The crux of the debate between proponents of behavioral psychology and cognitive psychology focuses on the issue of accessibility. Cognitivists believe that mental mechanisms and processes are accessible, and that their inner workings can be inferred from experimental observations of behavior. Behaviorists, on the contrary, believe that mental processes and mechanisms are inaccessible, and that nothing important about them can be inferred from even the most cleverly designed empirical studies. One argument that is repeatedly raised by cognitivists is that even though mental processes are not directly accessible, this should not be a barrier to unravelling the nature of the inner mental processes and mechanisms. Inference works for other sciences, such as physics, so why not psychology? If physics can work so successfully with their kind of inaccessibility to make enormous theoretical progress, then why not psychology? As with most previous psychological debates, there is no "killer argument" that can provide an unambiguous resolution. In its absence, author William Uttal explores the differing properties of physical and psychological time, space, and mathematics before coming to the conclusion that there are major discrepancies between the properties of the respective subject matters that make the analogy of comparable inaccessibilities a false one. This title was first published in 2008.

Originally published in 1981, this third volume deals with the empirical data base and the theories concerning visual perception - the set of mental responses to photic stimulation of the eyes. As the book develops, the plan was to present a general taxonomy of visual processes and phenomena. It was hoped that such a general perspective would help to bring some order to the extensive, but largely unorganized, research literature dealing with our immediate perceptual responses to visual stimuli at the time. The specific goal of this work was to provide a classification system that integrates and systematizes the data base of perceptual psychology into a comprehensive intellectual scheme by means of an eclectic, multi-level metatheory invoking several different kinds of explanation.

In this fascinating book, William R. Uttal raises the possibility that, however much we learn about the anatomy and physiology of the brain and psychology, we may never be able to cross the final bridge explaining how the mind is produced by the brain. Three main classes of mind-brain theory are considered and rejected: field theories, because they are based on a superficial analogy; single cell theories, because they emerge from a massive uncontrolled experimental program; and neural net theories, because they are constrained by combinatorial complexity.
To support his argument, Uttal explores the empirical and conceptual foundations of these theoretical approaches and identifies flaws in their fundamental logic. The author concludes that the problems preventing solution of the mind-brain problem are intractable, yet well within the confines of natural science.

This research monograph describes a large programming project in which an underwater organism, capable of perceiving, learning, deciding, and navigating, is computationally simulated. The developed computational model serves as a contemporary theory of perceptual-motor performance, embodying much of what is known about human vision and some of what is known about other cognitive processes. This artificial intelligence project has substantial contributions to make to the development of autonomous underwater vehicles. It also makes a specific theoretical statement about the organization and nature of organic perceptual motor systems that may be useful to psychologists, neuroscientists, and theoreticians in a number of other fields.

First published in 1987. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Originally published in 1988, this is the final volume in the set. The original intent of the tetralogy was to review neural explanations of high level perceptual and cognitive processes. However, at this point, it became clear that there were few neural explanations of perceptual topics - a situation that still persists today. This book, therefore, used a different framework examining the role of detection, discrimination, and recognition at the behavioral level.

The crux of the debate between proponents of behavioral psychology and cognitive psychology focuses on the issue of accessibility. Cognitivists believe that mental mechanisms and processes are accessible, and that their inner workings can be inferred from experimental observations of behavior. Behaviorists, on the contrary, believe that mental processes and mechanisms are inaccessible, and that nothing important about them can be inferred from even the most cleverly designed empirical studies. One argument that is repeatedly raised by cognitivists is that even though mental processes are not directly accessible, this should not be a barrier to unravelling the nature of the inner mental processes and mechanisms. Inference works for other sciences, such as physics, so why not psychology? If physics can work so successfully with their kind of inaccessibility to make enormous theoretical progress, then why not psychology? As with most previous psychological debates, there is no "killer argument" that can provide an unambiguous resolution. In its absence, author William Uttal explores the differing properties of physical and psychological time, space, and mathematics before coming to the conclusion that there are major discrepancies between the properties of the respective subject matters that make the analogy of comparable inaccessibilities a false one.

