"Better to fight for something than live for nothing." - General George S. Patton It is 75 years since the end of WW II and the strange, mysterious death of General George S. Patton, but as in life, Patton sets off a storm of controversy. The Tragedy of Patton: A Soldier's Date With Destiny asks the question: Why was General Patton silenced during his service in World War II? Prevented from receiving needed supplies that would have ended the war nine months earlier, freed the death camps, prevented Russian invasion of the Eastern Bloc, and Stalin's murderous rampage. Why was he fired as General of the Third Army and relegated to a governorship of post-war Bavaria? Who were his enemies? Was he a threat to Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley? And is it possible as some say that the General's freakish collision with an Army truck, on the day before his departure for US, was not really an accident? Or was Patton not only dismissed by his peers, but the victim of an assassin's bullet at their behest? Was his personal silence necessary? General George S. Patton was America's antihero of the Second World War. Robert Orlando explores whether a man of such a flawed character could have been right about his claim that because the Allied troops, some within 200 miles of Berlin, or just outside Prague, were held back from capturing the capitals to let Soviet troops move in, the Cold War was inevitable. Patton said it loudly and often enough that he was relieved of command and silenced. Patton had vowed to "take the gag off" after the war and tell the intimate truth and inner workings about controversial decisions and questionable politics that had cost the lives of his men. Was General Patton volatile, bombastic, self-absorbed, reckless? Yes, but he was also politically astute and a brilliant military strategist who delivered badly needed wins. Questions still abound about Patton's rise and fall. The Tragedy of Patton seeks to answer them.

Tall, handsome, charming Col. Richard Meinertzhagen (1878-1967) was an acclaimed British war hero, a secret agent, and a dean of international ornithology. His exploits inspired three biographies, movies have been based on his life, and a square in Jerusalem is dedicated to his memory. Meinertzhagen was trusted by Winston Churchill, David Lloyd George, Chaim Weizmann, David Ben Gurion, T. E. Lawrence, Elspeth Huxley, and a great many others.He bamboozled them all. Meinertzhagen was a fraud. Many of the adventures recorded in his celebrated diaries were imaginary, including a meeting with Hitler while he had a loaded pistol in his pocket, an attempt to rescue the Russian royal family in 1918, and a shoot-out with Arabs in Haifa when he was seventy years old. True, he was a key player in Middle Eastern events after World War I, and during the 1930s he represented Zionism's interests in negotiations with Germany. But he also set up Nazi front organizations in England, committed a half-century of major and costly scientific fraud, and -- oddly -- may have been innocent of many killings to which he confessed (e.g., the murder of his own polo groom -- a crime of which he cheerfully boasted, although the evidence suggests it never occurred at all). Further, he may have been guilty of at least one homicide of which he professed innocence. A compelling read about a flamboyant rogue, "The Meinertzhagen Mystery" shows how recorded history reflects not what happened, but what we believe happened.

William K. Harvey was the CIA's most daring and successful field operator during the tense, early days of the Cold War. Extremely intelligent, a dedicated martini drinker, coarse in manner and appearance, both loved and hated, he was larger than life. But just as Harvey reached his zenith, fate and personal flaws caused his swift, dramatic downfall. Bayard Stockton provides a rich portrait of the man, including accounts from Harvey's family, friends, and former CIA colleagues who have never spoken publicly before.Harvey's intelligence career began at the FBI, where he hunted Nazi spies. After running afoul of J. Edgar Hoover, Harvey went to the fledgling CIA in 1947. Harvey's CIA successes included the unmasking of Soviet spy Kim Philby and masterminding the famous Berlin Tunnel that tapped Russian communications. The pinnacle of Harvey's career came as chief of both ZR/RIFLE, the agency's political assassination operation, and Task Force W, the group targeted on Cuba. But Harvey was in constant conflict with Bobby Kennedy, who micromanaged operations against Fidel Castro. Harvey profanely insulted the president's brother during a tense meeting, which led to Harvey's reassignment to Rome. His alcoholism worsened in Italian exile, and he was forced to retire. He became a nonperson. However, Harvey resurfaced during Senate hearings in the 1970s. When his supervision of the plots to assassinate Castro was revealed, many labeled Harvey the epitome of CIA excess. Harvey's continuing friendship with Johnny Rosselli, a Mafia figure who had helped the CIA with Cuban operations, opened further questions as some-most notably Robert Blakey, former chief counsel to the House Subcommittee onAssassinations-linked Rosselli to JFK's assassination."Flawed Patriot" cuts through the rumors and inaccuracies surrounding Harvey to show a brilliant but flawed man who was undoubtedly one of the most talented and imaginative officers in the agency's storied history.

