certain morally reactive attitudes, such as resentment or indignation, they thereby communicate their regard for the meaning taken to be revealed in that agent's actions. It is then open for the agent held responsible to respond to those holding her responsible by offering an apology, a justification, an excuse, or some other response, thereby extending the evolving conversational exchange. The conversational theory of moral responsibility that McKenna develops here accepts two features of Strawson's theory: that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal-so that being responsible must be understood by reference to the nature of holding responsible-and that the moral emotions are central to holding responsible. While upholding these two aspects of Strawson's theory, McKenna's theory rejects a further Strawsonian thesis, which is that holding morally responsible is more fundamental or basic than being morally responsible. On the conversational theory, the conditions for holding responsible are dependent on the nature of the agent who is responsible. So holding responsible cannot be more basic than being responsible. Nevertheless, the nature of the agent who is morally responsible is to be understood in terms of sensitivity to those who would make moral demands of her, thereby holding her responsible. Being responsible is therefore also dependent on holding responsible. Thus, neither being nor holding morally responsible is more basic than the other. They are mutually dependent.

What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or another of these kinds. Debate on this point turns partly on disagreement about the kinds of responses made appropriate when one is blameworthy or praiseworthy. It is generally agreed that these include "reactive attitudes" such as resentment and gratitude, but theorists disagree about the nature of these attitudes. They dispute the connections between moral responsibility, desert, and the justification of punishment as well. Many theorists take it that, whatever the appropriate responses are, they are responses to an agent's "quality of will," but there is no consensus on what this comes to. Are the agent's beliefs about the moral status of her behavior what matter, or is it what she cares about, or what she judges important? This volume presents twelve original essays from participants in these debates. The contributors include prominent established figures as well as influential younger philosophers. A substantive introduction by the editors surveys recent debates and situates the contributions within it.

Philosophical interest in forgiveness has seen a resurgence. This interest reflects, at least in part, a large body of new work in psychology, several newsworthy cases of institutional apology and forgiveness, and intense and increased attention to the practices surrounding responsibility, blame, and praise. In this book, some of the world's leading philosophers present twelve entirely new essays on forgiveness. Some contributors have been writing about forgiveness for decades. Others have taken the opportunity here to develop their thinking about forgiveness they broached in other work. For some contributors, this is their first time writing on forgiveness. While all the contributions address core questions about the nature and norms of forgiveness, they also collectively break new ground by raising entirely new questions, offering original proposals and arguments, and making connections to the topics of free will, moral responsibility, collective wrongdoing, apology, religion, and our emotions.

Annie dreams that pop singer fame will make everything right. But mysterious visions refuse to die and keep dragging her down. Each vision makes her feel more disconnected from her world and threatens to permanently separate her from reality. Then, rape and betrayal shatter her dreams entirely and drive her to the brink of suicide. Late one night at a local beach the water beckons Annie. Just a few more steps and she knows the wet darkness will end all her pain. However, while teetering on the point of no return, Annie encounters the mysterious Esmeralda who, in a flash, initiates Annie's amazing and brutal transportation from modern city to medieval land. There, fate recasts Annie as reluctant hero on a mysterious and epic quest. Reborn into a world of wizardry and wonder, Annie befriends Rex, a sorcerer struggling with his own challenges. Together they witness a dramatic battle and birth, during which Annie receives a mysterious talisman from the newborn dragon, Holdfast. Set upon by a warrior Princess Zoila and her army of evil gouls, Rex and Annie become unlikely partners. Thrust together by circumstance, they undertake a journey to solve the mystery of the talisman and help Annie find her way home again before it's too late. Along the way Annie and Rex are drawn into a deadly power struggle between members of the local royal family--a struggle in which Annie plays a crucial and dangerous role in the fate of all. To return home, Annie must solve the enigma of the dragon's gift, help two princesses defeat an evil monarch, and face the terrible secret that haunts her. Her time is running out as the world that Esmeralda cast her in grows increasingly unstable. If Annie doesn't face the terrible secret that haunts her soon, both worlds may be lost to her forever. Note about the book: Annie's Odyssey is about an adolescent or young adult who either struggles with a traumatic past, or the difficulty of fitting in, with our disconnected and judgmental culture. The reader belongs to similar groups of readers that have found empowerment and encouragement in classic fantasy stories with personal growth messages like Alice in Wonderland, The Wizard of OZ, The Chronicles of Narnia, The Once and Future King, and of recent Harry Potter. The mean age group the novel targets is 17 with a readership likely to span from 14 to 22. However, adults of all ages will identify w/Annie. Although the novel has strong feminist themes, males sorting through the difficulties inherent in the targeted age group will also find the novel captivating. The spiritual messages are religion-neutral in most respects with aspects of Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and mixture of Native American lore and nature-based spirituality. This allows most readers in the targeted age range to find growth messages they can relate to. The primary purpose of the novel is one of self-discovery through entertainment. About the Author: K. A. Plouffe is a retired Air Force mental health technician. He holds a B.S. and M.S. in Psychology and is completing a M.S. in Counseling at Walden University. He is a writer with ZERO-END productions and a contributing editor to OH Magazine. He continues to work in the mental health field and lives with his wife in Maine.

This book explores an important issue within the free will debate: the relation between free will and moral responsibility. In his seminal article 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility', Harry Frankfurt launched a vigorous attack on the standard conception of that relation, questioning the claim that a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Since then, Frankfurt's thesis has been at the center of philosophical discussions on free will and moral responsibility. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, edited by David Widerker and Michael McKenna, draws together the most recent work on Frankfurt's thesis by leading theorists in the area of free will and responsibility. As the majority of the essays appear here for the first time, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities offers the newest developments in this important debate.