Originally published in 1990. This study was first written in 1965
when interest in Leibniz was intensifying. The book looks in detail
at the doctrine of necessity - that necessary truths are those
derivable from the principle of identity by the substitution of
definitions. It first considers views of philosophic predecessors,
relating Leibniz' doctrine to Aristotle and Hobbes among others.
The second section examines the conflict between his reductionistic
and formalistic views and the opposing intuitionism and
anti-reductionism of Descartes and Locke. The author critically
examines the theory of necessity, including Leibniz's arguments
against the views of Hobbes and Locke, concluding with distinctions
between necessary and contingent truths.
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