Originally published in 1981, this third volume deals with the empirical data base and the theories concerning visual perception - the set of mental responses to photic stimulation of the eyes. As the book develops, the plan was to present a general taxonomy of visual processes and phenomena. It was hoped that such a general perspective would help to bring some order to the extensive, but largely unorganized, research literature dealing with our immediate perceptual responses to visual stimuli at the time. The specific goal of this work was to provide a classification system that integrates and systematizes the data base of perceptual psychology into a comprehensive intellectual scheme by means of an eclectic, multi-level metatheory invoking several different kinds of explanation.

Originally published in 1978, this book develops a conceptual synthesis of the field of physiological psychology, the science specifically concerned with the relationship between the brain and the mind. It was designed to elucidate the important questions under investigation, the basic intellectual and technical problems that were encountered, and the significance of the major empirical results of the time. Of equal or even greater importance is the author's derivation of the general principles relating brain and mind that had emerged after decades of modern research into this important question. Included in the volume are historical and philosophical perspectives on the mind-brain problem as well as extensive discussions of instruments, methodology, empirical findings and theory. Here is a powerful heuristic tool that informs the reader about the concepts and ideas implicit in this science rather than simply exhaustively listing experimental results. The author does not ignore findings; he organizes them into three broad categories - localization; representation, and learning - then emphasizes the relationships among experiments. This is a book that synthesizes, integrates, and stresses concepts, principles and problems. The careful organization of the book makes it especially useful for students of brain and mind at all levels.

Originally published in 1973, this book deals with what were, even at that time, the well-known neural coding processes of the sensory transmission processes. The book was written to demonstrate the common features of the various senses. It concentrates on the most peripheral neural aspects of the senses starting with the physical transduction process and culminating in the arrival of signals at the brain.

In this book, William R. Uttal continues his analysis and critique of theories of mind. This book considers theories that are based on macroneural responses (such as those obtained from fMRI) that represent the averaged or cumulative responses of many neurons. The analysis is carried out with special emphasis on the logical and conceptual difficulties in developing a theory but with special attention to some of the current attempts to go from these cumulative responses to explanations of the grand question of how the mind is generated by the brain. While acknowledging the importance of these macroneural techniques in the study of the anatomy and physiology of the brain, Uttal concludes that this macroneural approach is not likely to produce a valid neural theory of cognition because the critical information-the states of the individual neurons-involved in brain activity becoming mental activity is actually lost in the process of summation. Controversial topics are considered in detail including discussions of empirical, logical, and technological barriers to theory building in cognitive neuroscience.

This volume examines the scientific basis of reductionist approaches to understanding visual perception. The author makes the provocative argument that contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science have gone off on a wild-goose chase in the search for reductionist explanations of perceptual phenomena. This book considers some specific and general examples of this misdirection and suggests an alternative future course for science. It reviews the successes and failures of the sciences' efforts to explain perceptual and other mental functions in the terms of either internal cognitive mechanisms, formal models, or the neural structures from which the brain--the organ of the mind--is constructed. Although this is an iconoclastic and minority view, the book shows how many contemporary perceptual scientists have qualified their thinking with regard to what their data and theories mean even while generally accepting the empirical findings. It is, without question, an attempted refutation of some of the primary assumptions of contemporary theory. Summing up the author's convictions concerning some of the most important questions of human nature, this book is a statement of a point of view that has provided a framework for his personal answers to some of these important questions of human history.

This book considers one of the most fundamental, but only infrequently considered, issues in psychology--Are mental processes accessible by means of verbal reports and/or experimental assays? It is argues that this is the main characteristic distinguishing between behaviorism and mentalistic cognitivism. The answer posed by the author is that, with few exceptions and for the most fundamental reasons, mental processes are not accessible and that any psychology, such as contemporary cognitivism, based on a putative analysis of mind into its mental components must be fallacious. Classic and modern arguments against both mentalism and behaviorism are reviewed. In general, it is concluded that most antibehaviorist arguments are based on second order humanistic considerations rather than those underlying the usual scientific standards. Behaviorism represents the best that can be done in a situation of fundamental immeasurability and uncertainty. A modern version is offered in the final chapter of this book.