Kristian Gustafson's "Hostile Intent" reexamines one of the most controversial chapters in U.S. intelligence history, the Central Intelligence Agency's covert operations in Chile from 1964 to 1974. At the request of successive U.S. presidents, the CIA in conjunction with the State Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency first acted to prevent Chilean socialist Salvador Allende from becoming the democratically elected president of his country and then tried to undermine his government once he was in office. Allende's government eventually fell in a bloody military coup on September 11, 1973. President Richard Nixon's administration and corporate interests were not sorry to see him go, but did U.S. covert operations actually play a decisive role in Allende's downfall? The declassification of thousands of U.S. government documents over the last several years demands that historians take a new look.Since 1973, most observers have maintained that U.S. machinations were responsible for the success of Gen. Augusto Pinochet's coup that forced Allende's fall and suicide. This assessment has been based on a thin documentary record of U.S. activity, the myth of an all-powerful CIA, and the CIA's checkered history of covert action in Latin America. However, Gustafson convincingly shows the conventional wisdom about the impact of U.S. actions is badly flawed. His meticulous research is based upon an intensive examination of previously unavailable U.S. records as well as interviews with key figures. "Hostile Intent" is the most comprehensive account to date of U.S. involvement in Chile, and its provocative reinterpretation of this involvement will shape all future debates.

John F. Sullivan was a polygraph examiner with the CIA for thirty-one years, during which time he conducted more tests than anyone in the history of the CIA's program. The lie detectors act as the Agency's gatekeepers, preventing foreign agents, unsuitable applicants, and employees guilty of misconduct from penetrating or harming the Agency. Here Sullivan describes his methods, emphasizing the importance of psychology and the examiners' skills in a successful polygraph program. Sullivan acknowledges that using the polygraph effectively is an art as much as a science, yet he convincingly argues that it remains a highly reliable screening device, more successful and less costly than the other primary method, background investigation. In the thousands of tests that Sullivan conducted, he discovered double agents, applicants with criminal backgrounds, and employee misconduct, including compromising affairs and the mishandling of classified information. But "Gatekeeper" is more than Sullivan's memoirs. It is also a window to the often acrimonious and sometimes alarming internal politics of the CIA: the turf wars over resources, personnel, and mandate; the slow implementation of quality control; the aversion to risk-taking; and the overzealous pursuit of disqualifying information. In an age when the intelligence community's conduct is rightly being questioned, Sullivan contributes a fascinating personal account of one of the Agency's many important tasks.

As the world prepared for war in the 1930s, the United States discovered that it faced the real threat of foreign spies stealing military and industrial secrets-and that it had no established means to combat them. Into that breach stepped J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI.

Although the FBI's expanded role in World War II has been well documented, few have examined the crucial period before Pearl Harbor when the Bureau's powers secretly expanded to face the developing international emergency. Former FBI agent Raymond Batvinis now tells how the Bureau grew from a small law enforcement unit into America's first organized counterespionage and counterintelligence service. Batvinis examines the FBI's emerging new roles during the two decades leading up to America's entry into World War II to show how it cooperated and competed with other federal agencies. He takes readers behind the scenes, as the State Department and Hoover fought fiercely over the control of counterintelligence, and tells how the agency combined its crime-fighting expertise with its new wiretapping authority to spy on foreign agents.

Based on newly declassified documents and interviews with former agents, Batvinis's account reconstructs and greatly expands our understanding of the FBI's achievements and failures during this period. Among these were the Bureau's mishandling of the 1938 Rumrich/Griebl spy case, which Hoover slyly used to broaden his agency's powers; its cracking of the Duquesne Espionage Case in 1941, which enabled Hoover to boost public and congressional support to new heights; and its failure to understand the value of Soviet agent Walter Krivitsky, which slowed Bureau efforts to combat Soviet espionage in America.

In addition, Batvinis offers a new view of the relationship between the FBI and the military, cites the crucial contributions of British intelligence to the FBI's counterintelligence education, and reveals the agency's ultra-secret role in mining financial records for the Treasury Department. He also reviews the early days of the top-secret Special Intelligence Service, which quietly dispatched FBI agents posing as businessmen to South America to spy on their governments.

With an insider's knowledge and a storyteller's skill, Batvinis provides a page-turning history narrative that greatly revises our views of the FBI--and also resonates powerfully with our own post-9/11 world.

