What is to be understood by 'rational legal argument'? To what
extent can legal reasoning be rational? Is the demand for
rationality in legal affairs justified? And what are the criteria
of rationality in legal reasoning? The answer to these questions is
not only of interest to legal theorists and philosophers of law.
They are pressing issues for practicing lawyers, and a matter of
concern for every citizen active in the public arena. Not only the
standing of academic law as a scientific discipline, but also the
legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on the possibility of
rational legal argumentation.
A theory of legal reasoning which tries to answer these questions
pre-supposes a theory of general practical reasoning. This theory
is the subject matter of the first two parts of the book. The
result is a theory of general practical discourse which rests on
insights of both Anglo-Saxon and German philosophy. It forms the
basis of the theory of rational legal discourse, which is developed
in the third part of this book.
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