A legendary CIA operative and central figure in the Watergate scandal at last tells his story World War II covert agent E. Howard Hunt joined the CIA soon after its inception, becoming one of its most valuable operatives until his retirement in 1970. He blazed a trail for the agency in Latin America, helping to orchestrate the successful 1954 coup in Guatemala as well as the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, which ended in disaster after an ill-fated decision by President John F. Kennedy. During the Nixon administration, he worked with the White House Special Investigations Unit (aka the "plumbers"). In the aftermath of the Pentagon Papers leak, he masterminded the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office in 1971, and, with G. Gordon Liddy, he organized the break-in at the Democratic National Committee's Watergate headquarters in 1972. Hunt was ultimately convicted of burglary, conspiracy, and wiretapping and served 33 months in prison. Now in his late eighties, Hunt looks back over his storied career, revealing what really happened and debunking the many rumors that have swirled around him. Writing with his characteristic salty wit, he brings to life his exploits in the CIA, offering surprising revelations about the agency's Latin American operations and its masterly manipulation of politics and the media in the U.S. He details the "black bag jobs" of the White House plumbers, explains why he agreed to participate in the Watergate burglary even though he thought it was a bad idea and sheds new light on the aftermath of the break-in. He sets the record straight on rumors about his first wife's death and accusations that have linked him to the JFK assassination and the George Wallace shooting. And finally, he offers an insider's advice on how the CIA must now reshape itself to regain its edge and help win the war on terrorism. E. Howard Hunt (Miami, FL) is author of more than 70 suspense novels. Greg Aunapu (Miami, FL) has reported for Time, People, and a variety of other national news media.

States seldom resort to war to overthrow their adversaries. They are more likely to attempt to covertly change the opposing regime, by assassinating a foreign leader, sponsoring a coup d'etat, meddling in a democratic election, or secretly aiding foreign dissident groups. In Covert Regime Change, Lindsey A. O'Rourke shows us how states really act when trying to overthrow another state. She argues that conventional focus on overt cases misses the basic causes of regime change. O'Rourke provides substantive evidence of types of security interests that drive states to intervene. Offensive operations aim to overthrow a current military rival or break up a rival alliance. Preventive operations seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival alliance, that may make them a future security threat. Hegemonic operations try to maintain a hierarchical relationship between the intervening state and the target government. Despite the prevalence of covert attempts at regime change, most operations fail to remain covert and spark blowback in unanticipated ways. Covert Regime Change assembles an original dataset of all American regime change operations during the Cold War. This fund of information shows the United States was ten times more likely to try covert rather than overt regime change during the Cold War. Her dataset allows O'Rourke to address three foundational questions: What motivates states to attempt foreign regime change? Why do states prefer to conduct these operations covertly rather than overtly? How successful are such missions in achieving their foreign policy goals? -- Cornell University Press

In a penetrating account of the evolution of British intelligence gathering in India, C. A. Bayly shows how networks of Indian spies, runners and political secretaries were recruited by the British to secure information about their subjects. He also examines the social and intellectual origins of these informants, and considers how the colonial authorities interpreted and often misinterpreted the information they supplied. As Professor Bayly demonstrates, it was such misunderstandings which ultimately contributed to the failure of the British to anticipate the mutinies of 1857. He argues, however, that, even before this, India's complex systems of communication were challenging the political and intellectual dominance of the European rulers.

The first edition of this book, published in 1999, was well-received, but interest in it has surged in recent years. It chronicles an early example of regime change that was based on a flawed interpretation of intelligence and proclaimed a success even as its mistakes were becoming clear. Since 1999, a number of documents relating to the CIA's activities in Guatemala have been declassified, and a truth and reconciliation process has unearthed other reports, speeches, and writings that shed more light on the role of the United States. For this edition, the author has selected and annotated twenty documents for a new documentary Appendix, culminating with President Clinton's apology to the people of Guatemala.

