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This volume explores from multiple perspectives the subtle and
interesting relationship between the theory of rational choice and
Darwinian evolution. In rational choice theory, agents are assumed
to make choices that maximize their utility; in evolution, natural
selection 'chooses' between phenotypes according to the criterion
of fitness maximization. So there is a parallel between utility in
rational choice theory and fitness in Darwinian theory. This
conceptual link between fitness and utility is mirrored by the
interesting parallels between formal models of evolution and
rational choice. The essays in this volume, by leading
philosophers, economists, biologists and psychologists, explore the
connection between evolution and rational choice in a number of
different contexts, including choice under uncertainty, strategic
decision making and pro-social behaviour. They will be of interest
to students and researchers in philosophy of science, evolutionary
biology, economics and psychology.
This volume explores from multiple perspectives the subtle and
interesting relationship between the theory of rational choice and
Darwinian evolution. In rational choice theory, agents are assumed
to make choices that maximize their utility; in evolution, natural
selection 'chooses' between phenotypes according to the criterion
of fitness maximization. So there is a parallel between utility in
rational choice theory and fitness in Darwinian theory. This
conceptual link between fitness and utility is mirrored by the
interesting parallels between formal models of evolution and
rational choice. The essays in this volume, by leading
philosophers, economists, biologists and psychologists, explore the
connection between evolution and rational choice in a number of
different contexts, including choice under uncertainty, strategic
decision making and pro-social behaviour. They will be of interest
to students and researchers in philosophy of science, evolutionary
biology, economics and psychology.
This is a collection of high-quality research papers in the
philosophy of science, deriving from papers presented at the second
meeting of the European Philosophy of Science Association in
Amsterdam, November 2009.
How much faith should we place in what scientists tell us? Is it
possible for scientific knowledge to be fully 'objective'? What,
really, can be defined as science? In the second edition of this
Very Short Introduction, Samir Okasha explores the main themes and
theories of contemporary philosophy of science, and investigates
fascinating, challenging questions such as these. Starting at the
very beginning, with a concise overview of the history of science,
Okasha examines the nature of fundamental practices such as
reasoning, causation, and explanation. Looking at scientific
revolutions and the issue of scientific change, he asks whether
there is a discernible pattern to the way scientific ideas change
over time, and discusses realist versus anti-realist attitudes
towards science. He finishes by considering science today, and the
social and ethical philosophical questions surrounding modern
science. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from
Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every
subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get
ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts,
analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make
interesting and challenging topics highly readable.
Over the last forty years the philosophy of biology has emerged as
an important sub-discipline of the philosophy of science. Covering
some of science's most divisive topics, such as philosophical
issues in genetics, it also encompasses areas where modern biology
has increasingly impinged on traditional philosophical questions,
such as free will, essentialism, and nature vs nurture. In this
Very Short Introduction Samir Okasha outlines the core issues with
which contemporary philosophy of biology is engaged. Offering a
whistle-stop tour of the history of biology, he explores key ideas
and paradigm shifts throughout the centuries, including areas such
as the theory of evolution by natural selection; the concepts of
function and design; biological individuality; and the debate over
adaptationism. Throughout Okasha makes clear the relevance of
biology for understanding human beings, human society, and our
place in the natural world, and the importance of engaging with
these issues. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series
from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost
every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to
get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine
facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make
interesting and challenging topics highly readable.
Samir Okasha approaches evolutionary biology from a philosophical
perspective in Agents and Goals in Evolution, analysing a mode of
thinking in biology called agential thinking. He considers how the
paradigm case involves treating an evolved organism as if it were
an agent pursuing a goal, such as survival or reproduction, and
seeing its phenotypic traits as strategies for achieving that goal
or furthering its biological interests. As agential thinking
deliberately transposes a set of concepts-goals, interests,
strategies-from rational human agents and to the biological world
more generally, Okasha's enquiry firstly looks at the justification
for this: is it mere anthropomorphism, or does it play a genuine
intellectual role in the science? From this central question, key
points are considered such as: how do we identify the 'goal' that
evolved organisms will behave as if they are trying to achieve? Can
agential thinking ever be applied to groups rather than to
individual organisms? And how does agential thinking relate to the
controversies over fitness-maximization in evolutionary biology? In
addition, Okasha examines the relation between the adaptive and the
rational by considering whether organisms can validly be treated as
agent-like. Should we expect their evolved behaviour to correspond
with that of rational agents as codified in the theory of rational
choice? If so, does this mean that the fitness-maximizing paradigm
of the evolutionary biologist can be mapped directly to the
utility-maximizing paradigm of the rational choice theorist? All of
these important questions are engagingly raised and discussed at
length.
