How can we explain our capacity to think about particulars in our
external environment? Many philosophers have answered this question
in terms of a sophisticated conception of space and time and the
movement of objects therein. A more recent reaction against this
view sought to explain this capacity solely in terms of perceptual
mechanisms of object individuation. Neither explanation remains
fully satisfactory. This book argues for a more desirable middle
ground in terms of a pragmatist approach to demonstrative thought,
where this capacity is explained through graded practical knowledge
of objects. This view allows us to do justice to important insights
put forward by both positions criticized in the book, while
avoiding their potential shortcomings. It also paves the way to a
more pragmatist approach to the theory of mental representation,
where the notion of practical knowledge is allowed to play a
central role in our cognitive life. Finally, it shows how practical
knowledge may be firmly rooted in neurobiological processes and
mechanisms that conform to what the empirical sciences tell us
about the mind.
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