Originally published in 1988, this is the final volume in the set. The original intent of the tetralogy was to review neural explanations of high level perceptual and cognitive processes. However, at this point, it became clear that there were few neural explanations of perceptual topics - a situation that still persists today. This book, therefore, used a different framework examining the role of detection, discrimination, and recognition at the behavioral level.

For many years behaviorism was criticized because it rejected the study of perception. This rejection was based on the extreme view that percepts were internal subjective experiences and thus not subject to examination. This book argues that this logic is incorrect and shows how visual perception, particularized in the study of form recognition, can be carried out from the behavioral point of view if certain constraints and limitations are understood and accepted. The book discusses the idea of representation of forms, considers the major historical neural, psychological, and computational theories of form recognition, and then concludes by presenting a modern approach to the problem. In this book, William Uttal continues his critical analysis of the foundations of modern psychology. He is particularly concerned with the logical and conceptual foundations of visual perception and uses form recognition as a vehicle to rationalize the discrepancies between classic behaviorism and what we now appreciate are legitimate research areas.

Directed to scholars and senior-level graduate students, this book is an iconoclastic survey of the history of dualism and its impact on contemporary cognitive psychology. It argues that much of modern cognitive or mentalist psychology is built upon a cryptodualism--the idea that the mind and brain can be thought of as independent entities. This dualism pervades so much of society that it covertly influences many aspects of modern science, particularly psychology. To support the argument, the history of dualism is extended over 100,000 years--from the Paleolithic times until modern philosophical and psychological thinking. The questions regarding this topic that are answered in the book are: 1) Does dualism influence the scientific theories of psychology? 2) If so, should dualism be put aside in the search for a more objective analysis of human mentation?

This book considers one of the most fundamental, but only infrequently considered, issues in psychology--Are mental processes accessible by means of verbal reports and/or experimental assays? It is argues that this is the main characteristic distinguishing between behaviorism and mentalistic cognitivism. The answer posed by the author is that, with few exceptions and for the most fundamental reasons, mental processes are not accessible and that any psychology, such as contemporary cognitivism, based on a putative analysis of mind into its mental components must be fallacious.
Classic and modern arguments against both mentalism and behaviorism are reviewed. In general, it is concluded that most antibehaviorist arguments are based on second order humanistic considerations rather than those underlying the usual scientific standards. Behaviorism represents the best that can be done in a situation of fundamental immeasurability and uncertainty. A modern version is offered in the final chapter of this book.

This volume examines the scientific basis of reductionist approaches to understanding visual perception. The author makes the provocative argument that contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science have gone off on a wild-goose chase in the search for reductionist explanations of perceptual phenomena. This book considers some specific and general examples of this misdirection and suggests an alternative future course for science. It reviews the successes and failures of the sciences' efforts to explain perceptual and other mental functions in the terms of either internal cognitive mechanisms, formal models, or the neural structures from which the brain--the organ of the mind--is constructed.
Although this is an iconoclastic and minority view, the book shows how many contemporary perceptual scientists have qualified their thinking with regard to what their data and theories mean even while generally accepting the empirical findings. It is, without question, an attempted refutation of some of the primary assumptions of contemporary theory. Summing up the author's convictions concerning some of the most important questions of human nature, this book is a statement of a point of view that has provided a framework for his personal answers to some of these important questions of human history.

This research monograph describes a large programming project in which an underwater organism, capable of perceiving, learning, deciding, and navigating, is computationally simulated. The developed computational model serves as a contemporary theory of perceptual-motor performance, embodying much of what is known about human vision and some of what is known about other cognitive processes. This artificial intelligence project has substantial contributions to make to the development of autonomous underwater vehicles. It also makes a specific theoretical statement about the organization and nature of organic perceptual motor systems that may be useful to psychologists, neuroscientists, and theoreticians in a number of other fields.

