Institutions of Law offers an original account of the nature of law and legal systems in the contemporary world. It provides the definitive statement of Sir Neil MacCormick's well-known 'institutional theory of law', defining law as 'institutional normative order' and explaining each of these three terms in depth. It attempts to fulfil the need for a twenty-first century introduction to legal theory marking a fresh start such as was achieved in the last century by H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law. It is written with a view to elucidating law, legal concepts and legal institutions in a manner that takes account of current scholarly controversies but does not get bogged down in them. It shows how law relates to the state and civil society, establishing the conditions of social peace and a functioning economy. In so doing, it takes account of recent developments in the sociology of law, particularly 'system theory'. It also seeks to clarify the nature of claims to 'knowledge of law' and thus indicate the possibility of legal studies having a genuinely 'scientific' character. It shows that there is an essential value-orientation of all work of this kind, so that valid analytical jurisprudence not merely need not, but cannot, be 'positivist' as that term has come to be understood. Nevertheless it is explained why law and morality are genuinely distinct by virtue of the positive character of law contrasted with the autonomy that is foundational for morality.

This book contains a series of essays discussing the uses of precedent as a source of law and a basis for legal arguments in nine different legal systems, representing a variety of legal traditions. Precedent is fundamental to law, yet theoretical and ideological as well as legal considerations lead to its being differently handled and rationalised in different places. Out of the comparative study come the six theoretical and synoptic essays that conclude the volume.

This collection of essays, published to coincide with Tony Honore's sixty-fifth birthday, focuses on the areas where Honore's thought has made the most significant contribution: Roman law and jurisprudence. Included are essays by P.S. Atiyah, Zenon Bankowski, John Bell, Peter Birks, John W. Cairs, Hugh Collins, David Daube, W. M. Gordon, J. W. Harris Nicola Lacey, A. D. E. Lewis, Detlef Liebs, G. D. MacCormack, Neil MacCormick, G. Maher, Pieter Norr, Alan Rodger, and Peter Stein.

This title was first published in 2003. Leading contemporary essays on interpretation are assembled in this volume, which offsets them against a small number of "classical" works from earlier periods. It has long been recognized that textual sources (constitutions, statutes, precedents, commentaries) are central to developed systems of law and that interpretation of such texts is one highly important element in adjudication, legal practice and legal scholarship. Scholars have also contended that the totality of legal activity is "interpretive" in a wider sense and debates about objectivity have raged. The reasons for this development are here critically scrutinized.

This book contains a series of essays discussing the uses of precedent as a source of law and a basis for legal arguments in nine different legal systems, representing a variety of legal traditions. Precedent is fundamental to law, yet theoretical and ideological as well as legal considerations lead to its being differently handled and rationalised in different places. Out of the comparative study come the six theoretical and synoptic essays that conclude the volume.

This title was first published in 2003. Leading contemporary essays on interpretation are assembled in this volume, which offsets them against a small number of "classical" works from earlier periods. It has long been recognized that textual sources (constitutions, statutes, precedents, commentaries) are central to developed systems of law and that interpretation of such texts is one highly important element in adjudication, legal practice and legal scholarship. Scholars have also contended that the totality of legal activity is "interpretive" in a wider sense and debates about objectivity have raged. The reasons for this development are here critically scrutinized.

This book is a work of outstanding importance for scholars of comparative law and jurisprudence and for lawyers engaged in EC law or other international forms of practice. It reviews, compares and analyses the practice of interpretation in nine countries representing Europe as well as the US and Argentina in common and civil law; it also explores implications for general theories of interpretation and of justification. Its authors, who include Aulis Aarnio, Robert Alexy, Ralf Dreier, Enrique Zuleta-Puceiro, Michel Troper, Christophe Grzegorczyk, Jean-Louis Gardes, Enrico Pattaro, Michele Taruffo, Massimo La Torre, Jerry Wroblewski, Alexsander Peczenik, Gunnar Bergholtz and Zenon Bankowski, as well as editors Robert S. Summers and D. Neil MacCormick, constitute an international team of great distinction; they have worked on this project for over seven years.

This book is a work of outstanding importance for scholars of comparative law and jurisprudence and for lawyers engaged in EC law or other international forms of practice. It reviews, compares and analyses the practice of interpretation in nine countries representing Europe as well as the US and Argentina in common and civil law; it also explores implications for general theories of interpretation and of justification. Its authors, who include Aulis Aarnio, Robert Alexy, Ralf Dreier, Enrique Zuleta-Puceiro, Michel Troper, Christophe Grzegorczyk, Jean-Louis Gardes, Enrico Pattaro, Michele Taruffo, Massimo La Torre, Jerry Wroblewski, Alexsander Peczenik, Gunnar Bergholtz and Zenon Bankowski, as well as editors Robert S. Summers and D. Neil MacCormick, constitute an international team of great distinction; they have worked on this project for over seven years.

