Can Northeast Asia become a zone of peace instead of a short fuse to war? With threatened satellite launches and missile tests, North Korea figured early among Barack Obama s many challenges. President George W. Bush had pinned North Korea to an axis of evil but then neglected Pyongyang until it tested a nuclear device. Would the new administration make similar mistakes? When the Clinton White House prepared to bomb North Korea s nuclear facilities, private citizen Jimmy Carter mediated to avert war and set the stage for a deal freezing North Korea s plutonium production. The 1994 Agreed Framework collapsed after eight years, but when Pyongyang went critical, the negotiations got serious. Using more carrots than sticks, Washington and its four main partners persuaded Pyongyang to commit to disabling its nuclear weapon facilities. Each time the parties advanced one or two steps, however, their advance seemed to spawn one or two steps backward.The history of U.S.-North Korean relations provides important lessons for negotiators how not to deal with dangerous adversaries but also how to create accommodations useful to each side. Clemens distills lessons from U.S. negotiations with Russia, China, and Libya and analyzes how they do and do not apply to six-party and bilateral talks with North Korea in a new political era."

Can Northeast Asia become a zone of peace instead of a short fuse to war? With threatened satellite launches and missile tests, North Korea figured early among Barack Obama s many challenges. President George W. Bush had pinned North Korea to an axis of evil but then neglected Pyongyang until it tested a nuclear device. Would the new administration make similar mistakes? When the Clinton White House prepared to bomb North Korea s nuclear facilities, private citizen Jimmy Carter mediated to avert war and set the stage for a deal freezing North Korea s plutonium production. The 1994 Agreed Framework collapsed after eight years, but when Pyongyang went critical, the negotiations got serious. Using more carrots than sticks, Washington and its four main partners persuaded Pyongyang to commit to disabling its nuclear weapon facilities. Each time the parties advanced one or two steps, however, their advance seemed to spawn one or two steps backward.The history of U.S.-North Korean relations provides important lessons for negotiators how not to deal with dangerous adversaries but also how to create accommodations useful to each side. Clemens distills lessons from U.S. negotiations with Russia, China, and Libya and analyzes how they do and do not apply to six-party and bilateral talks with North Korea in a new political era."

A Pulitzer Prize-winning editorial cartoonist teams up with a noted political commentator. For everyone who loves to hate the Bush administration and is ready to laugh about it! Ambushed! recounts the exploits of the Bush administration, at home and abroad, 2001 to 2008, through the lens of a Pulitzer Prize-winning cartoonist for the Miami Herald and the analysis of a leading political scientist at Boston University and Harvard University. The book begins with the ways in which American voters were ambushed in two presidential elections and ranges widely among the ensuing disasters from Enron to Katrina to the budget deficit to the economy and finally to the "global war on terror" that lost America many friends and inspired enemies worldwide. Contrasting the Bush administration's lofty promises with its policy failures-from Baghdad to New Orleans-the book suggests that this has been not only the least effective but the most destructive presidency of the past century.

A Pulitzer Prize-winning editorial cartoonist teams up with a noted political commentator. For everyone who loves to hate the Bush administration and is ready to laugh about it! Ambushed! recounts the exploits of the Bush administration, at home and abroad, 2001 to 2008, through the lens of a Pulitzer Prize-winning cartoonist for the Miami Herald and the analysis of a leading political scientist at Boston University and Harvard University. The book begins with the ways in which American voters were ambushed in two presidential elections and ranges widely among the ensuing disasters from Enron to Katrina to the budget deficit to the economy and finally to the "global war on terror" that lost America many friends and inspired enemies worldwide. Contrasting the Bush administration's lofty promises with its policy failures-from Baghdad to New Orleans-the book suggests that this has been not only the least effective but the most destructive presidency of the past century.

This book, which offers the work of a group of distinguished contributors, is designed to clarify the bearing of the arms control issue on the Sino-Soviet dispute and to suggest future policy directions for the United States. Arms control and security issues have been at the heart of much of Russian-Chinese disagreement since the opening of the rift in the 1950's. This book, which offers the work of a group of distinguished contributors, is designed to clarify the bearing of the arms control issue on the Sino-Soviet dispute and to suggest future policy directions for the United States. Specifically, the contributors seek to illuminate the security problems facing the United States and to examine the prospects for arms control as they are affected by conflict within the Communist world. Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control begins with the observation that the Soviet Union and Communist China use disarmament talk as a way of pointing out issues of major importance in their dispute, of competing for support within the third world and the Communist bloc, and of expressing genuine disagreement over the fundamental causes of the Sino-Soviet rift. The first section of the book deals with the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the arms control policies of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. The authors argue that arms control is possible without China, that the Chinese are unlikely to be interested in arms control agreements in the near future, and that arms control could be of paramount importance to relations among the three countries. Part II of the book is a historical exploration of the interrelation between specific arms control measures and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The authors give the most detailed account yet available of Sino-Soviet nuclear relations between 1957 and 1960 and document the extent to which the quarrel has centered on military and security issues. The role of the test ban in widening the Sino-Soviet rift is explored. In Part III each author poses the same question: what would be the nature of Sino-Soviet relations during a Washington-Peking crisis? The first three chapters in this section answer the question from the viewpoint of each country concerned; the last examines these relations during the 1958 Quemoy crisis. Definitive information on the events pertinent to the Sino-Soviet dispute of the 1950's and early 1960's is rare; although it does not pretend to tell the entire story, this book makes a significant contribution to the body of knowledge on the evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute. As a learned, perceptive comment on the security problems created by the dispute and on the possibilities for agreement that it presents, Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control will have a wide audience among political scientists, specialists in Sino-Soviet affairs, and a lay public that recognizes the importance of this political issue.