In this fascinating book, William R. Uttal raises the possibility that, however much we learn about the anatomy and physiology of the brain and psychology, we may never be able to cross the final bridge explaining how the mind is produced by the brain. Three main classes of mind-brain theory are considered and rejected: field theories, because they are based on a superficial analogy; single cell theories, because they emerge from a massive uncontrolled experimental program; and neural net theories, because they are constrained by combinatorial complexity. To support his argument, Uttal explores the empirical and conceptual foundations of these theoretical approaches and identifies flaws in their fundamental logic. The author concludes that the problems preventing solution of the mind-brain problem are intractable, yet well within the confines of natural science.

Psychology deals with the most complex subject matter of any science. As such, it is subject to misunderstandings, artifacts, and just simple errors of data, logic, and interpretation. This book teases out the details of some of the sources of these errors. It considers errors in psychological data and theories that arise from confusing endogenous and exogenous causal forces in perceptual research, misinterpreting the effects of inevitable natural laws as psychological phenomena, improper application of statistics and measurement, and flawed assumptions. Examples of each of these sources of error are presented and discussed. Finally, the book concludes that a return to a revitalized kind of behaviorism is preferred, rather than continuing on the current cognitive path.

Psychology deals with the most complex subject matter of any science. As such, it is subject to misunderstandings, artifacts, and just simple errors of data, logic, and interpretation. This book teases out the details of some of the sources of these errors. It considers errors in psychological data and theories that arise from confusing endogenous and exogenous causal forces in perceptual research, misinterpreting the effects of inevitable natural laws as psychological phenomena, improper application of statistics and measurement, and flawed assumptions. Examples of each of these sources of error are presented and discussed. Finally, the book concludes that a return to a revitalized kind of behaviorism is preferred, rather than continuing on the current cognitive path.

For many years behaviorism was criticized because it rejected the study of perception. This rejection was based on the extreme view that percepts were internal subjective experiences and thus not subject to examination. This book argues that this logic is incorrect and shows how visual perception, particularized in the study of form recognition, can be carried out from the behavioral point of view if certain constraints and limitations are understood and accepted. The book discusses the idea of representation of forms, considers the major historical neural, psychological, and computational theories of form recognition, and then concludes by presenting a modern approach to the problem.
In this book, William Uttal continues his critical analysis of the foundations of modern psychology. He is particularly concerned with the logical and conceptual foundations of visual perception and uses form recognition as a vehicle to rationalize the discrepancies between classic behaviorism and what we now appreciate are legitimate research areas.

These four volumes, originally published between 1973 and 1988, were intended to provide a broad survey of cognitive neuroscience, a field known variously as physiological psychology or psychobiology in the 1970s and 1980s when the books were written. The general goal was to summarize what was known about the relation between brain and mind at that time, with an emphasis on sensory and perceptual topics. Out of print for many years, the Tetralogy is now available again, as a set for the first time (which is as the author envisaged it), or as individual volumes. William R. Uttal was Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the University of Michigan and Professor Emeritus of Engineering at the Arizona State University. Uttal was a prolific author whose output included 30 books and 140 scientific articles.

This book, a companion to William R. Uttal's earlier work on macrotheories theories of mind-brain relationships, reviews another set of theories-those based on microneuronal measurements. Microneural theories maintain the integrity of individual neurons either in isolation or as participants in the great neuronal networks that make up the physical brain. Despite an almost universal acceptance by cognitive neuroscientists that the intangible mind must, in some way, be encoded by network states, Uttal shows that the problem of how the transformation occurs is not yet supported by empirical research findings at the micro as well as at the macro levels of analysis. Theories of the neuronal network survive more as metaphors than as robust explanations. This book also places special emphasis on the technological developments that stimulate these metaphors. A major conclusion drawn in this book is that it is not at all certain that the mind-brain problem is solvable in the sense that many other grand scientific problems are.