The events of September 11, 2001 sharply revived governmental and societal anxieties in many democratic countries concerning the threats posed by terrorism, organized crime, the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, and other complex security threats. In many countries, public discourse of subjects traditionally considered part of social policy, such as immigration and asylum, have been securitized, while intelligence services have been granted greater resources and expanded powers. This comprehensive volume discusses the various challenges of establishing and maintaining accountable and democratically controlled intelligence services, drawing both from states with well-established democratic systems and those emerging from authoritarian systems and in transition towards democracy. It adopts a multidisciplinary and comparative approach, identifying good practices to make security services accountable to society and its democratic representatives. The volume will engage both academics and practitioners in the discussion of how to anchor these vital yet inherently difficult to control institutions within a firmly democratic framework. As such, it has clear relevance for these concerned with the control and oversight of intelligence and security issues in many countries.

This is a true story of daring and adventure during World War II,with such unexpected players as Marlene Dietrich, who took part in the "musical warfare," and Julia Child, whose duties were clerical but who nonetheless felt she was "saving the world." To quote Tom Moon: "Anything that could hurt the enemy and aid the Allies was fair game. The rules of warfare were to be abolished for this organization." "This organization" was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the CIA, which President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered into existence five months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The eclectic group of specially skilled agents included scientists, professors, policemen, forgers, pickpockets-and a nineteen-year-old French-speaking draftee from Nebraska named Tom Moon. Their mission: to gather information and to carry out sabotage and guerrilla operations behind enemy lines any way they could, anywhere in the world. Here is a little-known but crucial aspect of the war effort, told as only an insider can.

This is the story of two Confederate spies, Tom Harbin and Charlie Russell. Harbin, among the most wanted of all Confederate agents, was also one of the leaders in the plot to kill Abraham Lincoln. It was Harbin who left a getaway horse for Booth outside Ford's Theatre, and Harbin who helped Booth escape across the Potomac. For a time there was a big price on Harbin's head, but he was never arrested. Tradition holds that he went into hiding, perhaps in Cuba or England, but this book demonstrates that he was again openly living and working in D.C. at least as early as 1866. The other half of this book presents a new Confederate spy: Tom Harbin's step-cousin Charlie Russell, a man who never talked and never left a paper trail. It was only while the author was conducting genealogical research into the Russell family of Clarksville, Virginia, that he stumbled across Russell's activities during the Civil War. Here the author presents a wealth of evidence to suggest that Russell, too, played a part in the dramatic history of Confederate espionage. Enhancing the life stories of both these men is detailed information on their genealogy and the lives of their forebears and descendants, many of whom were prominent in the history and society of Washington, D.C.

For decades, a great number of Americans saw Alger Hiss as an innocent victim of McCarthyism--a distinguished diplomat railroaded by an ambitious Richard Nixon. And even as the case against Hiss grew over time, his dignified demeanor helped create an aura of innocence that outshone the facts in many minds.
Now G. Edward White deftly draws together the countless details of Hiss's life--from his upper middle-class childhood in Baltimore and his brilliant success at Harvard to his later career as a self-made martyr to McCarthyism--to paint a fascinating portrait of a man whose life was devoted to perpetuating a lie. White catalogs the evidence that proved Hiss's guilt, from Whittaker Chambers's famous testimony, to copies of State Department documents typed on Hiss's typewriter, to Allen Weinstein's groundbreaking investigation in the 1970s. The author then explores the central conundrums of Hiss's life: Why did this talented lawyer become a Communist and a Soviet spy? Why did he devote so much of his life to an extensive public campaign to deny his espionage? And how, without producing any new evidence, did he convince many people that he was innocent? White offers a compelling analysis of Hiss's behavior in the face of growing evidence of his guilt, revealing how this behavior fit into an ongoing pattern of denial and duplicity in his life.
The story of Alger Hiss is in part a reflection of Cold War America--a time of ideological passions, partisan battles, and secret lives. It is also a story that transcends a particular historical era--a story about individuals who choose to engage in espionage for foreign powers and the secret worlds they choose to conceal. In White's skilledhands, the life of Alger Hiss comes to illuminate both of those themes.

