It is widely held that private ownership is the preferred end
state for all scarce resources. Those who hold this view have not
looked closely enough at water in the American West, Barbanell
contends. Because of water's special attributes, private ownership
is an ineffective means for protecting individuals interests.
Splitting the various rights of ownership between individual
resources users and the community to which they belong can better
protect those interests. Barbanell develops a conception of this
form of common ownership, a common-property arrangement, and shows
that it can function effectively for water in the West. More
generally, he offers an expanded framework for analyzing right
relationships and examining problems related to resource
scarcity.
Some economists argue that John Locke's account of property
justifies the private ownership of water in the West. Barbanell
argues, however, that because Locke did not think carefully enough
about the variable nature of resources, his account does not
support that conclusion. Although economists recognize that private
ownership may not be perfectly suited to all resources, they are
nonetheless skeptical about common ownership alternatives.
Barbanell shows that this skepticism is unwarranted. When the
rights relationship among members of a resource community is based
on mutual expectations of reciprocal behavior, then a
common-property arrangement can function effectively to control the
degradation and depletion of a scarce resource. Barbanell's
argument that common ownership is a conceptually sound and
politically viable alternative for water will be of particular
interest to public policy makers, environmentalists, resource
economists, and political philosophers.
General
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