Books > Business & Economics > Economics > Economic theory & philosophy
|
Buy Now
Strategic Social Choice - Stable Representations of Constitutions (Paperback, 2010 ed.)
Loot Price: R3,070
Discovery Miles 30 700
|
|
Strategic Social Choice - Stable Representations of Constitutions (Paperback, 2010 ed.)
Series: Studies in Choice and Welfare
Expected to ship within 10 - 15 working days
|
This book was written mainly during the Spring periods of 2008 and
2009, when the ?rst author was visiting Maastricht University.
Financial s- port both from the Dutch Science Foundation NWO
(grants 040. 11. 013 and 0. 40. 11. 082) and from the research
institute METEOR (Maastricht Univ- sity) is gratefully
acknowledged. Jerusalem Bezalel Peleg Maastricht Hans Peters April
2010 v Contents Preview to this book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Part I
Representations of constitutions 1 Introduction to Part I. . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.
1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 3 1. 2 Arrow's constitution. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. 3 Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem and its implications. . . . . . . . . 4 1. 4
Ga ]rdenfors's model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. 5 Notes and comments. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2
Constitutions, e?ectivity functions, and game forms . . . . . . 7
2. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. 2 Constitutions . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.
3 Constitutions and e?ectivity functions . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 12 2. 4 Game forms and a representation theorem. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2. 5 Representation and simultaneous
exercising of rights. . . . . . . . 19 2. 6 Notes and comments. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19 3 Nash consistent representations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. 2 Existence
of Nash consistent representations: a general result 22 3. 3 The
case of ?nitely many alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 24 3. 4 Nash consistent representations of topological
e?ectivity functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3. 5 Veto functions
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 34 3. 5. 1 Finitely many alternatives. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3. 5. 2 Topological veto
functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3. 6
Liberalism and Pareto optimality of Nash equilibria. . . . . . . .
. 40 3. 7 Notes and comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 vii viii Contents 4 Acceptable
representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . 45 4. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ."
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
|
|
Email address subscribed successfully.
A activation email has been sent to you.
Please click the link in that email to activate your subscription.