This taut, true thriller dives into a dark world that touches us all, as seen through the brilliant, breakneck career of an extraordinary hacker--a woman known only as Alien. When she arrived at MIT in the 1990s, Alien was quickly drawn to the school's tradition of high-risk physical trespassing: the original "hacking." Within a year, one of her hallmates was dead and two others were arraigned. Alien's adventures were only just beginning. After a stint at the storied, secretive Los Alamos National Laboratory, Alien was recruited by a top cybersecurity firm where she deployed her cache of virtual weapons--and the trespassing and social engineering talents she had developed while "hacking" at MIT. The company tested its clients' security by every means possible--not just coding, but donning disguises and sneaking past guards and secretaries into the C-suite. Alien now runs a boutique hacking outfit that caters to some of the world's biggest and most vulnerable institutions--banks, retailers, government agencies. Her work combines devilish charm, old-school deception, and next generation spycraft. In Breaking and Entering, cybersecurity finally gets the rich, character-driven, fast-paced treatment it deserves.

The story of one of the most astonishing episodes of espionage and deception of World War Two.This is the tale of two men: Claude Dansey, deputy head of MI6, and double agent Henri Dericourt, who was planted with the rival wartime secret service - SOE - at Dansey's instructions. From there began a terrifying trail of destruction. After making contact with Dansey in 1942, Dericourt was recruited to SOE as the man desperately needed to organize top-secret flights in and out of occupied French territory. But at the same time Dericourt was in touch with German counter-espionage in Paris. As SOE congratulated themselves on a new asset, Dericourt gave the Nazis everything; every flight, operation and coded message he could. Against a background of unprecedented deception and betrayal, Dansey's secret MI6 operation eventually led to the arrest of nearly one thousand men and women, hundreds of whom died in concentration camps. How did it go so wrong? A shocking, enthralling account of a devastating episode in the history of the British secret services, perfect for readers of Ben MacIntyre.

The British conquered India within two generations, not only because of their military superiority, but also because they deployed a sophisticated intelligence system. In an account of the evolution of British intelligence gathering in India, this text shows how networks of Indian spies were recruited by the British to secure information about their subjects. It also examines the social and intellectual origins of these informants, and considers how the colonial authorities interpreted and often misinterpreted the information they supplied. The text argues that it was such misunderstandings which ultimately contributed to the failure of the British to anticipate the mutinies of 1857. It also argues, however, that, even before this, India's complex systems of communication were challenging the political and intellectual dominance of the European rulers.

Intelligence services form an important but controversial part of the modern state. Drawing mainly on British and American examples, this book provides an analytic framework for understanding the "intelligence community" and assessing its value. Michael Herman, a former senior British Intelligence officer, describes the various components of intelligence; discusses what intelligence is for; considers issues of accuracy, evaluation and efficiency; and makes recommendations for the future of intelligence in the post-Cold War world.

Truth to Power, the first-ever history of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC), is told through the reflections of its eight Chairs in the period from the end of the Cold War until 2017. Co-editors Robert Hutchings and Gregory Treverton add a substantial introduction placing the NIC in its historical context going all the way back to the Board of National Estimates in the 1940s, as well as a concluding chapter that highlights key themes and judgments. This historic mission of this remarkable but little-known organization, now almost forty years old, is strategic intelligence assessment in service of senior American foreign policymakers. Its signature inside products, National Intelligence Estimates, are now accompanied by the NIC's every-four-years Global Trends. Unclassified, Global Trends has become a noted NIC brand, its release awaited by officials, academics and private sector managers around the world. Each chapter places its particular period of the NIC's history in context (the global situation, the administration, the intelligence community) and assesses the most important issues with which the NIC grappled during the period, acknowledging failures as well as claiming successes. For example, Hutchings' chapter examines the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the fallout from the ill-fated Iraqi WMD estimate, the debate over intelligence community reform, and the year-long National Intelligence Council 2020 project. With the creation of the Director of National Intelligence in 2005, the NIC's mission mushroomed to include direct intelligence support to the two main policymaking committees in the government: the Principals Committee (cabinet secretaries in the foreign affairs departments) and the Deputies Committee (their deputies or number threes). The mission shift took the NIC directly into the thick of the action but at some cost to its abilities to do strategic thinking: of some 700 NIC papers in 2016, more than half were responses to questions from the National Security Adviser or her deputies, most, though hardly all, of which were current and tactical, not longer-term and strategic.