In 1975, four teenagers from Mount Temple School in Dublin gathered in a crowded kitchen to discuss forming a band. More than thirty years later, Bono, The Edge, Adam Clayton, and Larry Mullen Jr are still together, bound by intense loyalty, passionate idealism, and a relentless belief in the power of rock and roll to change the world.

In an epic journey that has taken the band from the clubs of Dublin to the stadiums of the world, U2 has sold more than 130 million albums, revolutionized live performance, spearheaded political campaigns, and made music that defines the age in which we live. Told with wit, insight, and astonishing candor by the band members themselves and manager Paul McGuinness, with pictures from their own archives, "U2 by U2" allows unprecedented access into the inner life of the greatest rock band of our times.

The concept of practical reason is central to contemporary thought on ethics and the philosophy of law - acting well means acting for good reasons. Explaining this requires several stages. How do reasons relate to actions at all, as incentives and in explanations? What are values, how do they relate to human nature, and how do they enter practical reasoning? How do the concepts of 'right and wrong' fit in, and in what way do they involve questions of mutual trust among human beings? How does our moral freedom - our freedom to form our own moral commitments - relate to our responsibilities to each other? How is this final question transposed into law and legal commitments?
This book explores these questions, vital to understanding the nature of law and morality. It presents a clear account of practical reason, valuable to students of moral philosophy and jurisprudence at undergraduate or postgraduate levels. For more advanced scholars it also offers a reinterpretation of Kant's views on moral autonomy and Smith's on self-command, marrying Smith's 'moral sentiments' to Kant's 'categorical imperative' in a novel way.
The book concludes and underpins the author's Law, State and Practical Reason series.Taken together the books offer an overarching theory of the nature of law and legal reason, the role of the State, and the nature of moral reason and judgement.

In this substantially revised second edition, Neil MacCormick delivers a clear and current introduction to the life and works of H.L.A. Hart, noted Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University from 1952 to 1968.
Hart established a worldwide reputation through his powerful philosophical arguments and writings in favor of liberalizing criminal law and applying humane principles to punishment. This book demonstrates that Hart also made important contributions to analytical jurisprudence, notably by clarifying many terms and concepts used in legal discourse, including the concept of law itself.
Taking into account developments since the first edition was published, this book provides a constructively critical account of Hart's legal thought. The work includes Hart's ideas on legal reasoning, judicial discretion, the social sources of law, the theory of legal rules, the sovereignty of individual conscience, the notion of obligation, the concept of a right, and the relationship between morality and the law. MacCormick actively engages with current scholarly interpretations, bringing this accessible account of England's greatest legal philosopher of the twentieth century up-to-date.

This is a controversial work of applied legal theory, addressing urgent contemporary questions about law and the State, about the character of the UK as a state, and about the juridical character of the European Union in its relationship with the member states of the Union. It is also a contribution to political theory in its discussion of the rule of law, the theory of sovereignty, and the principles of liberal nationalism. It combines a statement and application of the `institutional theory of law' with a balanced and carefully argued version of contemporary Scottish nationalism.

The concept of practical reason is central to contemporary thought on ethics and the philosophy of law - acting well means acting for good reasons. Explaining this requires several stages. How do reasons relate to actions at all, as incentives and in explanations? What are values, how do they relate to human nature, and how do they enter practical reasoning? How do the concepts of 'right and wrong' fit in, and in what way do they involve questions of mutual trust among human beings? How does our moral freedom - our freedom to form our own moral commitments - relate to our responsibilities to each other? How is this final question transposed into law and legal commitments?
This book explores these questions, vital to understanding the nature of law and morality. It presents a clear account of practical reason, valuable to students of moral philosophy and jurisprudence at undergraduate or postgraduate levels. For more advanced scholars it also offers a reinterpretation of Kant's views on moral autonomy and Smith's on self-command, marrying Smith's 'moral sentiments' to Kant's 'categorical imperative' in a novel way.
The book concludes and underpins the author's Law, State, and Practical Reason series. Taken together the books offer an overarching theory of the nature of law and legal reason, the role of the State, and the nature of moral reason and judgement.

What is to be understood by 'rational legal argument'? To what extent can legal reasoning be rational? Is the demand for rationality in legal affairs justified? And what are the criteria of rationality in legal reasoning? The answer to these questions is not only of interest to legal theorists and philosophers of law. They are pressing issues for practicing lawyers, and a matter of concern for every citizen active in the public arena. Not only the standing of academic law as a scientific discipline, but also the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on the possibility of rational legal argumentation.
A theory of legal reasoning which tries to answer these questions pre-supposes a theory of general practical reasoning. This theory is the subject matter of the first two parts of the book. The result is a theory of general practical discourse which rests on insights of both Anglo-Saxon and German philosophy. It forms the basis of the theory of rational legal discourse, which is developed in the third part of this book.

This work is a controversial collection of interrelated papers investigating and arguing about issues of concern to lawyers and politicians today. MacCormick combines a scholarly concern with leading thinkers such as John Locke, Lord Stair, Adam Smith and David Hume, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Patrick Atiyah, and stringently argued view of questions of political obligation, civil liberty, and legal rights.

