This book takes a new approach to the debate on causal pluralism in
the philosophy of biology by asking how useful pluralism is instead
of debating its truth. The core thesis in this work is that many
problems do not hinge on the question of whether or not we
subscribe to causal pluralism. As one step in this central
argument, the author develops an account that reasonably
distinguishes pluralism from monism; in another step he studies
cases that allegedly motivate causal pluralism in biology.
Examining these cases shows how pluralism is often irrelevant and
why pursuing pluralism is sometimes dangerous, since it may
generate pseudo solutions to persistent philosophical problems.
This book offers a systematic approach to this subject matter and
argues that we might have overestimated the significance of the
monism-pluralism distinction and at the same time failed to see the
risks of pursuing causal pluralism.
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