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Over the last two decades, public diplomacy has become a central
area of research within Cold War studies. Yet, this field has been
dominated by studies of the United States' soft power practices.
However, the so-called 'cultural dimension' of the Cold war was a
much more multifaceted phenomenon. Little attention has been paid
to European actors' efforts to safeguard a wide range of strategic
and political interests by seducing foreign publics. This book
includes a series of works which examine the soft power techniques
used by various European players to create a climate of public
opinion overseas which favored their interests in the Cold war
context. This is a relevant book for three reasons. First, it
contains a wide variety of case studies, including Western and
Eastern, democratic and authoritarian, and core and peripheral
European countries. Second, it pays attention to little studied
instruments of public diplomacy such as song contests, sport
events, tourism and international solidarity campaigns. Third, it
not only concentrates on public diplomacy programs deployed by
governments, but also on the role played by some non-official
actors in the cultural Cold War in Europe
Enemy Number One tells the story of the Soviet cultural and
propaganda apparatus and its efforts to control information about
the United States in the postwar landscape. Beginning with the 1945
meeting of American and Soviet troops on the Elbe, this period saw
cultural relations develop in close connection to oppression as the
Soviet authorities attempted to contain and appropriate images of
the United States. Rosa Magnusdottir analyzes two official
narratives about the USSR's "enemy number one" -Stalin's
anti-American campaign and Khrushchev's policy of peaceful
coexistence-and shows how each relied on the legacy of the wartime
alliance in their approach. Stalin used the wartime experience to
spread fear of a renewed war, while Khrushchev used the wartime
alliance as proof that the two superpowers could work together.
Drawing from extensive archival resources, Magnusdottir brings to
life the propaganda warriors and ideological chiefs of the early
Cold War period in the Soviet Union, revealing their confusion and
insecurities as they attempted to navigate the uncertain world of
late Stalin and early Khrushchev cultural bureaucracy. She also
demonstrates how concerned Soviet authorities were by their
people's presumed interest in the United States, resorting to
monitoring and even repression-behavior indicative of the
inferiority complex of the Soviet project as it related to the
outside world.
Enemy Number One tells the story of the Soviet cultural and
propaganda apparatus and its efforts to control information about
the United States in the postwar landscape. Beginning with the 1945
meeting of American and Soviet troops on the Elbe, this period saw
cultural relations develop in close connection to oppression as the
Soviet authorities attempted to contain and appropriate images of
the United States. Rosa Magnusdottir analyzes two official
narratives about the USSR's "enemy number one" -Stalin's
anti-American campaign and Khrushchev's policy of peaceful
coexistence-and shows how each relied on the legacy of the wartime
alliance in their approach. Stalin used the wartime experience to
spread fear of a renewed war, while Khrushchev used the wartime
alliance as proof that the two superpowers could work together.
Drawing from extensive archival resources, Magnusdottir brings to
life the propaganda warriors and ideological chiefs of the early
Cold War period in the Soviet Union, revealing their confusion and
insecurities as they attempted to navigate the uncertain world of
late Stalin and early Khrushchev cultural bureaucracy. She also
demonstrates how concerned Soviet authorities were by their
people's presumed interest in the United States, resorting to
monitoring and even repression-behavior indicative of the
inferiority complex of the Soviet project as it related to the
outside world.
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