Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify
changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the
belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of
which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then
addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available
to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is
proposed, which rejects the conventional view that a propositional
attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a
linguistic entity or some other intentional object such as a
proposition or set of possible worlds. The last two chapters offer
an account of change in states of full belief understood as changes
in commitments rather than changes in performance; one chapter
deals with adding new information to a belief state, the other with
giving up information. The book builds upon topics discussed in
some of Levi's earlier work. It will be of particular interest to
discussion theorists, epistemologists, philosophers of science,
computer scientists, and cognitive psychologists.
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