"The Constitutional Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of the American People" explores the idea that the Supreme Court should radically revise its general theory of constitutional rights and discusses various aspects of some special theories of constitutional rights in order to ensure a sufficient universe of discourse.

As a former deputy district attorney for Los Angeles County, Guminski gained a wealth of experience in preparing arguments for appellate courts. Based on his experience and careful research, he proposes a persuasive theory that explains why some but not all rights secured against infringement by the United States are also secured against infringement by the states by both the privileges or immunities and the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, adopted in 1868. He examines whether national citizenship before the Civil War was paramount and superior, addresses the procedural and substantive aspects of the due process clause, and recites the reasons supporting his general theory.

In presenting the essentials of his theory about how the Constitution should be judicially construed, Guminski thereby encourages other citizens to express their own opinions about constitutional law with the hope that these views may one day have an impact on the way the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution.

Precedent is an important tool of judicial decision making and reasoning in common law systems such as the United States. Instead of having each court decide cases anew, the rule of precedent or stares decisis dictates that similar cases should be decided similarly. Adherence to precedent promotes several values, including stability, reliability, and uniformity, and it also serves to constrain judicial discretion. Yet while adherence to precedent is important, there are some cases where the United States Supreme Court does not follow it when it comes to constitutional reasoning. Over time the US Supreme Court under its different Chief Justices has approached rejection of its own precedent in different ways and at varying rates of reversal. This book examines the role of constitutional precedent in US Supreme Court reasoning. The author surveys the entire history of the US Supreme Court up until 2020, keying in on decisions regarding when it chose to overturn its own constitutional precedent and why. He explores how the US Supreme Court under its different Chief Justices has approached constitutional precedents and justified its reversal and quantifies which Courts have reversed the most constitutional precedents and why. Constitutional Precedent in US Supreme Court Reasoning is essential reading for law professors and students interested in precedent and its role in legal reasoning. Law libraries which will find this book of importance to their collections on legal reasoning and analysis.

This book covers several areas of economic theory and political philosophy from the perspective of Austrian Economics and libertarianism. As such, it deals with Epistemology and Methodology, Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Labor Economics, International Economics, Political Philosophy, Law and Public Policy, all from the Austro-libertarian perspective. Hence, this book offers an integrated view of libertarianism and Austrian economics in the light of recent debates in the areas of economic science and political philosophy. Moreover, it builds from the foundations of the Austrian approach (epistemology and methodology), while the latter material deals with its application to the individual from the microeconomic perspective, which in turn allows an exploration of subjects in macroeconomics. Additionally, this work applies Austro-libertarianism to law, politics, and public policy. Thus, it offers a unified view of the entire approach, in a logical progression, allowing the readers to judge this perspective in full. Futerman and Block say that their book is not a manual, which I suppose it is not. But it is a collection of highly pertinent essays, from which you can understand what is mistaken in the orthodoxy of economics, law, and politics. The central term of art in Austrian economics is that phrase "human action." It is the exercise of human will, not the blind bumping of one molecule against another or one organism against another, as in the physical sciences... Futerman and Block distinguish Austrian economics as a scientific enterprise based on liberty of the will from "libertarianism" as an advocacy based on policies implied by such liberty. "Although Austrian economics is positive and libertarianism is normative," they write, "this book shows how both are related; how each can support the other." Indeed they do. Deirdre N. McCloskey, PhD UIC Distinguished Professor of Economics and of History Emerita, Professor of English Emerita, Professor of Communication Emerita, University of Illinois at Chicago

This book considers the phenomenon of soft law employed by domestic public authorities. Lawyers have long understood that public authorities are able to issue certain communications in a way that causes them to be treated like law, even though these are neither legislation nor subordinate legislation. Importantly for soft law as a regulatory tool, people tend to treat soft law as binding even though public authorities know that it is not. It follows that soft law's 'binding' effects do not apply equally between the public authority and those to whom it is directed. Consequently, soft law is both highly effective as a means of regulation, and inherently risky for those who are regulated by it. Rather than considering soft law as a form of regulation, this book examines the possible remedies when a public authority breaches its own soft law upon which people have relied, thereby suffering loss. It considers judicial review remedies, modes of compensation which are not based upon a finding of invalidity, namely tort and equity, and 'soft' challenges outside the scope of the courts, such as through the Ombudsman or by seeking an ex gratia payment.