This volume brings together a selection of the most philosophically significant papers of Arthur Pap. As Sanford Shieh explains in the Introduction to this volume, Pap's work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This role goes beyond the merely historical fact that Pap's views of dispositional and modal concepts were influential. As a sympathetic critic of logical empiricism, Pap, like Quine, saw a deep tension in logical empiricism at its very best in the work of Carnap. But Pap's critique of Carnap is quite different from Quine's, and represents the discovery of limits beyond which empiricism cannot go, where there lies nothing other than intuitive knowledge of logic itself. Pap's arguments for this intuitive knowledge anticipate Etchemendy's recent critique of the model-theoretic account of logical consequence.

Alongside Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam and Jacques Derrida, Stanley Cavell is arguably one of the best-known philosophers in the world. This state-of-the-art collection explores the work of this original and interesting figure who has already been the subject of a number of books, conferences and Phd theses.

A philosopher whose work encompasses a broad range of interests, such as Wittgenstein, scepticism in philosophy, the philosophy of art and film, Shakespeare, and philosophy of mind and language, Cavell has also written much about Henry Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson.

Including contributions from Hilary Putnam, Cora Diamond, Jim Conant and Stephen Mulhall, this book is a must-have for libraries and students alike.

This collection of previously unpublished essays presents a new approach to the history of analytic philosophy, one which does not assume at the outset a general characterization of the distinguishing elements of the analytic tradition. The distinguished contributors, including luminaries W.V. Quine, John Rawls and Hilary Putnam, pay close attention to the historical contexts in which analytic philosophers have worked, revealing multiple discontinuities and misunderstandings, as well as a complex interaction between science and philosophical reflection.

This volume brings together a selection of the most philosophically significant papers of Arthur Pap. As Sanford Shieh explains in the Introduction to this volume, Pap s work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This role goes beyond the merely historical fact that Pap s views of dispositional and modal concepts were influential. As a sympathetic critic of logical empiricism, Pap, like Quine, saw a deep tension in logical empiricism at its very best in the work of Carnap. But Pap s critique of Carnap is quite different from Quine s, and represents the discovery of limits beyond which empiricism cannot go, where there lies nothing other than intuitive knowledge of logic itself. Pap s arguments for this intuitive knowledge anticipate Etchemendy s recent critique of the model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Pap s work also anticipates prominent developments in the contemporary neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics championed by Wright and Hale. Finally, Pap s major philosophical preoccupation, the concepts of necessity and possibility, provides distinctive solutions and perspectives on issues of contemporary concern in the metaphysics of modality. In particular, Pap s account of modality allows us to see the significance of Kripke s well-known arguments on necessity and apriority in a new light.
This volume will be of interest to all researchers in the philosophical history of the analytic tradition, in philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics, and contemporary analytic metaphysics."

A long tradition, going back to Aristotle, conceives of logic in terms of necessity and possibility: a deductive argument is correct if it is not possible for the conclusion to be false when the premises are true. A relatively unknown feature of the analytic tradition in philosophy is that, at its very inception, this venerable conception of the relation between logic and necessity and possibility - the concepts of modality - was put into question. The founders of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, held that these concepts are empty: there are no genuine distinctions among the necessary, the possible, and the actual. In this book, the first of two volumes, Sanford Shieh investigates the grounds of this position and its consequences for Frege's and Russell's conceptions of logic. The grounds lie in doctrines on truth, thought, and knowledge, as well as on the relation between mind and reality, that are central to the philosophies of Frege and Russell, and are of enduring philosophical interest. The upshot of this opposition to modality is that logic is fundamental, and, to be coherent, modal concepts would have to be reconstructed in logical terms. This rejection of modality in early analytic philosophy remains of contemporary significance, though the coherence of modal concepts is rarely questioned nowadays because it is generally assumed that suspicion of modality derives from logical positivism, which has not survived philosophical scrutiny. The anti-modal arguments of Frege and Russell, however, have nothing to do with positivism and remain a challenge to the contemporary acceptance of modal notions.