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Moral Fictionalism (Hardcover)
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Moral Fictionalism (Hardcover)
Series: Lines of Thought
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Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject
matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is
representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions -
propositions that attribute moral properties to things.
Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery
associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our
noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively
moral subject matter is regarded as something to be debunked by
philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and
makes public our noncognitive attitudes. The realist fiction might
be understood as a philosophical misconception of a discourse that
is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather
practical. There is, however, another way to understand the realist
fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that
stands in no need of debunking, but is rather the means by which
our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral
propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in accepting a
moral sentence competent speakers do not believe the moral
proposition expressed but rather adopt the relevant non-cognitive
attitudes. Noncognitivism, in its primary sense, is a claim about
moral acceptance: the acceptance of a moral sentence is not moral
belief but is some other attitude. Standardly, non-cognitivism has
been linked to non-factualism - the claim that the content of a
moral sentence does not consist in its expressing a moral
proposition. Indeed, the terms 'noncognitivism' and 'nonfactualism'
have been used interchangeably. But this misses an important
possibility, since moral content may be representational but the
acceptance of moral sentences might not be belief in the moral
proposition expressed. This possibility constitutes a novel form of
noncognitivism, moral fictionalism. Whereas nonfactualists seek to
debunk the realist fiction of a moral subject matter, the moral
fictionalist claims that that fiction stands in no need of
debunking but is the means by which the noncognitive attitudes
involved in moral acceptance are conveyed by moral utterance. Moral
fictionalism is noncognitivism without a non-representational
semantics.
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