The defection of Igor Gouzenko in September 1945, more so than any other single event, alerted the West to the nature and scale of the Soviet espionage offensive being waged by the Kremlin. Apart from the dozen or so defendants convicted of spying, Gouzenko wrecked an organization that had taken years to develop, exposed the penetration of the Manhattan atomic weapons project, and demonstrated the very close relationship between the Canadian Communist Party and Moscow. Many credit this event as sparking the bitter but secretive struggle fought between the intelligence agencies of the East and West for nearly half a century. The Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence tells the story of both sides' fierce efforts to penetrate and subvert the opponent while desperately trying to avoid a similar fate. Through a chronology, an introduction, appendixes, a bibliography, and hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries on the organizations, operations, events, and personalities that influenced counterintelligence during the Cold War, the world of double agents, spies, and moles is explained in the most comprehensive reference currently available.

Virginia Hall left her comfortable Baltimore roots of privilege in 1931 to follow a dream of becoming a Foreign Service Officer. After watching Hitler roll into Poland, then France, she decided to work for the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), a secret espionage and sabotage organization. She was soon deployed to France where the Gestapo imprisoned, beat, and tortured spies.
Against such an ominous backdrop, Hall managed to locate drop zones for money and weapons, helped escaped POWs and downed Allied airmen flee to England, and secured safe houses for agents. Soon, wanted posters appeared throughout France offering a reward for her capture. By winter of 1942 Hall had to flee France via the only route possible: a hike on foot through the frozen Pyrenees Mountains into neutral Spain.Upon her return to England, the OSS recruited her and sent her back to France disguised as an old peasant woman. While there, she was responsible for killing 150 German soldiers and capturing 500 others, sabotaging communications and transportation links, and directing resistance activities.
This is the true story of Virginia Hall, a remarkable woman ignored by history books for over fifty years.

Ever since the publication in 2004 of the 9/11 Commission Report, the U.S. intelligence community has been in the throes of a convulsive movement for reform. In Preventing Surprise Attacks (2005), Richard A. Posner carried the story of the reform movement up to the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which produced a defective plan for reorganizing the intelligence system, partly as result of the failure of the 9/11 Commission and Congress to bring historical, comparative, and scholarly perspectives to bear issues. At that time, however, the new structure had not yet been built. Posner's new book brings the story up to date. He argues that the decisions about structure that the Administration has made in implementation of the Act are creating too top-heavy, too centralized, an intelligence system. The book * exposes fallacies in criticisms of the performance of the U.S. intelligence services; * analyzes structures and priorities for directing and coordinating U.S. intelligence in the era of global terrorism; * presents new evidence for the need to create a domestic intelligence agency separate from the FBI, and a detailed blueprint for such an agency; * incorporates a wealth of material based on developments since the first book, including the report of the presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction and the botched response to Hurricane Katrina; * exposes the inadequacy of the national security computer networks; * critically examines Congress's performance in the intelligence field, and raises constitutional issues concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President; * emphasizes the importance of reforms that do not require questionable organizational changes. The book is published in cooperation with the Hoover Institution

In the 21st century, more than any other time, US agencies have relied on contractors to conduct core intelligence functions. This book charts the swell of intelligence outsourcing in the context of American political culture and considers what this means for the relationship between the state, its national security apparatus and accountability within a liberal democracy. Through analysis of a series of case studies, recently declassified documents and exclusive interviews with national security experts in the public and private sectors, the book provides an in-depth and illuminating appraisal of the evolving accountability regime for intelligence contractors.

During World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, Richard W. Cutler was an officer with the elite X-2 counterintelligence branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and with its successor, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). "Counterspy" offers a rare firsthand account of the secret war against Hitler and the postwar competition with the Soviets for German intelligence assets.While with X-2, Cutler analyzed the super-secret Ultra intercepts and vetted agents about to be sent into Nazi Germany. Cutler provides an insightful overview of OSS operations during the war and their contribution to the Allies' victory. This is also one of the few books to describe the role of the OSS and the SSU in the postwar occupation of Germany. Cutler's first job after the German surrender was to vet all of Allen Dulles's wartime sources inside Germany, who were aptly nicknamed the Crown Jewels. Just as the OSS was reorganized into the SSU, Cutler moved to Berlin, where his first task was to collect intelligence from former Nazis. Soon he became chief of counterespionage in Berlin. Soviet intelligence had already begun recruiting former German intelligence officers to spy on Americans, so Cutler's top priority was to uncover Soviet objectives and either neutralize or double their agents. Cutler reveals previously unpublished case histories of double agents against Soviet intelligence and details agents' recruitment, missions, methods of operation, successes and failures, and fates. All of these events are recounted against the fascinating background of postwar Germany. He provides a vivid picture of the mood of the German people, how they rationalized war guilt, and how they coped with thedevastation throughout the country. With photographs and a foreword by bestselling author Joseph E. Persico ("Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage"), "Counterspy" is a unique account of espionage during the momentous years of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War.