In this substantially revised second edition, Neil MacCormick delivers a clear and current introduction to the life and works of H.L.A. Hart, noted Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University from 1952 to 1968.
Hart established a worldwide reputation through his powerful philosophical arguments and writings in favor of liberalizing criminal law and applying humane principles to punishment. This book demonstrates that Hart also made important contributions to analytical jurisprudence, notably by clarifying many terms and concepts used in legal discourse, including the concept of law itself.
Taking into account developments since the first edition was published, this book provides a constructively critical account of Hart's legal thought. The work includes Hart's ideas on legal reasoning, judicial discretion, the social sources of law, the theory of legal rules, the sovereignty of individual conscience, the notion of obligation, the concept of a right, and the relationship between morality and the law. MacCormick actively engages with current scholarly interpretations, bringing this accessible account of England's greatest legal philosopher of the twentieth century up-to-date.

When cases come before courts can we predict the outcome? Is legal reasoning rationally persuasive, working within a formal structure and using recognizable forms of arguments to produce predictable results? Or is legal reasoning mere "rhetoric" in the pejorative sense, open to use, and abuse, to achieve whatever ends unscrupulous politicians, lawyers and judges desire? If the latter what becomes of the supposed security of living under the rule of law?
This book tackles these questions by presenting a theory of legal reasoning, developing the author's classic account given in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (OUP, 1978). It explains the essential role syllogism plays in reasoning used to apply the law, and the elements needed in addition to deductive reasoning to give a full explanation of how law is applied and decisions justified through the use of precedent, analogy and principle.
The book highlights that problems of interpretation, classification and relevance will always arise when applying general legal standards to individual cases. In justifying their conclusions about such problems, judges need to be faithful to categorical legal reasons and yet fully sensitive to the particulars of the cases before them. How can this be achieved, and how should we evaluate the possible approaches judges could take to solving these problems? By addressing these issues the book asks questions at the heart of understanding the nature of law and the moral complexity of the rule of law.

In this short, but authoritative book, the nature and purpose of the European Constitution are explained by someone involved in its preparation. The author discusses how it was drafted, and tackles some much debated questions: whether it promises any enhancement of democracy in the EU, whether it implies that the EU is becoming a superstate, and whether it will strengthen the principle of subsidiarity and the protection of human rights.

Is legal reasoning rationally persuasive, working within a discernible structure and using recognisable kinds of arguments? Does it belong to rhetoric in this sense, or to the domain of the merely 'rhetorical' in an adversative sense? Is there any reasonable certainty about legal outcomes in dispute-situations? If not, what becomes of the Rule of Law? Neil MacCormick's book tackles these questions in establishing an overall theory of legal reasoning which shows the essential part 'legal syllogism' plays in reasoning aimed at the application of law, while acknowledging that simple deductive reasoning, though always necessary, is very rarely sufficient to justify a decision. There are always problems of relevancy, classification or interpretation in relation to both facts and law. In justifying conclusions about such problems, reasoning has to be universalistic and yet fully sensitive to the particulars of specific cases. How is this possible? Is legal justification at this level consequentialist in character or principled and right-based? Both normative coherence and narrative coherence have a part to play in justification, and in accounting for the validity of arguments by analogy. Looking at such long-discussed subjects as precedent and analogy and the interpretative character of the reasoning involved, Neil MacCormick expands upon his celebrated Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (OUP 1978 and 1994) and restates his 'institutional theory of law'.

Institutions of Law offers an original account of the nature of law and legal systems in the contemporary world. It provides the definitive statement of Sir Neil MacCormick's well-known 'institutional theory of law', defining law as 'institutional normative order' and explaining each of these three terms in depth. It attempts to fulfill the need for a twenty-first century introduction to legal theory marking a fresh start such as was achieved in the last century by H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law.
Institutions of Law is written with a view to elucidating law, legal concepts and legal institutions in a manner that takes account of current scholarly controversies but does not get bogged down in them. It shows how law relates to the state and civil society, establishing the conditions of social peace and a functioning economy. In so doing, it takes account of recent developments in the sociology of law, particularly 'system theory'. It also seeks to clarify the nature of claims to 'knowledge of law' and thus indicate the possibility of legal studies having a genuinely 'scientific' character. It shows that there is an essential value-orientation of all work of this kind, so that valid analytical jurisprudence not merely need not, but cannot, be 'positivist' as that term has come to be understood. Nevertheless it is explained why law and morality are genuinely distinct by virtue of the positive character of law contrasted with the autonomy that is foundational for morality.

This is a controversial work of applied legal theory, addressing urgent contemporary questions about law and the State, about the character of the UK as a state, and about the juridical character of the European Union in its relationship with the Member States of the Union. It is also a contribution to political theory in its discussion of the rule of law, the theory of sovereignty, and the principles of liberal nationalism. It combines a statement and application of the `institutional theory of law' with a balanced and carefully argued version of contemporary Scottish nationalism.