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Intelligence and the State - Analysts and Decision Makers (Hardcover)
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Intelligence and the State - Analysts and Decision Makers (Hardcover)
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In the eighty years since Pearl Harbor, the United States has
developed a professional intelligence community that is far more
effective than most people acknowledge--in part because only
intelligence failures see the light of day, while successful
collection and analysis remain secret for decades. Intelligence and
the State explores the relationship between the community tasked to
research and assess intelligence and the national decision makers
it serves. The book argues that in order to accept intelligence as
a profession, it must be viewed as a non-partisan resource to
assist key players in understanding foreign societies and leaders.
Those who review these classified findings are sometimes so
invested in their preferred policy outcomes that they refuse to
accept information that conflicts with preconceived notions. Rather
than demanding that intelligence evaluations conform to
administration policies, a wise executive should welcome a source
of information that has not "drunk the Kool-Aid" by supporting a
specific policy decision. Jonathan M. House offers a brief overview
of the nature of national intelligence, and especially of the
potential for misperception and misunderstanding on the part of
executives and analysts. Furthermore, House examines the rise of
intelligence organizations first in Europe and then in the United
States. In those regions fear of domestic subversion and radicalism
drove the need for foreign surveillance. This perception of a
domestic threat tempted policy makers and intelligence officers
alike to engage in covert action and other policy-based, partisan
activities that colored their understanding of their adversaries.
Such biases go far to explain the inability of Nazi Germany and the
Soviet Union to predict and deal effectively with their opponents.
The development of American agencies and their efforts differed to
some degree from these European precedents but experienced some of
the same problems as the Europeans, especially during the early
decades of the Cold War. By now, however, the intelligence
community has become a stable and effective part of the national
security structure. House concludes with a historical examination
of familiar instances in which intelligence allegedly failed to
warn national leaders of looming attacks, ranging from the 1941
German invasion of the USSR to the Arab surprise attack on Israel
in 1973.
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