When, early in 1940, an important Soviet defector provided hints to British Intelligence about spies within the country's institutions, MI5's report was intercepted by a Soviet agent in the Home Office. She alerted her sometime lover, Isaiah Berlin, and Berlin's friend, Guy Burgess, whereupon the pair initiated a rapid counter-attack. Burgess contrived a reason for the two of them to visit the Soviet Union, which was then an ally of Nazi Germany, in order to alert his bosses of the threat and protect the infamous 'Cambridge Spies'. The story of this extraordinary escapade, hitherto ignored by the historians, lies at the heart of a thorough and scholarly expose of MI5's constitutional inability to resist communist infiltration of Britain's corridors of power and its later attempt to cover up its negligence. Guy Burgess's involvement in intelligence during WWII has been conveniently airbrushed out of existence in the official histories and the activities of his collaborator, Isaiah Berlin, disclosed in the latter's letters, have been strangely ignored by historians. Yet Burgess, fortified by the generous view of Marxism emanating from Oxbridge, contrived to effect a change in culture in MI5, whereby the established expert in communist counter-espionage was sidelined and Burgess's cronies were recruited into the Security Service itself. Using the threat of a Nazi Fifth Column as a diversion, Burgess succeeded in minimising the communist threat and placing Red sympathisers elsewhere in government. The outcome of this strategy was far-reaching. When the Soviet Union was invaded by Hitler's troops in June 1941, Churchill declared his support for Stalin in defeating the Nazi aggressor. But British policy-makers had all too quickly forgotten that the Communists would still be an enduring threat when the war was won and appeasement of Hitler was quickly replaced by appeasement of Stalin. Moreover, an indulgence towards communist scientists meant that the atom secrets shared by the US and the UK were betrayed. When this espionage was detected, MI5's officers engaged in an extensive cover-up to conceal their misdeeds. Exploiting recently declassified material and a broad range of historical and biographical sources, Antony Percy reveals that MI5 showed an embarrassing lack of leadership, discipline and tradecraft in its mission of `Defending the Realm'. This book will be of interest to all students of history, international relations, espionage and civil, national and international security.

'Fascinating and powerful.' Sunday Times What do you do with a hundred thousand idle spies? By 1990 the Berlin Wall had fallen and the East German state security service folded. For forty years, they had amassed more than a billion pages in manila files detailing the lives of their citizens. Almost a hundred thousand Stasi employees, many of them experienced officers with access to highly personal information, found themselves unemployed overnight. This is the story of what they did next. Former FBI agent Ralph Hope uses present-day sources and access to Stasi records to track and expose ex-officers working everywhere from the Russian energy sector to the police and even the government department tasked with prosecuting Stasi crimes. He examines why the key players have never been called to account and, in doing so, asks if we have really learned from the past at all. He highlights a man who continued to fight the Stasi for thirty years after the Wall fell, and reveals a truth that many today don't want spoken. The Grey Men comes as an urgent warning from the past at a time when governments the world over are building an unprecedented network of surveillance over their citizens. Ultimately, this is a book about the present.

Known as "the Great War," the world's first truly global conflict is remarkable in what might now be termed modern espionage. World War I was witness to plenty of "firsts." Apart from the contribution made by aerial reconnaissance and the interception of wireless telegraphy, telephone and cable traffic, there was the scientific aspect, with new machines of war, such as the submarine, sea-mine, torpedo, airship, barbed wire, armored tank and mechanized cavalry in a military environment that included mustard gas, static trench warfare, the indiscriminate bombardment of civilian population centers and air-raids. Large-scale sabotage and propaganda, the manipulation of news and of radio broadcasts, and censorship, were all features of a new method of engaging in combat, and some ingenious techniques were developed to exploit the movement of motor and rail transport, and the transmission of wireless signals. The hitherto unknown disciplines of train-watching, bridge-watching, airborne reconnaissance and radio interception would become established as routine collection methods, and their impact on the conflict would prove to be profound. The Historical Dictionary of World War I Intelligence relates this history through a chronology, an introductory essay, an appendix, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 400 hundred cross-referenced entries on intelligence organizations, the spies, and the major cases and events of World War I. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about the world of intelligence in World War I.

