Lottaz, Iwama, and their contributors investigate the role of neutral and nonaligned European states during the negotiations for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Focusing on the years from the Irish Resolution of 1958 until the treaty’s opening for signatures ten years later, the nine chapters written by area experts highlight the processes and reasons for the political and diplomatic actions the neutrals took, and how those impacted the multilateral treaty negotiations. The book reveals new aspects of the dynamics that lead to this most consequential multilateral breakthrough of the Cold War. In part one, three chapters analyze the international system from a bird’s eye perspective, discussing neutrality, nonalignment, and the nuclear order. The second part features six detailed case studies on the politics and diplomacy of Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia. Overall, this study suggests that despite the volatile and dangerous nature of the early Cold War, the balance of the strategic environment enabled actors that were not part of one or the other alliance system to play a role in the interlocking global politics that finally created the nuclear regime that defines international relations until today. A valuable resource for scholars of nonproliferation, the cold war, neutrality, nonalignment, and area studies.

What were the calculations made by the US and its major allies in the 1960s when they faced the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? These were all states with the technological and financial capabilities to develop and possess nuclear weapons should they wish to do so. In the end, only the United Kingdom and France became nuclear weapon states. Eventually, all of them joined the non-proliferation regime. Leading American, British, Canadian, French, German and Japanese scholars consider key questions that faced the signatories to the NPT: How imperative was nuclear deterrence in facing the perceived threat to their country? How reliable did they think the US extended deterrence was, and how costly would an independent deterrent be both financially and politically? Was there a regional option? How much future was there in the civilian nuclear energy sector for their country and what role would the NPT play in this area? What capabilities needed to be preserved for the country's future and how could this be made compatible with the NPT? What were the determining factors of deciding whether to join the NPT?

What were the calculations made by the US and its major allies in the 1960s when they faced the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? These were all states with the technological and financial capabilities to develop and possess nuclear weapons should they wish to do so. In the end, only the United Kingdom and France became nuclear weapon states. Eventually, all of them joined the non-proliferation regime. Leading American, British, Canadian, French, German and Japanese scholars consider key questions that faced the signatories to the NPT: How imperative was nuclear deterrence in facing the perceived threat to their country? How reliable did they think the US extended deterrence was, and how costly would an independent deterrent be both financially and politically? Was there a regional option? How much future was there in the civilian nuclear energy sector for their country and what role would the NPT play in this area? What capabilities needed to be preserved for the country's future and how could this be made compatible with the NPT? What were the determining factors of deciding whether to join the NPT?