The most difficult challenge for a terrorist organization seeking to build a nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device is obtaining fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Experts acknowledge that obtaining HEU, uranium that has been processed to increase the proportion of the U-235 isotope to over 20%, is the most difficult challenge facing a state or non-state actor seeking to build a nuclear explosive. The large stocks of HEU in civilian use, many not adequately protected, are thus one of the greatest security risks facing the global community at present. This book contains chapters examining the various uses for this material and possible alternatives; the threat posed by this material; the economic, political and strategic obstacles to international efforts to end the use of HEU for commercial and research purposes; as well as new national and international measures that should be taken to further the elimination of HEU.

This book was published as a special issue of The Nonproliferation Review.

The postwar period saw increased interest in the idea of relatively easy-to-manufacture but devastatingly lethal radiological munitions whose use would not discriminate between civilian and military targets. Death Dust explores the largely unknown history of the development of radiological weapons (RW)—weapons designed to disperse radioactive material without a nuclear detonation—through a series of comparative case studies across the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Iraq, and Egypt. The authors illuminate the historical drivers of and impediments to radiological weapons innovation. They also examine how new, dire geopolitical events—such as the war in Ukraine—could encourage other states to pursue RW and analyze the impact of the spread of such weapons on nuclear deterrence and the nonproliferation regime. Death Dust presents practical, necessary steps to reduce the likelihood of a resurgence of interest in and pursuit of radiological weapons by state actors.

This book, first published in 1984, analyses the critically important Cold War issue of the Soviet national security decision-making process dealing with weapons acquisition, arms control and the application of military force. It conceptualises Soviet decision-making for national security from Stalinist antecedents to 1980s modes, and examines the problems of decision-making concerning weapons development, defence research and development and SALT negotiations. It also focuses on the decision-making processes which led to the use or threatened use of military force in Czechoslovakia (1968), the Middle East (1973) and Afghanistan (1979).

International experts examine transactions, capabilities, structures and norms influencing the complex network of trade in missile technologies.

This book, first published in 1984, analyses the critically important Cold War issue of the Soviet national security decision-making process dealing with weapons acquisition, arms control and the application of military force. It conceptualises Soviet decision-making for national security from Stalinist antecedents to 1980s modes, and examines the problems of decision-making concerning weapons development, defence research and development and SALT negotiations. It also focuses on the decision-making processes which led to the use or threatened use of military force in Czechoslovakia (1968), the Middle East (1973) and Afghanistan (1979).

The postwar period saw increased interest in the idea of relatively easy-to-manufacture but devastatingly lethal radiological munitions whose use would not discriminate between civilian and military targets. Death Dust explores the largely unknown history of the development of radiological weapons (RW)—weapons designed to disperse radioactive material without a nuclear detonation—through a series of comparative case studies across the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Iraq, and Egypt. The authors illuminate the historical drivers of and impediments to radiological weapons innovation. They also examine how new, dire geopolitical events—such as the war in Ukraine—could encourage other states to pursue RW and analyze the impact of the spread of such weapons on nuclear deterrence and the nonproliferation regime. Death Dust presents practical, necessary steps to reduce the likelihood of a resurgence of interest in and pursuit of radiological weapons by state actors.

The most difficult challenge for a terrorist organization seeking to build a nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device is obtaining fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Experts acknowledge that obtaining HEU, uranium that has been processed to increase the proportion of the U-235 isotope to over 20%, is the most difficult challenge facing a state or non-state actor seeking to build a nuclear explosive. The large stocks of HEU in civilian use, many not adequately protected, are thus one of the greatest security risks facing the global community at present. This book contains chapters examining the various uses for this material and possible alternatives; the threat posed by this material; the economic, political and strategic obstacles to international efforts to end the use of HEU for commercial and research purposes; as well as new national and international measures that should be taken to further the elimination of HEU. This book was published as a special issue of The Nonproliferation Review.

Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States explores theoretical approaches, helping to explain a broad range of perspectives on the problems posed by the threat of proliferation.
With the collapse of the USSR, fifteen fledgling sates inherited a massive Soviet arsenal, unstable political systems, and desperate economies. A "sell everything" mentality threatens to result in the largest arms bazaar in human history, and this potential "fire sale" includes weapons of mass destruction. This book addresses the challenges the new independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (FSU) face in controlling and monitoring their sensitive, military-related exports.

With the collapse of the USSR, fifteen fledgling sates inherited a massive Soviet arsenal, unstable political systems, and desperate economies. A "sell everything" mentality threatens to result in the largest arms bazaar in human history, and this potential "fire sale" includes weapons of mass destruction. This book addresses the challenges the new independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (FSU) face in controlling and monitoring their sensitive, military-related exports.
"Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States" explores the various theoretical approaches that help explain the development of nonproliferation export control systems in the NIS. The contributors, coming from both the FSU states and the US, provide a broad range of perspectives on the problems posed by the threat of proliferation.

The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, a new book from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, assesses the motivations and capabilities of terrorist organizations to acquire and use nuclear weapons, to fabricate and and detonate crude nuclear explosives, to strike nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities, and to build and employ radiological weapons or "dirty bombs."

The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, a new book from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, assesses the motivations and capabilities of terrorist organizations to acquire and use nuclear weapons, to fabricate and detonate crude nuclear explosives, to strike nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities, and to build and employ radiological weapons or dirty bombs. The authors maintain that there is a greater likelihood today than any time in the past three decades that nuclear weapons will actually be used. This stark assessment is based upon two premises: 1) Non-state actors have emerged who seek nuclear weapons in order to use them and 2) Crude but real nuclear weapons, as distinct from radiological dispersal devices, are well within the technical reach of some terrorist organizations. The authors urge the United States and its international partners to take immediate steps to prevent the most catastrophic forms of nuclear terrorism and to reduce the consequences of the most likely nuclear terror attacks. Russia; securing, consolidating, and eliminating highly enriched uranium globally; and providing for secure storage and disposal of radioactive materials used in medicine, scientific research, and industry. The book also stresses the need to educate the public on the real risks of radiation exposure and radioactive contamination to help psychologically immunize citizens against fear of radiological attacks, which the authors conclude are all but inevitable in the coming years.

Despite their Cold War rivalry, the United States and the Soviet Union frequently engaged in joint efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Leaders in Washington and Moscow recognized that nuclear proliferation would serve neither country's interests even when they did not see eye-to-eye in many other areas. They likewise understood why collaboration in mitigating this nuclear danger would serve both their own interests and those of the international community. This volume examines seven little known examples of US-Soviet cooperation for non-proliferation, including preventing South Africa from conducting a nuclear test, developing international safeguards and export control guidelines, and negotiating a draft convention banning radiological weapons. It uses declassified and recently-digitized archival material to explore in-depth the motivations for and modalities for cooperation under often adverse political circumstances. Given the current disintegration of Russian and US relations, including in the nuclear sphere, this history is especially worthy of review. Accordingly, the volume's final chapter is devoted to discussing how non-proliferation lessons from the past can be applied today in areas most in need of US-Russian cooperation.

Every nuclear weapons program for decades has relied extensively on illicit imports of nuclear-related technologies. This book offers the most detailed public account of how states procure what they need to build nuclear weapons, what is currently being done to stop them, and how global efforts to prevent such trade could be strengthened. While illicit nuclear trade can never be stopped completely, effective steps to block illicit purchases of nuclear technology have sometimes succeeded in slowing nuclear weapons programs and increasing their costs, giving diplomacy more chance to work. Hence, this book argues, preventing illicit transfers wherever possible is a key element of an effective global non-proliferation strategy.

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