Given recent experiences with terrorism, clearly even the most democratic societies have a legitimate need for secrecy. This secrecy has often been abused, however, and strong oversight systems are necessary to protect individual liberties. The assembled authors, each well known in the international community of national security scholars, bring together in one volume the rich experience of three decades of experimentation in intelligence accountability. Using a structured approach, they examine the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence systems of Argentina, Canada, Germany, Norway, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While these democracies have experimented with methods to make intelligence more accountable, they all have different political systems, political cultures, legal systems, and democratic traditions, thereby presenting an exceptional opportunity to examine how intelligence accountability evolves under disparate circumstances. The contributors draw together the best practices into a framework for successful approaches to intelligence accountability, including a prescription for a model law.

In literature and film the spy chief is an all-knowing, all-powerful figure who masterfully moves spies into action like pieces on a chessboard. How close to reality is that depiction, and what does it really take to be an effective leader in the world of intelligence? This first volume of Spy Chiefs broadens and deepens our understanding of the role of intelligence leaders in foreign affairs and national security in the United States and United Kingdom from the early 1940s to the present. The figures profiled range from famous spy chiefs such as William Donovan, Richard Helms, and Stewart Menzies to little-known figures such as John Grombach, who ran an intelligence organization so secret that not even President Truman knew of it. The volume tries to answer six questions arising from the spy-chief profiles: how do intelligence leaders operate in different national, institutional, and historical contexts? What role have they played in the conduct of international relations and the making of national security policy? How much power do they possess? What qualities make an effective intelligence leader? How secretive and accountable to the public have they been? Finally, does popular culture (including the media) distort or improve our understanding of them? Many of those profiled in the book served at times of turbulent change, were faced with foreign penetrations of their intelligence service, and wrestled with matters of transparency, accountability to democratically elected overseers, and adherence to the rule of law. This book will appeal to both intelligence specialists and general readers with an interest in the intelligence history of the United States and United Kingdom.

'The minister's nephew recounts an extraordinary life . . . a vivid account' HENRY DE QUETTEVILLE, Telegraph 'Completely absorbing and told with huge compassion, integrity and skill' CAROL ANN LEE, author of The Murders at White House Farm and A Passion For Poison 'What a book. I didn't have to turn the pages. They turned themselves I literally consumed the book in just a few hungry sittings . . . Julian Hayes is perfectly placed to tell this story, particularly it's captivating human side . . . most definitely a must read' DR SALEYHA AHSAN, filmmaker and journalist, Cambridge The shocking story behind the TV drama Stonehouse In November 1974, British MP and former cabinet minister John Stonehouse walked into the sea off a beach in Miami and disappeared, seemingly drowned. Then he was found - on the other side of the world, in Australia - and his extraordinary story began to come to light: a Labour cabinet minister and a devoted family man; also in a long-term affair with his secretary, and a spy for the Czech State Security agency, who had committed fraud and attempted to fake his own death to escape catastrophic business failures. Was it a mental breakdown as he later claimed? Or were there more sinister reasons for his dramatic disappearance? This is the definitive biography of Stonehouse, written by Julian Hayes, who, as the son of Stonehouse's nephew and lawyer, Michael Hayes, is uniquely placed to tell the story of this charismatic but deeply flawed politician. As a criminal lawyer in London, Hayes has used his in-depth knowledge and experience of the criminal courts, not least the Old Bailey, where the Stonehouse trial took place, to forensically examine Stonehouse's story, including Czech defector Josef Frolik's claim that he was a spy. Hayes has unearthed secret reports in the archives in Prague written by Stonehouse's former spymasters. He has also gleaned much from family members and lawyers involved in the trial and from the trial documents and other government papers held in archives in the UK and Australia.

