This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world
is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that
inhabit our world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all
the worlds. Lewis argues that the philosophical utility of modal
realism is a good reason for believing that it is true.
After putting forward the type of modal realism he favors, Lewis
answers numerous objections that have been raised against it. These
include an insistence that everything must be actual; paradoxes
akin to those that confront naive set theory; arguments that modal
realism leads to inductive skepticism, or to disregard for prudence
and morality; and finally, sheer incredulity at a theory that
disagrees so badly with common opinion. Lewis grants the weight of
the last objection, but takes it to be outweighed by the benefits
to systematic theory that acceptance of modal realism brings. He
asks whether these same benefits might be gained more cheaply if we
replace his many worlds by many merely 'abstract' representations;
but concludes that all versions of this 'ersatz modal realism' are
in serious trouble. In the final chapter, Lewis distinguishes
various questions about trans-world identity, and argues that his
'method of counterparts' is preferable to alternative
approaches.
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