Financial crises have occurred throughout history, resulting in the loss of national and international public and personal wealth, creating political uncertainty and shaking the foundations of the national, regional and international economic and social order. This book provides answers to the basic questions of what could have caused some of the more recent regional financial crises, what their key characteristics were, how they could have been prevented, what lessons national governments, central bankers and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have learned and how such crises could be prevented in the future. The authors include current and former cabinet members of national governments, central bankers, IMF officials, scholars and practicing economists in both national and multilateral organizations, all of whom have either participated in the management of the various types of financial crises they analyze and discuss and/or have made major contributions to their understanding, including recommendations of how they could be avoided in the future.

Sir Alan Walters ex-chief economic advisor to PM Margaret Thatcher Whether it succeeds or fails, Europe is everyone's concern. The idea of a united Europe has been entertained, even partially at least, achieved, inter alia, CharlemagI e, Napoleon, Hitler, and in our da)' by Spaak, Monet and Chancellor Kohl: the first three by military conquest, the last three by "negotiation" and the creation of integrating institutional arrangements. The motives varied from the twisted paranoia of the Nazis to the idealism of SpaaklMonet/Kohl in avoiding conflicts and wars. Under the protection of NATO the European Coal and Steel Community soon was transformed into the EEC by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The massive reduction of trade barriers, particularly between France and Germany, was rewarded by vigorous growth over the next 15 years. Even as late as 1972, when Britain acceeded to the Treaty of Rome, the EEC was thought to be lar ely a customs union: in de Gaulle eyes the EEC was simply a collection of sovereISJ: l states who cooperated primarily on trade. Each state however enjoyed a veto; deCIsions had to be unanimous.

Hardbound. This book contains a collection of chapters discussing the issues involved in establishing a stable global exchange rate system. In doing so, the authors review the advantages and disadvantages of the various exchange rate regimes used throughout the world during the last fifty years, analyze the role of exchange rate systems in recent international financial crises and explore the probability of constructing a stable global arrangement in the next century.

Financial crises have occurred throughout history, resulting in the loss of national and international public and personal wealth, creating political uncertainty and shaking the foundations of the national, regional and international economic and social order. This book provides answers to the basic questions of what could have caused some of the more recent regional financial crises, what their key characteristics were, how they could have been prevented, what lessons national governments, central bankers and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have learned and how such crises could be prevented in the future. The authors include current and former cabinet members of national governments, central bankers, IMF officials, scholars and practicing economists in both national and multilateral organizations, all of whom have either participated in the management of the various types of financial crises they analyze and discuss and/or have made major contributions to their understanding, including recommendations of how they could be avoided in the future.

Sir Alan Walters ex-chief economic advisor to PM Margaret Thatcher Whether it succeeds or fails, Europe is everyone's concern. The idea of a united Europe has been entertained, even partially at least, achieved, inter alia, CharlemagI e, Napoleon, Hitler, and in our da)' by Spaak, Monet and Chancellor Kohl: the first three by military conquest, the last three by "negotiation" and the creation of integrating institutional arrangements. The motives varied from the twisted paranoia of the Nazis to the idealism of SpaaklMonet/Kohl in avoiding conflicts and wars. Under the protection of NATO the European Coal and Steel Community soon was transformed into the EEC by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The massive reduction of trade barriers, particularly between France and Germany, was rewarded by vigorous growth over the next 15 years. Even as late as 1972, when Britain acceeded to the Treaty of Rome, the EEC was thought to be lar ely a customs union: in de Gaulle eyes the EEC was simply a collection of sovereISJ: l states who cooperated primarily on trade. Each state however enjoyed a veto; deCIsions had to be unanimous.