States seldom resort to war to overthrow their adversaries. They are more likely to attempt to covertly change the opposing regime, by assassinating a foreign leader, sponsoring a coup d'etat, meddling in a democratic election, or secretly aiding foreign dissident groups. In Covert Regime Change, Lindsey A. O'Rourke shows us how states really act when trying to overthrow another state. She argues that conventional focus on overt cases misses the basic causes of regime change. O'Rourke provides substantive evidence of types of security interests that drive states to intervene. Offensive operations aim to overthrow a current military rival or break up a rival alliance. Preventive operations seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival alliance, that may make them a future security threat. Hegemonic operations try to maintain a hierarchical relationship between the intervening state and the target government. Despite the prevalence of covert attempts at regime change, most operations fail to remain covert and spark blowback in unanticipated ways. Covert Regime Change assembles an original dataset of all American regime change operations during the Cold War. This fund of information shows the United States was ten times more likely to try covert rather than overt regime change during the Cold War. Her dataset allows O'Rourke to address three foundational questions: What motivates states to attempt foreign regime change? Why do states prefer to conduct these operations covertly rather than overtly? How successful are such missions in achieving their foreign policy goals? -- Cornell University Press

Could the Arab-Israeli conflict have been avoided? Was it possible to achieve peace between Jews and Arabs in Palestine in the 1930s? Rafael Medoff's intriguing study reveals, for the first time, the story of the Fifth Avenue multimillionaires who believed they could bring peace to the Middle East through secret diplomacy and a generous dose of baksheesh (bribery). In documents unearthed from archives on three continents, Medoff has discovered an extraordinary and previously unknown chapter in the history of Middle East diplomacy. Here he brings the story to life. A work of history that reads like a thriller, this book takes the reader from the elite Jewish social clubs of interwar Manhattan to the bustling bazaars of Baghdad, as it sheds fresh light on the Arab-Jewish conflict, the relationship between American Jewry and the Holy Land, and the divisions within the Jewish community over the Palestinian Arab issue.

Cybersecurity expert Theresa Payton tells battlefront stories from the global war being conducted through clicks, swipes, internet access, technical backdoors and massive espionage schemes.  She investigates the cyberwarriors who are planning tomorrow’s attacks, weaving a fascinating yet bone-chilling tale of Artificial Intelligent mutations carrying out attacks without human intervention, “deepfake� videos that look real to the naked eye, and chatbots that beget other chatbots. Finally, Payton offers readers telltale signs that their most fundamental beliefs are being meddled with and actions they can take or demand that corporations and elected officials must take before it is too late. 

'A compelling history of the dark arts of statecraft... Fascinating' Jonathan Rugman 'Rich in anecdote and detail.' The Times Today's world is in flux. Competition between the great powers is back on the agenda and governments around the world are turning to secret statecraft and the hidden hand to navigate these uncertain waters. From poisonings to electoral interference, subversion to cyber sabotage, states increasingly operate in the shadows, while social media has created new avenues for disinformation on a mass scale. This is covert action: perhaps the most sensitive - and controversial - of all state activity. However, for all its supposed secrecy, it has become surprisingly prominent - and it is something that has the power to affect all of us. In an enthralling and urgent narrative packed with real-world examples, Rory Cormac reveals how such activity is shaping the world and argues that understanding why and how states wield these dark arts has never been more important.

During the Cold War, spy stories became popular on both sides of the Iron Curtain, capturing the imaginations of readers and film goers alike as secret police outfits quietly engaged in espionage and surveillance under the shroud of utmost secrecy. Curiously, in the post-Cold War period there are no signs of this enthusiasm diminishing. With the opening of the secret police archives in many countries in Eastern Europe comes the unique chance to excavate many forgotten spy stories and narrate them for the first time. Cold War Spy Stories from Eastern Europe brings together a wide range of Cold War spy stories from the Eastern Bloc and explores stories compiled from the East German Stasi, the Romanian Securitate, and the Ukrainian KGB files. This edited volume also investigates spy narratives told in multimodal forms of communication and representation, that is, stories told through different and distinctive combinations of visual, verbal-aural, musical, textual, and gestural signs. Crafted from a blend of memory, fiction, and forensic evidence from the archived files, these stories offer a rediscovery of curious and enigmatic espionage events. By revisiting some little-known DEFA films and their depictions of the East German spy as opposed to the sleek Western James Bond type, Cold War Spy Stories from Eastern Europe explores old and new tropes in espionage films and television dramas. It concludes with a close reading of the moral ambiguity that is prominent in recent Hollywood spy films such as Bridge of Spies and transatlantic television productions about Cold War Germany such as Deutschland 83, which point to a new aesthetic of surveillance and a new post-ideological depiction of the spy. These stories of collusion and complicity, of betrayal and treason, of right and wrong, and of good and evil call into question Cold War certainties and divides.