John Goldsmith's wartime exploits are all the more remarkable considering that at first his services were consistently refused due to his being over 30. Not easily deterred he eventually became a tank driving instructor in the ranks. In 1942 accidental circumstances saw his recruitment into Buckmaster's F Section of the Special Operations Executive. His faultless French and upbringing in Paris were to prove invaluable. Commissioned overnight and after intensive training he was parachuted into France for the first of his three missions. His adventures included crossing the Pyrenees, sabotage, forming his own circuits, being captured by the Gestapo, a daring escape and black-marketeering. In 1944, now a Major, he was advisor to the Maquis in the Mont Ventoux area where they fought the Germans in pitched battles and won. Although this refreshingly modest account does not admit to it, Goldsmith's extraordinary war is best summed up by his DSO, MC, three Croix de Guerre and Legion d'honneur. Accidental Agent is as thrilling an account of war behind enemy lines as has ever been written.The author's descriptions of his experiences and the many colourful characters he came across are a joy to read.

The Gestapo was the most feared instrument of political terror in the Third Reich, brutally hunting down and destroying anyone it regarded as an enemy of the Nazi regime: socialists, Communists, Jews, homosexuals, and anyone else deemed to be an 'anti-social element'. Its prisons soon became infamous - many of those who disappeared into them were never seen again - and it has been remembered ever since as the sinister epitome of Nazi terror and persecution. But how accurate is it to view the Gestapo as an all-pervasive, all-powerful, all-knowing instrument of terror? How much did it depend upon the cooperation and help of ordinary Germans? And did its networks extend further into the everyday life of German society than most Germans after 1945 ever wanted to admit? Answering all these questions and more, this book uses the very latest research to tell the true story behind this secretive and fearsome institution. Tracing the history of the organization from its origins in the Weimar Republic, through the crimes of the Nazi period, to the fate of former Gestapo officers after World War II, Carsten Dams and Michael Stolle investigate how the Gestapo really worked - and question many of the myths that have long surrounded it.

In 1963, a frustrated President Kennedy turned to the Pentagon for help in carrying out subversive operations against North Vietnam- a job the CIA had not managed to handle effectively. Thus was born the Pentagon's Special Operations Group(SOG). Under the cover name"Studies and Observation Group," SOG would, over the next eight years, dispatch numerous spies to North Vietnam, create a triple-cross deception program, wage psychological warfare by manipulating North Vietnamese POW's and kidnapped citizens, and stage deadly assaults on enemy soldiers traveling the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Written by the country's leading expert on SOG, here is the story of that covert war-one that would have both spectacular and disastrous results.

The Stasi were among the most successful security and intelligence services of the Cold War. Behind the Berlin Wall, colleagues, friends, husbands and wives, informed on each other. Stasi chief, General Mielke, prided himself on this situation. Under Marcus Wolf, Stasi agents were spectacularly successful in gaining entry into the West German Establishment and NATO. Some remain undiscovered. In this book two British experts reveal how the Stasi operated. Based on a wealth of sources, including interviews with former Stasi officers and their victims, the book tells a story of unbridled power, misguided idealism, treachery, widespread opportunism and lonely courage.

Even though the United States was still officially at peace prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it was secretly devising a chain of intelligence-sharing alliances with future allies in the impending war in the Pacific. This work is divided into four sections, which bring together bits and pieces of often isolated details about the intelligence alliance, allowing readers to gain a sense of how it came to exist, how it functioned and what were its limitations, often severe.

Section One discusses the efforts of the Washington, Hawaii and Philippines units in breaking all cryptographic systems used by foreign powers. Section Two covers the roles of Canada and Australia, the secondary powers of the British commonwealth, the Dutch East Indies and China, the secondary independent powers, and other players in the Allied effort. Section Three concentrates on other covert intelligence sharing in London, Hawaii and the Philippines. Section Four ends the text with a discussion of the suppression and their revelation of the role of Great Britain.

