Using the historical case study method of examination, this monograph reviews the interrelationship of national power, strategy, and operational plans. It surveys the national power, strategic goals, and war plans of five countries prior to the First World War. The five countries selected for review are Germany, Austria-Hungary, England, France, and Russia. The paper provides a background summary of conditions in Europe prior to the outbreak of war, reviews the factors which influenced each country's national power capability, surveys the relative strengths and weaknesses of the potential antagonists, examines strategic goals and operational plans, and analyzes the linkage between power, strategic goals, and plans. Four conclusions are reached. First, a relationship exists between national power, strategy, and plans. Second, resource availability must drive the development of strategy and plans. Third, strategy and plans must be based on realistic conditions. Fourth, regardless of the quality of the calculations, strategy, or plans, the "fog of war" may cause them to be wrong.

This monograph examines the rear battle to determine if current self-defense doctrine is consistent with the tenets of AirLand Battle and the principles of war. It investigates the importance successful defense has on both the tactical and operational missions assigned to the total force, analyses current self-defense doctrine, and examines alternatives which might enhance operations in the rear area. The analysis shows that current doctrine is inconsistent with the tenets of AirLand Battle and the principle of war. Changes are needed to optimize self-defense capability. It also reinforces the need to look at rear operations as one of three components of the total battle and recognizes that rear operations are critical to success in the close and deep battles.