Samir Okasha offers a philosophical perspective on evolutionary
biology in Agents and Goals in Evolution. His focus is on "agential
thinking", which is a mode of thought commonly employed in
evolutionary biology. The paradigm case of agential thinking
involves treating an evolved organism as if it were an agent
pursuing a goal, such as survival or reproduction, and treating its
phenotypic traits as strategies for achieving that goal, or
furthering its biological interests. Agential thinking involves
deliberately transposing a set of concepts - goals, interests,
strategies - from rational human agents to the biological world
more generally. Okasha's enquiry begins by asking whether this is
justified. Is agential thinking mere anthropomorphism, or does it
play a genuine intellectual role in the science? This central
question leads Okasha to a series of further questions. How do we
identify the "goal" that evolved organisms will behave as if they
are trying to achieve? Can agential thinking ever be applied to
groups or genes, rather than to individual organisms? And how does
agential thinking relate to the controversies over
fitness-maximization in evolutionary biology? In the final third of
the book, Okasha examines the relation between the adaptive and the
rational. If organisms can validly be treated as agent-like, for
the purposes of evolutionary analysis, should we expect that their
evolved behaviour will correspond to the behaviour of rational
agents as codified in the theory of rational choice? If so, does
this mean that the fitness-maximizing paradigm of the evolutionary
biologist can be mapped directly to the utility-maximizing paradigm
of the rational choice theorist? Okasha explores these questions
using an inter-disciplinary methodology that draws on philosophy of
science, evolutionary biology and economics.
The biological and philosophical implications of the emergence of
new collective individuals from associations of living beings. Our
intuitive assumption that only organisms are the real individuals
in the natural world is at odds with developments in cell biology,
ecology, genetics, evolutionary biology, and other fields. Although
organisms have served for centuries as nature's paradigmatic
individuals, science suggests that organisms are only one of the
many ways in which the natural world could be organized. When
living beings work together-as in ant colonies, beehives, and
bacteria-metazoan symbiosis-new collective individuals can emerge.
In this book, leading scholars consider the biological and
philosophical implications of the emergence of these new collective
individuals from associations of living beings. The topics they
consider range from metaphysical issues to biological research on
natural selection, sociobiology, and symbiosis. The contributors
investigate individuality and its relationship to evolution and the
specific concept of organism; the tension between group evolution
and individual adaptation; and the structure of collective
individuals and the extent to which they can be defined by the same
concept of individuality. These new perspectives on evolved
individuality should trigger important revisions to both
philosophical and biological conceptions of the individual.
Contributors Frederic Bouchard, Ellen Clarke, Jennifer Fewell,
Andrew Gardner, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Charles J. Goodnight, Matt
Haber, Andrew Hamilton, Philippe Huneman, Samir Okasha, Thomas
Pradeu, Scott Turner, Minus van Baalen
Does natural selection act primarily on individual organisms, on
groups, on genes, or on whole species? Samir Okasha provides a
comprehensive analysis of the debate in evolutionary biology over
the levels of selection, focusing on conceptual, philosophical and
foundational questions. A systematic framework is developed for
thinking about natural selection acting at multiple levels of the
biological hierarchy; the framework is then used to help resolve
outstanding issues. Considerable attention is paid to the concept
of causality as it relates to the levels of selection, in
particular the idea that natural selection at one hierarchical
level can have effects that 'filter' up or down to other levels.
Unlike previous work in this area by philosophers of science, full
account is taken of the recent biological literature on 'major
evolutionary transitions' and the recent resurgence of interest in
multi-level selection theory among biologists. Other biological
topics discussed include Price's equation, kin and group selection,
the gene's eye view, evolutionary game theory, outlaws and selfish
genetic elements, species and clade selection, and the evolution of
individuality. Philosophical topics discussed include reductionism
and holism, causation and correlation, the nature of hierarchical
organization, and realism and pluralism.
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