Emphatic of the importance of legal thought to the rise and fall of empires, this book highlights the centrality of empires to the development of legal thought. Comprehension of the development of legal thought over time is necessary for any historical, philosophical, practical, or theoretical enquiry into the subject today, it is argued here. When seen against the background of broad geopolitical, diplomatic, administrative, intellectual, religious, and commercial changes, law begins to appear very resilient. It withstands the rise and fall of empires. It provides the framework for the establishment of new orders in the place of the old. Today what analogies, principles, and authorities of law have survived these changes continue to inform much of the international legal tradition. Contributors are: Clifford Ando, Lia Brazil, Joseph Canning, Edward Cavanagh, Zachary Chitwood, Emanuele Conte, Matthew Crow, Alberto Esu, Tiziana Faitini, Dante Fedele, Naveen Kanalu, Alexandre A. Loktionov, P. G. McHugh, Jordan Rudinsky, Mark Somos, Joshua Smeltzer, Lorenzo Veracini, Halcyon Weber, and Sarah Winter.

The open access publication of this book has been published with the support of the Swiss National Science Foundation. By taking an innovative perspective, Gender Equality in the Mirror aims to advance the debate on gender equalities and to engage with the complexities of their practical implications in everyday life. Through the voice of women who are contributing with their life and work to the pursuit of the collective task of inclusion, the volume develops an original analysis of the socio-economic and political dimension of gender parity to frame implementing pathways of aspirational human rights principles. Gender Equality in the Mirror explores these dimensions with the ultimate aim of raising broad awareness of the need to invest in women's empowerment for the construction of our society.

In The Investment Game in Private Equity, Mika Lehtimaki discusses the legal and contractual relationship between investors and managers of private equity funds as well as the economic incentives governing their relationship. Based on this analysis he sets out a game-theoretical framework for evaluating the role of regulation and contract in asset management. He argues that the contractual 'investment game' between the parties, noting their outcome maximisation objective, results in much of the current fund regulation being non-optimal from the investor perspective. This means that the parties are able to control, subject to qualifications relating to the bargaining process, their relationship and the protect their interests contractually instead of resorting to extensive regulation.