In this provocative and thoughtful book, Amy Zegart challenges the conventional belief that national security agencies work reasonably well to serve the national interest as they were designed to do. Using a new institutionalist approach, Zegart asks what forces shaped the initial design of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in ways that meant they were handicapped from birth.
Ironically, she finds that much of the blame can be ascribed to cherished features of American democracy--frequent elections, the separation of powers, majority rule, political compromise--all of which constrain presidential power and give Congress little incentive to create an effective foreign policy system. At the same time, bureaucrats in rival departments had the expertise, the staying power, and the incentives to sabotage the creation of effective competitors, and this is exactly what they did.
Historical evidence suggests that most political players did not consider broad national concerns when they forged the CIA, JCS, and NSC in the late 1940s. Although President Truman aimed to establish a functional foreign policy system, he was stymied by self-interested bureaucrats, legislators, and military leaders. The NSC was established by accident, as a byproduct of political compromise; Navy opposition crippled the JCS from the outset; and the CIA emerged without the statutory authority to fulfill its assigned role thanks to the Navy, War, State, and Justice departments, which fought to protect their own intelligence apparatus.
Not surprisingly, the new security agencies performed poorly as they struggled to overcome their crippled evolution. Only the NSC overcame its initial handicaps as several presidents exploited loopholes in the National Security Act of 1947 to reinvent the NSC staff. The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years--i.e., throughout the Cold War--and the CIA's pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing picture: the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so.

This is a first-hand report by a top German intelligence agent sent to the still-neutral United States in World War I. Official German records, captured by British and American forces at the end of World War II, show the memoirs of the German naval officer to be accurate. Rintelen's orders in Berlin had called for measures to prevent the shipment of American war material to Germany's enemies. In the US, this meant buying arms to keep them from being purchased by the Allies, but it could also mean placing bombs in the hulls of ships sailing for Eurpoe and fomenting strikes among the labour force of American ammunition manufacturers.

Even paranoids have enemies. Hitler's most powerful foes were the Allied powers, but he also feared internal conspiracies bent on overthrowing his malevolent regime. In fact, there was a small but significant internal resistance to the Nazi regime, and it did receive help from the outside world. Through recently declassified intelligence documents, this book reveals for the first time the complete story of America's wartime knowledge about, encouragement of, and secret collaboration with the German resistance to Hitler?including the famous July 20th plot to assassinate the Fuehrer.The U.S. government's secret contacts with the anti-Nazi resistance were conducted by the OSS, the World War II predecessor to the CIA. Highly sensitive intelligence reports recently released by the CIA make it evident that the U.S. government had vast knowledge of what was going on inside the Third Reich. For example, a capitulation offer to the western Allies under consideration by Count von Moltke in 1943 was thoroughly discussed within the U.S. government. And Allen Dulles, who was later to become head of the CIA, was well informed about the legendary plot of July 20th. In fact, these secret reports from inside Germany provide a well-rounded picture of German society, revealing the pro- or anti-Nazi attitudes of different social groups (workers, churches, the military, etc.). The newly released documents also show that scholars in the OSS, many of them recruited from ivy-league universities, looked for anti-Nazi movements and leaders to help create a democratic Germany after the war.Such intelligence gathering was a major task of the OSS. However, OSS director ?Wild Bill? Donovan and others favored subversive operations, spreading disinformation, and issuing propaganda. Unorthodox and often dangerous schemes were developed, including bogus ?resistance newspapers,? anti-Nazi letters and postcards distributed through the German postal service, sabotage, and fake radio broadcasts from ?German generals? calling for uprisings against the regime.This is much more than a documentary collection. Explanatory footnotes supply a wealth of background information for the reader, and a comprehensive introduction puts the documents into their wider historical perspective. Arranged in chronological order, these intelligence reports provide a fascinating new perspective on the story of the German resistance to Hitler and reveal an intriguing and previously unexplored aspect of America's war with Hitler.