In recent years, university?industry?government interactions have come to the forefront as a method of promoting economic growth in increasingly knowledge-based societies.This ground-breaking new volume evaluates the capacity of the triple helix model to represent the recent evolution of local and national systems of innovation. It analyses both the success of the triple helix as a descriptive and empirical model within internationally competitive technology regions as well as its potential as a prescriptive hypothesis for regional or national systems that wish to expand their innovation processes and industrial development. In addition, it examines the legal, economic, administrative, political and cognitive dimensions employed to configure and study, in practical terms, the series of phenomena contained in the triple helix category. This book will have widespread appeal amongst students and scholars of economics, sociology and business administration who specialise in entrepreneurship and innovation. Policy-makers involved in innovation, industrial development and education as well as private firms and institutional agencies will also find the volume of interest.

Herbert Simon's renowned theory of bounded rationality is principally interested in cognitive constraints and environmental factors and influences which prevent people from thinking or behaving according to formal rationality. Simon's theory has been expanded in numerous directions and taken up by various disciplines with an interest in how humans think and behave. This includes philosophy, psychology, neurocognitive sciences, economics, political science, sociology, management, and organization studies. The Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality draws together an international team of leading experts to survey the recent literature and the latest developments in these related fields. The chapters feature entries on key behavioural phenomena, including reasoning, judgement, decision making, uncertainty, risk, heuristics and biases, and fast and frugal heuristics. The text also examines current ideas such as fast and slow thinking, nudge, ecological rationality, evolutionary psychology, embodied cognition, and neurophilosophy. Overall, the volume serves to provide the most complete state-of-the-art collection on bounded rationality available. This book is essential reading for students and scholars of economics, psychology, neurocognitive sciences, political sciences, and philosophy.

Herbert Simon's renowned theory of bounded rationality is principally interested in cognitive constraints and environmental factors and influences which prevent people from thinking or behaving according to formal rationality. Simon's theory has been expanded in numerous directions and taken up by various disciplines with an interest in how humans think and behave. This includes philosophy, psychology, neurocognitive sciences, economics, political science, sociology, management, and organization studies. The Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality draws together an international team of leading experts to survey the recent literature and the latest developments in these related fields. The chapters feature entries on key behavioural phenomena, including reasoning, judgement, decision making, uncertainty, risk, heuristics and biases, and fast and frugal heuristics. The text also examines current ideas such as fast and slow thinking, nudge, ecological rationality, evolutionary psychology, embodied cognition, and neurophilosophy. Overall, the volume serves to provide the most complete state-of-the-art collection on bounded rationality available. This book is essential reading for students and scholars of economics, psychology, neurocognitive sciences, political sciences, and philosophy.

Biological and Cultural Bases of Human Inference addresses the interface between social science and cognitive science. In this volume, Viale and colleagues explore which human social cognitive powers evolve naturally and which are influenced by culture. Updating the debate between innatism and culturalism regarding human cognitive abilities, this book represents a much-needed articulation of these diverse bases of cognition. Chapters throughout the book provide social science and philosophical reflections, in addition to the perspective of evolutionary theory and the central assumptions of cognitive science. The overall approach of the text is based on three complementary levels: adult performance, cognitive development, and cultural history and prehistory. Scholars from several disciplines contribute to this volume, including researchers in cognitive, developmental, social and evolutionary psychology, neuropsychology, cognitive anthropology, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. This contemporary, important collection appeals to researchers in the fields of cognitive, social, developmental, and evolutionary psychology and will prove valuable to researchers in the decision sciences.

Biological and Cultural Bases of Human Inference addresses the interface between social science and cognitive science. In this volume, Viale and colleagues explore which human social cognitive powers evolve naturally and which are influenced by culture. Updating the debate between innatism and culturalism regarding human cognitive abilities, this book represents a much-needed articulation of these diverse bases of cognition. Chapters throughout the book provide social science and philosophical reflections, in addition to the perspective of evolutionary theory and the central assumptions of cognitive science. The overall approach of the text is based on three complementary levels: adult performance, cognitive development, and cultural history and prehistory. Scholars from several disciplines contribute to this volume, including researchers in cognitive, developmental, social and evolutionary psychology, neuropsychology, cognitive anthropology, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. This contemporary, important collection appeals to researchers in the fields of cognitive, social, developmental, and evolutionary psychology and will prove valuable to researchers in the decision sciences.

This book covers a broad spectrum of topics, from experimental philosophy and cognitive theory of science, to social epistemology and research and innovation policy. Following up on the previously published Volume 1, "Mind, Rationality, and Society," it provides further applications of methodological cognitivism in areas such as scientific discovery, technology transfer and innovation policy. It also analyzes the impact of cognitive science on philosophical problems like causality and truth. The book is divided into four parts: Part I "Experimental Philosophy and Causality" tackles the problem of causality, which is often seen as straddling metaphysics, ontology and epistemology. Part II "Cognitive Rationality of Science" deals with the cognitive foundation of scientific rationality, starting from a strong critique of the neopositivist rationality of science on the one hand and of the relativist and social reduction of the methodology of science on the other. Part III "Research Policy and Social Epistemology" deals with topics of social epistemology, science policy and culture of innovation. Lastly, Part IV "Knowledge Transfer and Innovation" addresses the dynamics of knowledge generation, transfer and use in technological innovation.

"Does knowledge matter to politics?" is the main question the book tries to answer. The analysis is interdisciplinary and covers a wide range of topics: a social epistemology assessment of the efficacy of political institutions in promoting the generation and the diffusion of science and technology; the proposal of the alternative concept of satisfying rationality to found the theory of social knowledge; the roles of social knowledge in the constitution making and the transitional justice; the arguments in favor of decentralized knowledge in social problem solving and its empowerment through devolution, de-bureaucratization and deregulation; the means to ensure the independency of knowledge from power and at the same time its social utility; the knowledge justified to inform the voters in political campaigns; the critique to technocracy as the wrong solution to deal with the crisis of complexity in contemporary society.

This book covers a broad spectrum of topics, from experimental philosophy and cognitive theory of science, to social epistemology and research and innovation policy. Following up on the previously published Volume 1, “Mind, Rationality, and Society,” it provides further applications of methodological cognitivism in areas such as scientific discovery, technology transfer and innovation policy. It also analyzes the impact of cognitive science on philosophical problems like causality and truth. The book is divided into four parts: Part I “Experimental Philosophy and Causality” tackles the problem of causality, which is often seen as straddling metaphysics, ontology and epistemology. Part II “Cognitive Rationality of Science” deals with the cognitive foundation of scientific rationality, starting from a strong critique of the neopositivist rationality of science on the one hand and of the relativist and social reduction of the methodology of science on the other. Part III “Research Policy and Social Epistemology” deals with topics of social epistemology, science policy and culture of innovation. Lastly, Part IV “Knowledge Transfer and Innovation” addresses the dynamics of knowledge generation, transfer and use in technological innovation.